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ABSTRACT
THE FAMILY AND AMBIGUITY:
THE POLITICS OF ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS
OF SELF AND
SOCIETY

FEBRUARY 1990

PHILIP

T.

NEISSER, B.A.
POTSDAM COLLEGE OF ARTS
AND SCIENCE, SUNY
,

M.A., GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by Professor Jean Bethke Elshtain

In this work

I

argue on the one hand that the modern

family of the west deserves criticism for its role in the

persistence of unmet need, of hurtful and unnecessary
inequality, and of a harmful management, denial and

denigration of difference.

On the other hand,

I

also

argue that the modern family deserves some defending, both
for its role in creating us as people for whom the

legitimacy of our order can be an issue, and because it is
a locus of
I

much that people experience as worthwhile.

am concerned in this work not only with the ambiguity

of the modern family, but also with the general problem

posed by ambiguity and affirmation.

I

approach this issue

from the point of view on an "ontology of discordance."
By this view, each way of constructing a self (and so any

possible way of forming society) necessarily involves
exclusion and loss, and perhaps means denial and

vii

denigration as well.

I

do not think, however, that this

fact is necessarily any cause
for "pessimism," as there
are still grounds on which to
defend social order as an
achievement.
In particular the fact of
discordance calls
on us to create forms of order
which acknowledge their own
impositional quality. This means that we
must create

greater institutional space for unmanaged
difference.
Along these lines, I affirm the importance,
in modern
conditions, of maintaining a category of
'
"family,

this term

I

but by

mean only a relation whereby child care and

household are accorded some distance from the
state and
from the "public" realm.
The point is that we
should

avoid detailing what constitutes

a

"family" and instead

provide vastly increased across the board support for

multiple forms of householding.

in particular we need to

support all the individuals who care for and protect
chi ldren.

My conclusion is that under modern conditions this kind
of minimalist defense of family best serves the causes of

equality for women, space for difference, and the end of
the imposition of social class.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

in this work

hand

I

defend two related claims.

On the one

argue that the modern family of
the west deserves
criticism for its role in the
persistence of unmet need,
of hurtful and unnecessary
inequality, and of a harmful
management, denial and denigration of
difference. These
crimes are systematic features of modern
order, and
today's family is both directly and
indirectly part of
their perpetration; it serves as one of
modern society's
mechanisms of provision, division, and management,
I

and it

also helps to provide legitimacy to the social
order which
deploys these mechanisms. On the other hand,
I also argue
that the modern family deserves some defending,
first of
all for its role in creating us as people for
whom the

legitimacy of our order can be an issue, and second of all
because it is a locus of much that people experience as

worthwhile or even deeply satisfying.

In sum, both the

modern family form and the modernity of which it is

a part

are profoundly ambiguous in their implications and
effects.

They are deserving of criticism at the most

basic level, in that they do
harm by virtue of
characteristics that are central to
what they are, but
they also stand as real achievements,
worthy of being
defended as such.

Neither of these claims are new,
but
important to make them together,

I

think it

and so in this work

I try
to delineate some of the ways that
the modern family plays
its ambiguous role.
This is not, however, the only goal
that shapes the following pages.
I also have been

motivated by a concern to confront an issue
raised by
ambiguity in general; this is the problem
of how in the
first place it is possible to make any
affirmations

~

defend, celebrate or recommend anything

if what is

"good" can (even from the same point of view)
at the same

time be seen to be "bad."

I

believe not only that this is

possible, but that it is desirable, even essential.

We

(if I can be rude and ethnocentric and use this
pronoun to

personalize the culture of the west which so dominates the

world today) need both to make affirmations despite
ambiguity and to affirm ambiguity even as we make other
affirmations.

This claim is also not new, but

I

hope in this work to

add to the discussion of just what is involved and at

stake in affirming ambiguity (and to be newly persuasive)
by virtue of the way

I

connect these issues to the

particular institution of the modern family.

Many of us

experience the ambiguities of
life very powerfully in
our
families, and at the same time
the institution of the
family is implicated in some of
our modes of denying
ambiguity.
This means that the family is
implicated in
some important forms of power.
The discussion
of family,

then, can

(I

believe) provide evidence both of
the

importance of acknowledging ambiguity
and of the very
existence of that ambiguity.
In this introduction

provisionally) what

I

I

do four things:

I

explain (very

mean by "the modern family,"

summarize my overall argument,

I

explain what

do in each of the chapters that follow,
and

I

I

i

set out to

point out

some of the limitations of this effort.

Today 's Family

Today's "family" exists in at least two ways

—

it is a

social and economic institution, and it is an image
that
circulates.

While the ideal of family is far from the norm, as a set
of assumptions it forms the basis of a host of features of

our society: wage levels, taxes, custody rulings,
benefits, names, etc.

A particular form of household is

enforced as the most successful means available of pooling
resources, avoiding isolation and loneliness, ensuring the

ability of parents and children to stay together, and
avoiding invasive regulatory intervention.

The same assumptions that
structure our options in these
tangible ways also operate on us
as assumptions.
There
are of course a great variety
of views
both academic
and personal
regarding the meaning of "family, "
and the
differences between them are important,
but there is
nonetheless enough commonality among
them to speak of a
single ideal of the family as predominant
in the west.
"The family" as an image stands at the
very least for
harmony, intimacy, stability, and mature
responsibility,
and it also incorporates (somewhat shifting)
assumptions
about gender roles, gender identity, class
aspirations,

-

-

personal aspirations, and political involvement.

Argument #1: T he Modern Family and Power
One aspect of the modern family's connection to
power
is fairly straightforward.

The modern family is

implicated in "oppression."

Oppressive power denies or prohibits, and the

structuring of our society around a certain form of family
helps deny the provision of needs to many.

The family is

placed in charge of meeting certain needs, but even
"model" families cannot meet these needs and many people

don't live in model families.

Many needs that the family

fails to address or addresses inadequately go largely
unmet, and for many people in the bottom half of our

socio-economic strata this means a good deal of privation.

specifically, many people in
modern societies lack
economic and emotional security,
protection from abuse and
options to abusive relationships,
a place they can call
home, and adequate nutrition,
medicinal care and
education.

Oppression of this sort exists
alongside the continuing
legitimacy of the institutions that
are party to it,
including the family. This legitimacy
can be accounted
for partly by reference to another
aspect power not easily
captured by the idea of "oppression."
it is also poorly
rendered by the concept of "ideology,"
although
it does

have to do with the way outlooks,
judgments, and goals are
produced.
This power concerns not so much the denial
of
need as the way people's "needs" are constituted.
This
form of power can be (and has been) called
"normalization"
or "subjugation."

Normalization works, first, by classing some people as
below the threshold of normality and then subjecting

them

to different treatment

—

that received by others.

aid, therapy, regulation

—

than

It works second by encouraging

those above the threshold to interpret their internal
murmuring, resistance, or disquietude as signs of their

chances of falling into abnormality and deviance, of
losing that integrated status that makes them qualify as

people with rights and interests.

To be deployed around a

norm is to be pressured to
fit in and
tix.
anH to ~
i
police
oneself so
that one fits in.
•

Normalization is at work when
welfare recipients are
classed as immoral or lazy,
when poverty is explained
as
the result of bad family
ways, and perhaps when many
in
the United States blame the
Soviet Union for modern
tendencies of centralization and
social management.

m

each case the classifiers are
constructing themselves and
the world so that they can view
themselves as
free and as

ethical (they earn what's theirs,
they contribute to a
free system of government, they
resist temptations), and
in each case the categories can
operate to make people
police themselves (construct themselves
as productive, as
members of good families, as ready to be
mobilized against
"socialist tendencies").

Normalization differs from oppression in that
it doesn't
imply so easily an opposite called "liberation."
To be

pressured to become and remain within the normal
is
different than to be held down and forbidden from
something.

In fact, a commitment to liberation can play a

role in enhancing or maintaining effects of normalization,
and this is true regardless of whether freedom is seen as
the exercise of rights by those qualified or,

alternatively, as self-realization through integrative

participation in a radical or alternative community.

The

taming of normalization requires slack, or space, in the

order; not si.ply an alternative
to the prevailing vision
of the good life.

Argument #?; The FamiTy ao Worth

While the modern family is
implicated in onerous forms
of power, the tremendous
appeal of the family idea cannot
be adequately explained by
reference to effects of
normalization, any more than it can
be explained by
reference to the powerful interests
sometimes served by
this appeal. This is where the second
part of my argument
comes in. The modern family has a
basis in human nature
and in the human condition (as we shall
see, to
call

something "natural" is neither to give that
something an
automatic grant of legitimacy nor to make an
uncontestable
claim).
Because of this, and because order
is not

entirely successful at appropriating and putting
to use
this human nature, the reality of family experience

cannot

be reduced to a prop of order.

It is more than that.

Our

order, similarly, is more than mere order; it is not

entirely unredeemable.

The disciplining of the modern

self is costly and deserves critique, but should not be

simply dispensed with.

What is the "natural basis" of today's family form?
be human is,

it seems,

To

to be embodied, finite, reflective

(in various ways and degrees), dependent for existence on

some sort of pattern of social relations, and formed as

a

self by virtue of participation
in some set of moral,
rather than merely utilitarian,
allegiances.
if for the
moment we understand by the
term "family" simply the
marking of kin ties, however
done, family is an apparently
universal response to these features
of human life.
To
put it another way, humans have
so far as we can tell
invariably used the category of the
biological to help
make concrete distinctions amongst
each other
to posit
specific obligations, and to recognize
specific shared
memories and experiences.

-

That something is natural does not mean
it presents no
problems; it does suggest that it may be
hard to dispense
with or dispensed with only at great cost.
I think that
some kind of valorization of specific personal
ties
between generations deserves defending because of
the way
it serves to create selves as caring and
moral.
The

recognition and experience of involuntary ties to specific
others, to the past, and to the future, serve as a
means
to "ground" caring

—

as a means to make the experience of

caring for others an aspect of identity, rather than

dependent on a merely voluntary concordance of feelings.
It can be looked at this way: the fact of personal ties

to past and future gives us each a story, and it is by

thinking of ourselves as a part of a narrative that we
each come to have an identity
as an "I."

—

to come to see ourselves

But here's the ambiguity again.

Such ties are

"tangible" not only in the real
existence of parents and
children but also in the ways
that the raising of
children
binds people to the specific
future that their social
institutions are pointed towards.
fact, out
tenuousness and our ambivalence
towards the

m

ideal of

family is rooted not only in
the structures of mobility
that undermine actual families
and not only in the
recognition that we sometimes have
of the losses that
families impose on us, but also
in the doubts many of us
have in the worth of the specific
future we are building.

The ChaptPrg
In chapter one

I

present the interpretation of modern

western culture and institutions in which

I

situate my

discussion of the politics of the contemporary
family.
This interpretation is composed of two
claims.
The

first

is that modern western social orders
(and increasingly

this means the global order they command
and depend on)
are sustained by heavily enforced but nonetheless
fragile

assumptions of the possibility of concord, or harmony,
inside the self and between the self and its world.

mode of order has its benefits, but,

I

argue,

This

it exacts

heavy costs as well.
The second claim is that our problems of order, self,
and freedom can be best understood from a point of view

which has been dubbed "the ontology of discordance."

10

According to this view
-Lew mere
there can
r^r, k~
be ~
no concord of self and
world, as each way of
constructing a
self has as a

byproduct the creation of
particular
And according to this view it

forxns of

disharmony.

is at least possible to

conceive of forms of order which
acknowledge such
disharmony.
Such order could be, the
argument continues,
less oppressive and normalizing.
The ontology of
discordance thus offers a vision of
life as thoroughly
politicized and a vision of democracy
as the appropriate
mode of living together given this
fact.
In chapter two

discuss the role of the institution
of
family in the modern order. Specifically,
I discuss
I

the

ways this institution participates in
oppression and
normalization.
I focus on the way assumptions
of

concordance embedded in our familial discourse
and
practice play a role in these forms of power.
While I am
in this discussion especially concerned
with criticizing
today's family, both as institution and image,
I

nevertheless end up defending it as well, as the power
of
the family to do harm stems in part from the good that
it

offers.
I

put off this issue of the modern family as achievement

until chapter four, and in chapter three

buttress the case

I

I

attempt to

have made in chapter two by showing

that assumptions of concordance, and so normalizing

implications, are indeed built
into much of today's
discourse on family.
in chapter four

return to the philosophy
of
discordance, first by discussing
some views
I

of the modern

family which assume discordance
rather than concordance,
but which do so in accordance
with the assumptions of
psychoanalytic theory, rather than
the more genealogical
approach I rely on in chapter two.
I argue that the
psychoanalytic tradition, while offering
important
insight, tends to lead to the
undue valorization of the
concept of -personality," at the
expense of the apparently

extra-familial spheres of political
culture, political
history, and occupational structure.
Moreover, when the
latter are given their proper due the
psychological

evidence appears inconclusive with regard
to the question
of what is to be done.
The psychological approach points
us toward the question of the "right"
mode of family, and
this, I argue, does more harm than good.
I

offer instead a "minimalist" defense of family.

By

this view "family" should be held to signify
not so much

particular form of child care or household as instead

a

relation whereby child care and household are accorded
some distance from the state and from the "public" realm

where everything is considered equally everyone's
business.

This does not mean that "the private" is not

political; it is.

The point is to insist on the

a

12

maintenance of an institutionalized
distinction between
the public and the private,
even as the nature
of this

distinction is rightly a matter
vigorous debate. The
point is also that we should avoid
detailing what
constitutes a family and instead
provide vastly increased
across the board support for all the
individuals who
care

for and protect children.

Conclusion, Limitation s, and Qual ifications

The central limitation of this work stems
from its broad
range.
It is quite likely that each of the
many claims I
make are better made elsewhere. The point,
again,

make them together.

is to

For example, today's image of family

as the seat of intimacy, the only possible
"home" for

harmony, and the proper locus of personal commitment
is

more hurtful to women than it is to men (even as it hurts
us all in some ways)

this work

I

.

This is a grave injustice, but in

am not so much concerned with demonstrating

this as with asserting that its persistence is linked to

assumptions of concord that are widely held, linked to
"the family," but highly problematic.

trouble making clear just

I

what

I

I

have enough

mean by this without

also trying to "prove" or even exhaustively delineate the

other claims

I

merely assert or rely on.

Because of my

focus, this work might not qualify as "feminist" in the

strongest sense of the word.

I

want to say, however, that

13

it not only is rooted in
a feminist commitment
but is also
entirely dependent on the prior
existence of

the feminist

movement and feminist political
thought.
feminism, this book could not
exist.

I

Without
am especially

concerned to say this because
feminist theory, like other
forms of theory, often relies on
assumptions of
concordance, and I use some of the
pages in this text
calling attention to this and labelling
it a
problem.

To summarize again my overall
purpose,

I

am concerned in

this work to show how the ambivalent
import of family is,
like the ambivalent import of our ideas
of legitimacy,
typically lost in our discourse, theoretical
and
otherwise.

This is,

I

argue, because of the dominance

(and institutionalization) of a philosophy
of concordance.
I

want to make the case that the modern private
family

should be evaluated from the point of view of discordance.
We should, in other words, do a kind of "cost-benefit

analysis" at the level of the self.

My particular version of this evaluation leads to this
conclusion: today's family is thoroughly bound up with

a

kind of enabling that is particularly disabling when it
comes to political change.

This is partly because of its

location within a civilization built around the pursuit of
growth, affluence, and concordance.

On the other hand

this criticism should be tempered by the recognition that

we will need something like today's family if we are to

14

strive towards a less normalizing
and oppressive order,
if, in other words, we
are to develop individual
empowerment, slack in the order,
space for difference, and
(a condition of many other
goals) a political movement
to
tame growth imperatives.

This historical possibility does
not require a complete
overthrow of modern traditions; instead
it would mean a
kind of wholesale shift, a rearrangement
of elements to
accommodate the loosening of growth
imperatives and the
cultural acknowledgment of the inevitability
of

arbitrariness and injustice in any social
form.

The most

complete change might not be noticed as such:
this would
be a transformed understanding of politics.
The politics
of the self would come to be an issue.
And so
the social

policing of families would, without necessarily coming
to
ar end, be referred to by some metaphor which
expressed

its impositional and political character,

it would be

contested.

This argument is,

I

think, likely to appeal mostly to

those who already wonder at the legitimacy enjoyed by

modern orders, and who have perhaps thus far dealt with
this problem by expressing disappointment in the working
class, crediting "ideological" machinery as too powerful

to overcome, seeing structural obstacles to change as all-

encompassing, or placing their hopes in an impending

immiseration and collapse of legitimacy.

In fact our

investment in the current
order is founded in reason,
fraught with ambiguity,
enforced by various imperatives
and disciplines, and subject
to change.

CHAPTER

2

THE ONTOLOGY OF DISCORDANCE

in this chapter

present the interpretation
of modern
western culture and institutions
in which I situate
I

my

discussion of the politics of the
contemporary family.
The argument is that modern
western social orders (and
increasingly this means the global
order they command and
depend on) are sustained by heavily
enforced but
nonetheless fragile assumptions of the
possibility of
concord, or harmony, inside the self
and between the self
and its world.
This mode of order
has its benefits, but

it exacts heavy costs as well.

It is probably inevitable that
humans will deal with

life's ambiguities and finitude by creating
compensatory

philosophies of concordance.
words,

"homesick animals."

People are, in Nietzsche's

Modernity, however, has its

own special version of concordance, with the
subject at
its center.

The modern order is perhaps unigue in the

degree to which it relies on, and produces, the pursuit
of
concord, rather than a less demanding and less aggressive

assumption of concord.

God no longer guarantees that we

are at home; instead home
seems to lie at the
point whe re
we have created conditions
of existence for
ourselve s
which we endorse upon
reflection.

This idea of legitimacy is
responsible for some very
real and important
achievements, but it has a
"normalizing" or subjugating
element built into it; and
this emerges powerfully in
the context of the modern
economic order. Modern legitimacy
has this repressive
potential because it lacks an
appreciation of the "dirt"
and ambiguity lodged in any
ideal.
And this
is

particularly a problem because our
world (not
coincidentally) is increasingly a
single order requiring
extensive social management and
governed by demanding
imperatives.
in this situation, the aggressive
quest for
legitimacy all too easily turns inward;
people tend to
define themselves so they can see
themselves as free (and
the order as legitimate) within the
existing constraints.
And numerous institutions, practices
and linguistic

distinctions support this process.
To put it another way, the pursuit of concord
is

implicated in forces of social control.

The conventions

required for the order to function become norms,
people
are encouraged or impelled to produce themselves
in

accordance with those norms, and room for the
unpredictable, the eccentric, the new, the reborn, the

18
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rebellious, or si»ply th .
different, is squeezed
response to this we need
„ore than rights. „ e
need to
ta me the Operatives of
the order and introduoe
a healthy
suspicion of our categories.

^

explain this notion of the
modern order in the pages
ahead, and then go on in the
following chapters to argue
that the modern institution
of family plays a pivotal,
and
ambiguous, role in the processes
of the reproduction of
that order. The modern family
is on the one hand the
locus of much of the best of our
modern world, while on
the other hand it a central means
of the maintenance of
much of the worst. The ambiguous
import that family has
for most of us is in a way an
analogue
I

for,

or a

representation of, the ambiguous import of
modernity
itself.
First, however, a word about theory.

I

formulate my

position with the help of assumptions about
the self and
the world which are in keeping with what
William Connolly
calls an "ontology of discordance."

I

begin, in other

words, with assumptions of disharmony, rather
than

concord.

1

This is akin to what is often called

a

See Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity (The University of
Wisconsin Press, 1987), esp. pp. 9-16, and also Jane
Bennett, who speaks of "fractious holism." Unthinking
Faith and Enlig htenment: Nature and the State in a PostHegelian Era (New York University Press, 1987), pp. 149-
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"genealogical" approach.

As „ iohael

shapiro explains
"Genealogy views every for*
of life as producing its
hu ma n
identities and systems of value
in a struggle with other
possible forms of life." 2
in my view this perspective
is invaluable in coming
to

terms with the meaning and
effects of the modern
institution of family. On the
other hand I also think
that the more traditional
questions of political theory
specifically questions of human
nature and human needs
must also be given at least
provisional and situated
answers if the modern family is to
be understood.
Kin
demarcations and kin loyalties speak to
some of the
deepest needs of human beings. The trick
is to make one's
affirmations, as well as one's critique
(concerning human
nature and human needs) consistent with
assumptions

-

of

,

disharmony.

This "trick- is of course necessary to
make

my position on the family hold together,
but, more
importantly, it is also essential in the process
of

building any politics of social change which stands
a
chance of allowing for a less controlling, less

demanding,

less "productive" form of order.

conviction.

This, at least,

is my

This work is, therefore, not just about the

family and politics; it is about theory as well.

A theory

2

"Politicizing Ulysses," Political Theory Vol. 17,
(February 1989), p. 22.

N.

1

.

20

of ambiguity can tell us
about the modern family,
and
today's politics of family
can tell us about the need
to
acknowledge ambiguity in theory.

Ontologies nf

rv^„ r^

An ontology is a point of view,
or theory, that speaks
to the nature of being in
some way. A social ontology
is
a set of understandings
concerning the nature of human
being and its relation to the
world.
Modern political
theories, says Connolly, are, for
the most
part, alike in

that each

gravitates toward an ontology of concord.
That is
U
S
P r °P erl y constituted and
2iSa?S ?S
situated
the individual or collective
achieves harmony with itself and with subiect
the other
elements of social life. 3

'

Theories which are alike in assuming concord
can
otherwise be very different. One way to assume
concord is
to privilege the individual subject as an
essence. 4
Some

theories instead privilege the community as the
medium

through which individuals can situate and realize
their
essence.

The individualist theories currently enjoy

political ascendancy compared to the more collectivistic
ones, and the former are also (typically) more celebratory

3

Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity p. 10.
To cite a contemporary example, see John Rawls, A Theory
of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1971)
,
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(rather than critical) of
contemporary western social,
economic, and political
arrangements. These differences
are certainly of great
political import. On the other
hand, their shared assumption
of concord is also

important.

They are all based, to use
Connolly's words,
on "the principle of a subject
realizing its essence in a
larger world. -5 They are, that
is, based on an ontology
of concord. 6
What, more precisely,
is so widely shared?

is the assumption of concord
that

it is,

in brief, the assumption that

the world and the self are constructed
such that there is
(or could be) a "common good"
consistent with the nature
of the actual or potential self.
One version of this
assumption holds that there is such a thing,
at least

potentially, as a self which is at "home" in
the world.
To be at home is to occupy "a place of
meaning
in a

meaningful world," says Jane Bennett, just as to

experience disharmony between the self and its world
as

problem to be overcome is "homesickness." 7
5

a

This kind of

Politics and Ambiguity p. 9.
6
Bennett likewise uncovers this affinity between parties
otherwise opposed
they being in this case the various
sides in the environmental debate. She shows them to be
distributed between the poles of "environmental
management" and "natural holism," both of which are
dependent on a faith in the possibility concord. See
Unthinki ng Faith and Enlightenment p. 4.
Unthink ing Faith and Enlightenment p. 2. Bennett is
following Neitzsche in characterizing modern philosophy as
one more example of "homesickness."
,

—

,

,
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"optimism" about the possibilities
of being at home is
often combined (by Marx, for
example) with a trenchant
critical reading of the
--homelessness- imposed by
current
orders.
I

am all for trenchant critique

deserve plenty

-

but

~

our modern orders

also think, following Connolly,

I

that there is a problem when
such critique is bound up
with, or based on, a "politics
of the common good" which
assumes that individuality and
commonality can in the
right context be made to "harmonize
nicely. »8 Marx , s idea
of harmony is repeated, albeit
in a very different
way,

in

the work of the "individualists,"
such as Hobbes and
Locke, whom he opposed.
In a certain sense Hobbes is
a
philosopher of discordance, as he is quite
"pessimistic"
about the possibility for selves to be
"at home" in the
world.
He considers the self and world to be
divided.
On
the other hand Hobbes holds on to the idea
of harmony in
his notion of individuals as rational agents,
transparent
to themselves, or at least properly held
responsible to

answer to the reasonable dictates of order, as

underwritten by God and his law.

The goal for Hobbes, as

for Locke, is to spell out the rational way for human

beings to adjust to the fact that they are not and will

never be fully at home in the world.

Politics and Am higuity

.

p.

6.

in many ways share this
goal, but I cannot
similarly
speak of individuals as
separate fro. "the world"
in which
they cannot be at home.*
An d once tnis assumption
Qf
division is suspended it
becomes impossible to use
the
word "rational" as Hobbes
did.
ah ways of adjusting to
the world are also ways
of adjusting the self,
I

and these

have internal as well as
external costs. 10
one "rational" mode of
adjustment.

There is no

The idea shared by Marx and
Hobbes is that of the true,
or consistent, self, whether
thought of as a state to be
achieved or as already naturally
occurring, the coherent
self is understood by both as
a being centered by a selfconsciousness who has a sense of
her/his own
integrity,

who can be held accountable, and
who adheres to rational
truth criteria. By this modern view
of the person, the
impulses that are unthought and which
manifest themselves
as intrusions upon the subject
ought to be (or already
are) chosen among, ranked, channeled,
assessed,
or

integrated by the subject in a way that is
rational and
harmonious. Herein lies the danger; modern
political

Thus Bennet speaks of the philosophy of
discordance
fractious holism." The self is, like the world in as
general, a multipicity which cannot be entirely
integrated, but the self is not separate from the world.
...human and non-human elements ...are interconnected
constituted in part by their relations to one another."
Unthinki ng Faith and Enlightenment p. 149.
10 See Connolly
on Hobbes, Politics and Ambiguity p. 12.
,

,
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theories tend to overlook
and even abet the extension
of
pressures to define oneself
within the ambit of the
»nor»al...
To see how this is the
case we need to look at
the self, and at the history
of the modern self, from
the
point of view of the philosophy
of discordance.

The Disrm-dant

.q

Al f

The "Other" is the term used
by Michel Foucault, as well
as by Bennett and Connolly,
to refer to those aspects of
self and of bodily experience
which intrude upon the
ordered reality striven for by self
-consciousness; the
Other is that which, within a
particular way of ordering
the self, does not fit into that
ordering.
it is
"the

locus of wishes, feelings, and desires
that escape
articulation," e.g., disorder, irrationality,
madness,
covert impulses of resistance, and
eccentricity. 1 ! Every
world necessarily has its Other.
By this view, we should accept both of
the following

propositions.

First,

"the homecoming [of the self] cannot

be arranged, for there is no set of philosophical
or

political or psychological conditions where the fit

between self and world will be neat," and, second, there

Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity p. 106. See also
Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment p. 6, and
Focuault, The Orde r of Things; An Archeology of the Human
Sciences (Random House, 1970), p. 328.
,

,

v
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is no single and most
rational way to adjust to

ho.elessness.12

This is because

on

,

^^^

^

way of constructing a self
has as a byproduct the
creation
of particular forms of
disharmony, and, on the other
hand
there are no rational
(independent in principle from
any
particular order and its way of
life) criteria by which
one could select a particular
mode of living as

incontestably superior.
Since the self is not "designed"
to fit perfect!
into any way of life, we mult
anticipate^
t every
good way of life will both
realize something in the
S
nter elem -ts in the self
resistance
its'for^

?^

This notion of the Other is meant
to draw attention to
the commonalities of theories of
concord which, whether or
not they recognize that our current
social orders spawn
their own forms of the Other, nonetheless
postulate
harmony
the absence of an Other
as a conceivable and
desirable state of affairs, it is for example
often taken
for granted, in the debate over whether
or not it makes
sense to say that people are "alienated,"
that there is a

-

-

true self from which we are or are not so
divided.

This

notion of self is very important to modern institutions
and modern achievements.

It is this self which is

Bennett, Unthinki ng Faith and Enlightenment
Connolly, Ambiguity and Politics p. 114.
,

,

pp.

1-2.
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understood to confer authority,
which is taken as capable
of being held responsible
for her/his actions,
and which
is contrasted with those
considered lacking in rights,
incapable of responsibility,
disorganized, out of order,
and,

in a word,

irrational.

it is also this self
which'

modern societies (and revolutionary
movements) so often
promise us as a measure of their
legitimacy,
citizens are
urged to pursue and express
their true selves, to
"find

themselves," usually with the
proviso that the results fit
in with the prevailing standards
for selfhood and the
economic imperatives of order.
Unfortunately, in order to see ourselves
as free and at
home we typically adjust ourselves
to accommodate the
imperatives of the order and the prevailing
standards of
rational behavior. Alternatively, we
sometimes find a

stance from which to critique the existing
order by making
reference to a idea of the authentic self
which could be
realized in a transformed world. Either way
a profoundly

anti-political urge is built into our standards for
legitimacy.

The idea is that humans should be at home in

a meaningful world,

and the result is not only that

political power is considered to appropriately rest on the
consent of such beings, but also that such power is

encouraged to work to "assist" and so transform or control
those not capable of reasoned consent or hampered by false

,

consciousness.

m

sum,

forces of normalization
are built
into the modern pursuit of
legitimacy.

The ontology of discordance
attempts to both locate
instances of normalization and
enable resistance to it.
It does this by offering
a vision of life as
thoroughly
politicized and a vision of democracy
as the appropriate
mode of living together given
this fact.
Life
is,

for

humans at least, profoundly
ambiguous, and we need
standards of legitimacy and
institutions of order which
take this into account.

This is, for Connolly at least,

what democracy at its best is all
about.

Democratic politics of the sort endorsed
here does
nSed f ° r n0rms
Jt ins ^ts upon
Tt
right, and when a
* ondltions
? number
sufficient
of citizens have affirmed
discordance as part of the human condition,
democratic turbulence subdues the politics
of
normalization.
it supports the ambiguous relation
to
public life essential to freedom. 14

K^T*

Given my purpose

^

—

'

to speak of the ways the modern

family bears on issues of power and democracy

—

i

need to

point to what is implied but not spelled out in
this
connection.

Freedom requires an ambiguous relation to

private life as well as public life.

It requires, to be

more exact, the valorization of our already existing

ambiguous relation to private and public life.

Democratic

turbulence is a healthy thing when it comes to processes

Politics and Ambiguity

,

p.

15.
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of coming to (and challenging)
collective understandings
of the norms of public
life and the politics of
personal
life,
our thought about what "family..
is and should be
best undertaken with the help
of assumptions of

^

discordance.
To go on and make this case

I

need to say a good deal

more about normalization, and
to this end I will follow
Foucault, Bennett, Connolly, and
Charles Taylor in
comparing modern ontologies of concord
to an ontology of
concord which preceded them and which,
by
its decline,

marks the onset of modernity.

Concord in a Meaningful Order
The world is seen, from this earlier
vantage point, as
an integrated, meaningful whole. This
western view can be
characterized, says Bennett, as a "Robust Faith"

~

robust, that is, compared to the weakened
faith that

endured the transformation of the enlightenment and

subsequently the rise of modern science and industrialism.
From the point of view of robust faith, "The world
is

a

creation, a vast web whose threads are those of

resemblance." 15

Charles Taylor, referring more broadly to

all western traditions prior to modernity, speaks of the

Unthink ing Faith and Enlightenment

,

p.

9.

notion of the world as a
"meaningful order. "16 The
long
dominant idea of the world
as filled with purpose
and
speaking through resemblance
is expressed, to use
Taylor's
example, in the notion that
because there are seven
holes
in the head there must
be seven planets. 17 ;
mtbm notion
is that different elements
in creation express or
embody a
certain order of ideas. "18
Foucault put
to the end of the sixteenth
century, resemblance played
a
constructive role in the knowledge
of Western

^^ ^
culture.""

The self is, by this view,
defined by its relation to
this order.
The world is alive with meanings
for
robust faith these meanings are
the words of God's text
and the proper role of humans is
to put themselves in tune
with these meanings. By this view,
"...man came most
fully to himself when he was in touch
with a cosmic
20
order."
Humans are thought to be special in
their role
as the interpreters of this order.
For robust faith,

-

~

"Knowledge consists of an approximate recovery
of divine
intentions embodied in the natural world and
revealed in
signs. "21 Mortal knowledge is, by this
view, necessarily

'Hegel

(Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 3-11.

Hegel, p. 4.
Hegel, p. 5.

The Order of Thing s p. 17.
Taylor, Hegel p. 6.
f

,

Bennett, Unthinki ng Faith and Enlightenment

,

p.

10.
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incomplete and imperfect.

We moderns are likely
to see
the ambiguities in the
signs as "evidence" that
the notion
of a meaningful order is
an illusion, but this
is not the
only way to interpret this
lack.
From the point of view
of robust faith it shows
the opaqueness of the order
to

limited human reason, as well
as "the temporality and
finitude of material things." 22
in such a meaningful order,
a concord of the cosmos
is
guaranteed by presumption, whatever
the state of human
knowledge and human affairs. if
this presumption of

incompletely visible harmony can be
sustained, a
considerable amount of experienced
disharmony, difference,
anomaly and mystery can, it follows,
find space for
itself, at least in the sense that
its meaning is

experienced as ambiguous.
the one hand, threatening
evil,

That which is "Other" is, on

—

it is sin, madness, error, or

on the other hand, it is also a sign of
the limits

to mortal abilities of interpretation
limits, mystery, and hidden truth.

—

it expresses

Its existence does not

indicate that the universe is not a harmonious whole,
does
not necessarily pose a challenge to existing customs
and

understandings, and does not call automatically for

corrective action of cure or assimilation.

Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment

,

p.

10.
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The relation to Otherness
of ambiguity does not,
it
should be understood, by any
means automatically redeem
medieval practices regarding
that which did not fit in.
This is not the point. The
comparison of then and now
can, however, draw attention
to hard to redeem features
of
modern practices. Foucault has
done this by counterposing
older and modern understandings
of the relation of truth
and madness.
"m the Middle Ages and until the

Renaissance, man's dispute with madness
was a dramatic
debate in which he confronted the
secret powers of the
world." we have travelled from this
point to "our own
experience, which confines insanity within
mental
illness. "23

Madness now is no less fear-inspiring
and

fascinating, but it is medicalized or assimilated
to
reason, rather than excluded and wondered
at.

A purposeful world can, finally, be characterized
by the
notion of authority that it sustains.
"Authorities,"
says

Connolly speaking of the late middle ages, "claimed
some

privileged access to the purposiveness of the world." 24

Authority was seen to be present everywhere, as all of
creation is an expression of God's will.

Authorities in

such a world are those who are convincing in their claim

23 Madness and C
ivilization: A History of Insanity in the
Age of Reason (Random House, 1965), p. xii.
24 Politics and
Ambiguity p. 129.
,

to interpret "Cod's
signs" authoritatively,
particularly
as found in sacred texts.
Their interpretations may
be
and soxneti.es were,
challenged, but as long as
authority
is thought to reside in
the teleological structure
of the
universe there is a presumption
in favor of existing

social customs.

The past and its expression
in the
present are privileged as lived
moments of creation,
themselves subject to various
interpretations.

The Tran sition to Modernii-y

Most of us, of course, do not
experience or speak of the
world as a text expressing God's
purpose.
Nor is this
idea taken seriously in public
parlance
or in the

scientific community,
of telos?

what has happened to presumptions

They survive in weakened form: in the
practice

of fragile, small, very dependent,
somewhat privileged

communities; in faith's "attempt to locate
one's true life
in a world beyond;" in the championing
of Platonic
and

Aristotelian political theory; and to some extent
in fastdisappearing non-modern cultures. 25 The theory and
practice of these communities provides an important
critique of and counterpoint to modern societies, but
the
idea of telos has trouble consistently engaging widespread

adherence in its own right.

Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment

,

p.

21.
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To explain the decline
of telos and its current
defensive posture, we would
have tQ

^

^^

following: the flaws and
contradictions in the idea
of the
universe as a harmonious
order of meaning; the
inability
of medieval faith to
survive certain economic
and
political changes; an - inadequacyof medieval faith from
the point of view of modern
economic processes and
political structures (with their
very demanding
imperatives of social coordination)
;
the highly visible
technical achievements that have
come with the new
"enlightenment" ideas which put
human beings much more in
the center of things; the
possibility for a variety of new
and powerful understandings of
human freedom and rights
which have come with those same ideas;
the institutional
edifice of consumption which makes
revised understandings
incompatible with making a living for
so many people; the
power of people's ongoing identification
with the order in
which they have invested so much of
themselves;
and,

finally, the effect of the various disciplines
which help

make people into selves who try to see themselves
as free,
and so who can -identify with- and -invest
themselves
into" the current order.

As one speaking from the point of view of an ontology
of

discordance,

I

am not calling for or hankering after the

restoration of robust faith.

I

therefore can beg off the

34

difficult task of discussing
every element involved
in the
decline of telos.26
x

^ ^^

^

^^

transition to modernity meant
a new idea of the self
and
its relation to nature.
This makes it important
that we
consider the problems inherent
in the medieval premise
of
telos, not in order to
"correct" them, and certainly
not
because these problems "caused"
the transformation
to

modernity, but because the heart
of modernity was formed
in this transition.
What is of the most importance
here
is the presumptions, and the
problems, which we did not
free ourselves of, despite the
magnitude of change
involved,

while medieval solutions in the
long run failed
to hold, resulting in the
disenchantment of the world,
this disenchantment was far from any
rejection of the

26 It

should be obvious from this list that I
do not
the0ry that exP lain * the weak position of
teleological doctrine as due largely to either
the
empirical falsity of its claims or the
"ideological"
conditioning and manipulation perpetrated by today's
societies.
The first of these views ignores the
unavoidable rooting of experiences of "empirical"
reality
in ontological assumptions, and neither
of them shows
enough respect for the ordinary participants of
the
medieval and modern worlds. It should also be clear
that
I am equally uninterested in the kind
of explanation that
privileges a particular category of social reality
such
as "ideas" or "economy"
as first of all intelligible
considered by itself and secondly as somehow primary in
causing historical change. I follow Foucault in holding
that there are always elements of the arbitrary and the
multiple at work in any historical transformation.
Several changes come together, perhaps, and are taken
advantage of, transformed, and put the service of
something else.

S^o^

—

—
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assumption of concord.

it meant rather its

transformation, into, among other
things, new tools of
normalization.
it also meant, as we
shall see, the rise
of the figure of the private
nuclear family as a
compelling image of harmony.
Both Bennett and Connolly,
informed by Hegel's
conception of modernity and Hans
Blumenberg's historical
work, argue that teleological
doctrines were not simply
repudiated, as in some act of hubris
that could
be

repented, nor were they lost in
the popularity of new
ideas of human independence or
power, "...they rather came
unraveled by the very attempts in the
late medieval and
early modern eras to perfect them. "27
This CQuld happgn
because, first of all, "strong"
teleological doctrines
(such as robust faith) are, Bennett
tells us, inherently
precarious as modes of consciousness.
"...the will to

believe in resemblances coexists with the
suspicion that
the truth of things may not be so comforting." 28
Secondly, late medieval thought dealt with this
problem in
a way that fatally undermined its own
premises and paved

the way for modernity.

This, at least, is the argument of

Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity p. 135. See also
Bennett, Unthinki ng Faith and Enlightenment
pp. 18-21,
Blumenberg, The Legi timacy of the Modern Age (Cambridge,
MIT Press, 1983), and, Charles Taylor, Hegel Chapter II,
pp. 51-75 and Chapter XX, pp. 537-571.
28 Unthin king
Faith and Enlightenment p. 18.
,

,

,

,
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Blumenberg that Bennett
and Connolly accept,
and it goe s
long way toward making
sense of modernity as a
new
response to the older
problem I mentioned earlier:

a

homesickness.

Hegel sees the problem of
modernity as the need to
accommodate and give full due
to the modern commitment
to
the reflective self (capable
of individual freedom and
entitled to individual rights,
while at the same provide
a
world in which that self can
be truly at home.
It

is not
for nothing that Neitzsche
called German philosophy the
most fundamental form of
homesickness, as Hegel sought to
restore, at a new self-conscious
and less immediate level,
what he believed succumbed to
the "enlightenment- movement
due to the contradictions in its
medieval version: an
experience of oneness between faith
and reason, autonomy
and belonging, self and world,
consciousness and culture,
humans and nature. 29

The threat to the medieval world view,
Blumenberg tells
us, was always the problem of evil. 30
How could God
evil to be? The onset of modernity is
marked, in this
view, by the victory of the nominalist
solution to this
problem over the Augustinian. Whereas Augustine
explains
evil as the work of humans, who were given
free will by

aUw

29 Taylor,

Hegel p. 65.
30 The Le
gitimacy of the Modern Aae
,

r

p.

130.

^
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God, nominalism simply
says that humans
understand
why evil exists because
divine will is absolute
and

incomprehensible to humans.

The first view has the

problem of positing an
all-powerful God who nonetheless
could not make a free human
being without evil. The
second view saves the power
of God, but in a way that
removes his immediate presence
in the forms

of signs to be
Modernity, the argument goes,
is marked by an
experience of God as more distant
and of nature as more
alien; the experience of
homesickness, to which robust
faith had been a response, was
forcefully reinvigorated by
the rise in a nominalist outlook.
The enlightenment
read.

conception of the world in terms of
need and desire, as
something to be mastered, was, by
this view, the response
which carried the day. Bennett puts
it this way.
In an indifferent world, homesickness
returned.
One
0 th S existential uncertainty was
the
l
maS
C° ntr01 3 " ature c °"«ived as
"matter. »?i

SSSTV*

^

This change in its turn entailed a new
centrality for
the category of the human self. The self
came

to be seen

not so much as an expression of God's will
who has been

given its own will after God's image, but as the
source of
all active will and purpose.

God is in the modern scheme

of things reduced to the role of the original creator,
and

Bennett, Unthinki ng Faith and Enlightenment

,

p.

20.
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is perhaps the forgiver
as well,

if he is believed in
at

all.

While the idea of a harmony
between self and world
has by no means faded away,
we have lost the
presumption
that it is already inscribed
in the cosmos.
instead the
assumption is likely to be that
we can and ought to make
this harmony ourselves, in
an active process of both
finding and defining our true
selves.

One way to

understand this change is to say
that the self has
replaced God as the "subject," as,
in other words, the
point of reference for which the
universe can be said to
"exist." Taylor speaks of this
change
in the self in

terms of its changed relation to
nature.

"The essential

difference can perhaps be put this way:
the modern subject
is self-defining, where on previous
views the subject is
defined in relation to a cosmic order." 32
This idea of the self is of course exactly
that, an
idea.

It is, however, also more than that,

it is a

reality of subjects who are striving for selfconsciousness, who understand themselves as free
only if
they endorse upon reflection all the restraints
that apply
to them, and who by virtue of this are subjected
to a host
of juridical and disciplinary mechanisms that enforce
the

Hegel, p. 6.
See also Connolly's and Bennett's
characterization of the transition to modernity as a new
relation of self and nature. Connolly, Politics and
Ambiguity, pp. 129-130. Bennett, Unthinking Faith and
Enlightenment p. 7.
,
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normal.

The modern idea of the
subject is, in otner
words, integral to the
institutional order of modernity;
and this order, while it
grants a great deal to the
self
in the for* of rights
and powers, also demands
a great
deal in the way of
self-discipline. The modern
pursuit of
self -consciousness is, by
this view, the heavily
enforced
pursuit of concord; it is the
normalizing (as well as
liberating) demand that we
integrate, deny, or eliminate
any -Otherness- in us.
It is enforced by a host
of
mechanisms: medical, economic,
religious, familial, and
otherwise.
Both the best and worst of our
modern forms of
order are linked, then, to the
pursuit of a concord of
consciousness (symbolized wonderfully,
perhaps, in the
modern image of "the family- as a locus
both of harmony
and of benevolent discipline)
This duality of
implication becomes clearer, I think, when
considered in
.

the light of some of the paradigmatic
features of modern
orders, as identified by Connolly.

Modernity and Sel f -consciousness

Connolly points out that the standard for authority
in
modern societies is endorsement by the rational self,
rather than, say, access to the purposiveness of the
world.

Authorities refer for justification (oftentimes

deceitfully of course) to the "rational consent of agents
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who agree (or promise,
to obey
les an(J
installed according to the
proper procedures. "33
This
idea of authority is
problematic, even though
compelling
in many ways, as any
given instance of "consent"
can
always be shown to fail to
live up to this standard,
fact, "The enlightened,
rational character of
obedience
through consent also locates
irrational dimensions

„

m

of

authority in the depth psychology
of the consenting
-34
adult.
By mQdern standards< fchen(
fQras

^

authority through consent are
dangerous.
People will at
times oppose authority when they
ought not to, just as at
times they will interpret their
own coercion as the
exercise of proper authority, in
order to see themselves
as free.
In modernity the status of the
inner psychology
of persons becomes valorized in
new ways; it becomes
central to questions of freedom and
political
power.

Modern societies are also characterized
by the
"conventionalization" of social life.

The presumption in

favor of existing social customs is weakened,
as their
authority comes to depend on the possibility
of their
discursive justification by those participating

in them.

Like the modern idea of authority on which it
depends,

Connolly, Politics and Amhjguity
Connolly, Politics and amhjauitv

.

p.

130.

.

p.

132.
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conventionalization gives a new
political importance to
the internal mental condition
of society's participants.
6

^
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of constraint anri
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Third, and this follows from what
has just been said,

modernity is future oriented.

Authority requires support

not so much from the belief in the
authenticity of certain
accounts of the past as from a shared
faith that

"obedience to a set of procedures, norms,
and authorities
today will help to foster the sort of world
we want for

ourselves or progeny tomorrow." 36

This brand of authority

is "fragile," in the sense that its ability
to defend

itself as in accordance with rational will depends
to a

great extent on the anticipated results of its exercise.

Modern authority is, in other words, more potentially
accountable than its historical precursor.
These three related features of modernity are certainly
at the heart of its greatest achievements and its most

favorable possibilities, but the way

Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity
Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity

I

,

pp.

,

p.

have characterized

130-131.
131.
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then,

points already to their
down side as well. „
e can
explore this ambiguity of
effects by
characterization of the
conventionalization of social
life
as -thematization,"
which, she says,
-permeates modern
life. -37 „ e of modern
ty arej by
.

argument>

particularly driven to give
intelligible form
conception, category and theory
to

-

-

in

all of the liquidity

of experience.

Conventionalization means a
potentially
never-ending process of inquisition
and categorization.
On the one hand, thematization
is an achievement.
To
thematize is to politicize; we
become aware of the human
made character of categories,
beliefs, roles, and social
forms, thus -admirably enhancing
the possibility of social
change. -38 0n the Qther
thematize

^

^ ^

categorially delineate a world, and
this
of view of discordance
is to impose

-

-

from the point

form on material

not perfectly designed to receive
it.

Modern

thematization is the aggressive categorization
of the
world.
Thematization enlightens and politicizes,
the realm of conscious human management; extending
at the same
time, thematization enlightens and
subjugates
torturing the space for the unmanageable. 39
'

Unthinking Faith a nd Enl inhl-.pn.»nh p i 42
Unthinking Faith and Rnl i.ghtenment p. 143.
Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment
,

.

.

r

,

p.
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The idea is that thematization
involves subjugation
through normalization.
"Thematization turns difference
into deviance, and that is
its truly black effect. "40
This idea is at the heart of
Foucault's critique of the
modern pursuit of self -consciousness.
Foucault, more than
any other thinker, has relentlessly
advanced the thesis
that there is an insidious form
of entrapment involved in
the pursuit of an order based on
a freely held consensus.
He in other words criticizes
modernity at the level of its
(our) quest for legitimacy; in
seeking a legitimate order
we participate in the process whereby
all are hammered
into a shape that suits the order.
Some of us are made
into those who endorse the order, while
others are

constructed as objects of treatment and as
counterexamples for the first group. Every consensus

has its

Other, whether embodied in specific individuals
designated
as lacking in some way, or located inside each
of us as

the rumblings of dissent and discomfort which we
root out
and reform.

Modern ideals of a society based on consensus

hide the violence which is necessarily a part of any such

concord

Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment

,

p.

146.
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Modern Institution*

[jagaaUaflfcLan

This idea, that the same
kind of self-consciousness
that
brxngs us modern conceptions
of democracy and
individuai
rights also provides a
powerful iMpetus to forces
of
normalization, becomes more
plausible when one considers
a
fourth important feature of
Modern societies identified
by
Connolly. This is that
imperatives of social coordination
have, for a variety of reasons,
become more complicated
and pressing.

We are encouraged, and
sometimes impelled,
towards such coordination by the
very structures

-

Physical and discursive -that
provide the context within
we as individuals make our way.
This happens even as the
fragility of authority has in_theory
put any putative
architects of the regulation of
individual activity

on the

defensive.
By social coordination

I

mean the management of

individuals regarding all or any facets
of their activity
where they live, how they look at life,
what they are
good at, what they believe in, what manners
they have, how
they are divided into groups, what family
means

—

for them,

how they account for their problems, etc.

The modern

world depends more and more on the problematic
exercise of
such management. Normalization is not only made
necessary
by our complex interdependence, it is provided with
the

perfect pretext as well.

Norms work with manipulation,

45

incentives, and coercion
to encourage, shore up,
and
sometimes simply substitute
for the consent needed
for the
exercise of authority.

our very

in^erdep^ndeic^^fve^acT oT s^T*

operation of the order by coercive
means
When

'

8m °° th

speak of a growing need for
social coordination I
refer especially to the patterns
of production and
consumption which tie us to imperatives
of growth (meaning
by "growth" the continual increase
of production and
income levels). 42 To summarize, these
imperatives propel
I

41 Connolly,

Politics and Ambig uity,
p 134<
a
n he WO
f Andr * G ° rz
Ma rshall Sahlins, and
Fred Hi^h M
H
f\°
M chael
Best and Connolly have developed the
i
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° f consum Ption permitted or
5°™!
encouraged
q
in the h
U.S. put citizens on a treadmill where
only
the
promise of continual growth in income stands
a chance of
maintaining their allegiance to the order. The
prevailing
alternatives in transportation, housing, food
growth
purchasing and storage, education, and other
consumption force most people to continually realms of
elusive affluence. They can never make ends pursue an
meet without
difficulty, no matter how much "richer" they become
Instead they find that the luxuries and vehicles
to
success of one day are turned into unliberating
necessities the next
cars and B.A. degrees are
examples.
This system of consumption, it is further
argued, cannot be transformed without corollary changes
other institutions such as the organization of work. Seein
Best and Connolly, The Politicized Economy Second Edition
(D.C. Heath and Company, 1982), pp. 5-7 and throughout;
Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity p. 27-30; Gorz, A
Strategy for Labor (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 11;
Gorz Socialism and Re volution (Garden City: Anchor Books,
1973)
Sahlins, Culture and Practical Reason (University
of Chicago Press, 1976)
and Hirsch, The Social Limits to
.

'
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us in the direction of
greater normalization in two
ways.
They do so directly because,
fro. the point of view of
the
pursuit of growth, certain
disciplines and particular
orientations are required, such
as the prioritizing of
investment, the acceptance of
class difference as the only
rational incentive system, the
placement of a variety of

growth-threatening causes on the back
burner (e.g.,
environmental and health concerns)
and the imposition of
hardship on service workers, welfare
recipients,
,

single

mothers, and others. 4 3

0ur institutions push us to view

upward mobility, marriage, and
self-support as normal
as appropriate models for behavior
even as many of us
do no fit into these models very
well.

-

-

Imperatives of growth also promote normalization
indirectly as they generate disaffection and
resistance
from the promises around which modern
institutions
are

constructed.

While the modern pursuit of growth has been

justified largely by the promise of the universalization
of affluence and the possibility of democracy,
today it

seems to require of us that we drop or amend both
of these

*************
Growth (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977).
43 The
proponents of "^industrialization, " recognizing
these imperatives and uncritically embracing them, are at
the forefront of calls to reinforce the "traditional
moralities" of, in George Gilder's words, "work, family,
and faith." Wealth and Poverty (Bantam Books, 1981), p.
,

.
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ooals.

Dissection from the order

of growtn

^

often expressed and even
experienced only covertly
because of both the absence
of credible alternatives
and
the strong desire of
reflective subjects to see
themselves
as free.
Individuals sometimes, even
as they evade
taxes

coM.it crimes, and opt out
of political life in
every wa y,
condemn overt expressions
of resistance such as
protests
and radical political
arguments because these are
found to
be threatening to the future
which they are trying to
hold
onto, and which they have
already -freely- committed
themselves to. The growth of
disaffection and resistance
leads, under conditions of
tight structural limits on the
possible, to counter-movements of
surveillance,

disciplinary action, -values- campaigns,
"public service
announcements " etc
,

To pursue growth as an unambiguously
good thing is, of
course, to participate in a kind of
ontology of concord.
While there are probably few people
today that

unhesitatingly endorse growth in this way,
the imperatives
of growth help tie us to philosophies
of concord
nonetheless.

This is because these imperatives, through

their reduction of "slack" (space for
unthematized or
unmanaged difference) in the order, tend to
intensify the
experience of homesickness which first made the

enlightenment view of the world as matter to be mastered
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so appealing.

It is, after all, not
easy to live „ ith the

judgment that one's civilization
is on a course which
one
neither endorses nor can
alter for the better.
This
situation provides excellent
conditions for the extension
of mechanisms of social
discipline. 44

and^s
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some circles and the
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introduction
of new means of social control
and
ideological management of hope in

others!^

All this suggests that, as long as
we cannot relax the
imperatives of growth governing our
societies, we can look
forward to continued and increasing
economic disparity,

I hope it is clear that I do
not contend that the
development of a variety of practices that
enforce norms is caused simply by the fact inculcate and
that any social
custom is,
modern times, subject to challenge. To
explain the role of reflexivity in today's
normalization
it is necessary to refer to institutional
structures with
their tendencies, direction, and imperatives.
Reflexivity
will never be an entirely innocent, liberating
affair, but
I am not "opposed" to it (quite the
opposite)
Nor, on
the other hand, am I claiming that the normalization
we
see around is an entirely necessary set of practices
given
our economic arrangements,
it is only that the hand of
normalization is enabled and to a degree forced by those
modern institutional imperatives, set in motion by
enlightenment ideas, which make the continued operation of
society such a daunting task.
45 Politics and
Ambiguity pp. 33-34.

m

.

,

.
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greater reliance on
manufactured consensus, a
more and
-re far reaching demand for
civic virtue,

a large degree
of mostly covert
resistance, and more and
more
surveillance and discipline
(exercised, as we shall
see,
with the help of the
institution of family)

Normalization anH Discerns
still have not spoken directly
of how it is that
normalization proceeds. Foucault
speaks to this question
By his reading, the last
several centuries have seen
the
growth in the reach and social
importance of "positivetechniques of power
powers "organized around the
management of life rather than the
menace of death. "46
The new "bio-power" is based both
on the active
disciplining of individual bodies and
the social
regulation of a newly conceived entity
the
I

-

—

"population.

What makes power hold good, what
makes it accepted
that Lt d ° esn/t onlv weighon us
as l^l*
rce that says no, but that it traversL
and
n „
produces
things, it induces pleasure, forms
knowledge, produces discourse,
it needs to
considered as a productive network that runs be
through
y
the whole social body. 47

46 The History
of Sexuality, vm
i. An introduction
trans, by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books,
1980)
147
p
,

.

^The

Hi story of Sexuality

,
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119.
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This productive network
consists of a whole series
of
more or less infinitesimal
mechanisms "which each have
their own history, their
own trajectory "48
These
mechanisms, which include
architecture, social
.

rites,

documentation of people's lives,
commonly held meanings
and expectations, and official
and unofficial forms of
punishment, assistance, correction,

treatment, and advice,
are "positive" in that they
work to produce individuals
as
particular forms of selves. Foucault,
then, points out
that social management is by no
means simply the
application of rules and incentives;
it also is the means
by which people are made to
construct themselves along the
lines of certain dichotomies, such
as sexuality and

deviance, sanity and insanity,
responsibility and
criminality, and sickness and health.
People are
deployed, in other words, within categories
of the normal
and the deviant, usually seeking to put
themselves at the
pole of the former, which is associated
with truth,
reason, knowledge and liberation.

Language, as an ordering of the world which
carries and

imposes meanings and interpretations of reality,
and which
inserts its understandings into the design and practice
of

most all human construction and activity, is not merely

4

"Two Lectures," Power/Knowledae: Selected Interviews and
Other Writings. 1 972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Books,
1972)

,

p.

99.
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one more mechanism of
normalization; it is central
to its
»eans of operation. How
we speak helps to make
us what we
are.
Fou cault, cognizant of
this fact, examines the
ways that various
disciplines of the self,
such as
psychiatry, penology, and
therapy, have as their
aim the
production of the appropriately
revealing discourse. „e
shows how the techniques
of these disciplines
increasingly
inform the practices of a
variety of social practices,
rules, and structures.
The point, he says, is in
each
case to get people to speak,
to individualize themselves,
bare the truth about themselves,
defend themselves, find
their inner coherence, etc.
And, indeed, this is a common
feature of job and loan interviews,
questionnaires, job
application forms, drug treatment
programs, welfare

checkups, self-help courses, therapy
sessions, parole
board reviews, family court hearings,
alternative

community group meetings, and problem
resolution sessions
between lovers. We are, as Foucault says,
a

"confessional" society.

Foucault 's various histories seek to document
how
imposition and elicitation of discourse is complicit the
in
this process of normalization. See Madness and
Civilization, Discipli ne and Punish: The Birth of t-ho
Prison (Random House, 1979) The Birth of the CI inic: an
Archeology of Medical Percep tion (Random House, 1975) The
History of Sexuality and The Use of Pleasure; The History
of Sexuality. Vo lume Two (Random House, 1986)
,

,
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To sum up, we are

by this read ng Qf
sQciety(
Pressed in numerous „ ays
to forn , narrative
.

,

^.^ ^

ourselves and to sticK
fast to this identity
as the
condition of our freedom
This has an effect
of normalization because
the ways we come to see
ourselves
and the commitments we
make as responsible selves
can
amount to the acceptance
of the prevailing
alternatives
for the organization of
the self.
One way to understand
normalization is to compare
it to
"oppression," the latter implying
a form of pQwer
holds down and prevents,
which in other words is

^

unjustifiable because it keeps
people from something they
need or would be better off
having.
Normalization
operates through mechanisms which
create
and direct,

rather than merely prevent.

The implication is that such

power is unjustifiable insofar as
it unnecessarily reduces
slack in the order, if it participates,
in other words, in
an unnecessary and hurtful
privileging of certain
individuals, certain powers for individuals,
or certain
ways of being.
These different conceptions

power as normalization

-

-

power as oppression and

are at odds in certain respects,

but the philosophy of discordance does
not, at least by
the reading I endorse, rule out the possibility
of

oppression.

People can be, and often are, "held down" in
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that they have real
needs

^

^.^

^^

-adequately addressed and could
be better addressed.

The

philosophy of discordance
only disallows
interpretation
of a particular set of
needs and desires as
the
"authentic," "truly fulfilling,"

^

or "true" ones.

To so
privilege is to pave the way
(at least theoretically,
for
normalization, as the positive
production of the needs and
desires thought to be part
of the true self win be
disguised. The project of
the "liberation"
of our "true

selves" can in fact come to
serve the ends of an
established order.
One example of this process
is of great relevance to
the
question of the effects of the
modern institution of
family; this is the "deployment
of sexuality," as traced
by Foucault.
I will speak more of
this in the next
chapter, which concerns normalization
and the family.
But
a few words about it now
might help in the present
discussion. As a form of "bio-power, "
the deployment of
sexuality is concerned not so much with
rules as with
knowledge.
"Sexuality" is not, says Foucault, a

substratum or drive which can either be held
down by rules
and force or liberated and allowed to
flourish,
it is

instead a modern construct

—

"it has been expanding at an

increasing rate since the seventeenth century." 50

The History of Se xuality. Vol.

i
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been constructed, says
Foucault, by me ans of the
eliciti ng
of discourse
people are asked or forced
to speak of
their sexuality
and by the construction
Qf
knowledges of sex. These
knowledges are based on the
interpretation by authorities of
the speaking of the
sexual subject.

-

-

"Sexuality" is, Foucault tells
us, able to function
to
make people speak first of
all because of its status
as a
truth to be discovered. it also
serves to make people
talk because of the panoply of
legal, medical and
therapeutic practices which assume
the truth of sexuality
in their operations.
On the one hand a certain
pleasure
is involved in the "discovery"
(construction) of our own
sexual "truth." Sexual "liberation"
generates
(and

appeals to) feelings of power for the
individual.
On the
other hand this "liberation" is an
imposition of a unity
upon the multiple pleasures of the desiring
body. 51 This
imposition takes place in the context of the
reality
of

therapeutic discipline.

To fall outside the bodily norms

(perhaps to be "gay," "hermaphroditic," a "dwarf,"
etc.)
is to be subjected to exploitative and
therapeutic

treatment. 52

51 Foucault,

The Hist ory of Sexuality. Vol. t pp. 152-153.
Herculi ne Barbin: Being the Recently
Discove redMemoirs of a Nineteenth Century French
Hermaphrodite, Introduced by Michel Foucault, Translated
by Richard McDougall (Pantheon Books, 1980)
52 See

.
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It is hard, perhaps
impossible, to finally
differentiate
between those aspects of
ourselves which we create
through
our thinking and speaking
and those which are

somehow

any dents in Foucault's
thesis, as his point is
the
importance we attach to this
difference and the effect s
on
ourselves of our searches for
the truth. On the other
hand, perhaps Foucault is
wrong (I don't think so)
and
"sexuality" is an underlying unity.
Even so, our
society's emphasis on the
meaningfulness of the experience
of this unity (the great joy
of having sex, the importance
of having a sexual identity)
can still be said to

constitute a normalizing force.

"Sexuality., promotes the

idea of a concord within the self
and between self and
world.
It stands as just one example
of an underlying
unity.
it is part of a world that tells
us constantly of
the importance of discovering just
who and what we truly
are.
And this perhaps promotes the idea that
there are

incontestable truths around which we can perhaps
one day
organize a world with no politics, if so, it

follows that

the deployment of sexuality produces homesickness

(especially under modern conditions)

.

As such, it likely

helps to maintain our commitment to the imperatives
of

growth which so govern our orders.
Foucault would be the first to agree that social
..disciplines"

—

meaning by this social practices which
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construct, and so "tame,"
the self to a degree
are not
new.
B y his reading, however,
today's disciplines have
a
broader and deeper reach
than in previous ti.es,
waning
that they result in a more
thorough-going construction
of
the self and they apply
across more areas of life.
The
techniques of modern disciplines
are, moreover, by his
reading especially reliant on
reflexivity. At the same
point in history as new levels
of self-conscious

-

reflection have made possible new
heights of critical
reassessment and therefore allowed
for new conceptions of
freedom, this self-conscious
reflection has been put to
use
not necessarily consciously
as a means of social
control. Modernity means, for
Foucault, the advent of
"disciplinary society." Connolly
summarizes Foucault
well:

-

-

The normalized self is, for Foucault,
the self that
maintains self-surveillance to avoid treatment
for
delinquency, mental illness, or sexual
perversity;
disciplinary society is the order that extends
strategies of normalization into new frontiers
of

The Ontology of Discordance Revisited

Most contemporary political theories are, as

I

already

have indicated, insufficiently aware of (or
complicit
with) the problem of the production of homesickness
and

Politics and Am Mauity

.

p.

104.
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normalised selves.54

Discordance distinguishes

from most of today's
political prograns
always in acknowledging the
injury done by any set of
norms; it could therefore
possibly provide (if it could
be
the basis of a political
program) the philosophical
grounding for the taming of the
imperatives which make us
depend so heavily on norms, it
is, in Connolly's

^

words,

compatible with and affirming of
a brand of democracy
which idealizes politics and its
strife as -part of the

affirmation of life itself." 55
By some readings, to affirm democracy
and politics is to
amend Foucault's critique of the
pursuit of freedom and
legitimacy through self -consciousness.
Whether this is
the case depends on if Foucault is
properly read as

The issue between them is how normalization
is
proceed," says Connolly. Politics and Ambiguity to
p. 10.
I have already mentioned George
Gilder's offer of "work
family, and faith" as the appropriate set of
norms to
follow.
Other cultural principles that can serve as the
basis for normalization include the pursuit of
consensus,
the rejection of materialism, and the libertarian
repudiation of any notion of the common good. An ontology
of discordance does not claim that these principles
are
all equally valid or invalid
reasons can (and should)
be given in support of some over others.
55 Politics and Ambiguity,,
p. 14.
Connolly says that his
affirmation of democratic politics as the medium through
which "voices of otherness can find expression" ( Politics
and Ambiguity, p. 15) constitutes a step away from
Foucault and Nietzsche, the former being ambivalent
regarding democracy and the latter considering it the
triumph of the resentful and concord-seeking "herd
mentality" (see Politics and Amhigni ^y p 14).
r

'
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lectin,

affiraation as necessarily
nornalizi
certainly he is clear
when h6 sayg
another system is to
participate in the present
systeB „ 56
Some g o so far as to
say that Foucault's
relentless
politicization amounts to a
nihilistic anti-politics
which
xs helpless to offer
any sort of response
to the
normalization of modern
bio-power
power.
More specifically
Foucault is said to rule
out the possibility
of any
legitimate normative commitment
to a politics of change
I am not convinced by
this reading; it seems
to falsely
encapsulate Foucault, perhaps
for the saKe of purchasing
a
clear reading of his "overall
position." Foucault,

^^

«

I

think, is committed simply
to consistently playingthe
role of the nay-sayer to all
our affirmations. 58 Connolly

57 Varieties

of this argument are offered bv ch a n oe
Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom
and Truth « SiSlS? n*

(198b '' ?P:

and Nancy Fraser, "Foucault on Modern
8 ™* No ™*ive Confusions^
Praxis iTelntl
International i no 3 (October 1981)
tin
oio-ort
•Michel Foucault: A Young -Conservative'?"
Ethic; 96 no
1 (October 1985), pp. 165-184.
A summary ofthUe
positions and a defense of Foucault is offered
Keenan in "The Paradox of Knowledge and Power: by Tom
Reading
3 '" Political theory. 15, no.
1 (February
l

1987K

1

'Tf'

.

^s^a?^

58 As

Connolly puts it, Foucault prefers to play "the
fool"
for modernity. He offers the theorist of
legitimacy a
double," a persistent voice of criticism. Politics and

Ambiguity

,

p.

92.
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argues that even if Foucault
excludes political
affirmation for strategic reasons
his critique of
reflexive self -consciousness
does not in fact rule out
such affirmation, it only
rules out the possibility of
unqualified affirmation, "...the
need remains to
establish a stance, even if it is
an ambiguous one,
towards those limits most deserving
"59
of
allegiance.

There is no need for me here to
enter into the debate
about what Foucault 's position
on this issue really is.
j
believe, following Connolly's lead,
that space does exist
in the order for the worthwhile
pursuit of political
legitimacy; the challenge is to make
this pursuit part of
a politics of the taming of
normalization rather than
of

its promotion.

Towards this end, we need a politics based

on "a mode of reflexivity which
...acknowledges the limits
to the reflexive assimilation of the
other ...»

Such a view ...supports, I want to say, an
ideal of
social order which can sustain itself without
havinq
mU ° h ° f the order into the orbit of social
control 60

A world such as this, in which the ambiguous, and so
contestable and political, nature of even our highest

achievements is recognized, is not easy to imagine.

It

would mean forms of speaking, modes of punishment, types

Politic s and Ambiguity pp. 93-94.
Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity p. 94.
r

,
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of social assistance,
and perhaps rituals of

acknowledgement which call
attention to the harm done
by
social categories and
arrangements. And it would
require
the loosening of the grip
of those imperatives of
coordination which make the
exercise of slack in the
application of social categories
too threatening to order
itself,
such a future may however
present the only
credible alternative to a possible
future of greater
disparity, new impositions, the
extension of
normalization, and considerable hatred,
resentment, fear,
and victimization for the sake
of order.

The transformation to a world of
greater slack would not
require the wholesale rejection of
prevailing commitments
and practices, but rather a selective
reformulation of our
commitments in the light of discordance.
Nor would
a

culture of discordance mean the end of
norms.

To say that

norms could disappear or become benign
would be to assume
again the possibility of harmony, if there
can
be no

final or cost free harmony, if "the social
order is

understood as a precarious and dangerous achievement,"
then human life is, as
"political." 61

m

I

said before, inherently

keeping with this conclusion, a culture

of discordance does not reject authority, even as
it

insists on the fact that every mode of authority brings

Bennett, Unthink ing Faith and Enlightenment

,

p.

153.
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losses and sacrifices to those
that accept it, because
authority is necessary if any
prized mode of sociai life
is to exist. 62

An ontology of discordance
does not, finally, disallow
us from making arguments based
on claims concerning "the
natural," even though it does,
importantly, challenge the
idea that whatever is "natural"
is unambiguously
good,

inevitably compelling, or entirely
consistent and unified
in its urgings.
it is not inconsistent with
discordance
to say that humans are embodied
and situated in the world
in ways that both enable and constrain.
The point of view
of discordance can, in Bennett's words,
"appreciate the
natural and bodily world as an ambiguous
setting in which
we reside, as both a medium and an
impediment to human
fulfillment, as successively host and adversary." 63

Discordance and the Family
The issue of the natural provides me with the
perfect

opportunity to turn this discussion to the question of
family.

From Plato and Aristotle on, most political

theory has seen the family either as an obstacle to, or as
an unambiguously good and necessary building block in, the

achievement of a natural harmony within and among selves,

See Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity pp. 136-139.
Unthink ing Faith and Enlightenment p. 151.
,

,
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but family, like social
order, is a precarious,
dangerous
and necessarily hurtful
achievement. Family, again
like
social order, is a social
institution (a product of
convention) which nonetheless
"partakes" of the natural
Defenses of "tfce" family as
natural are typically
conservative in their import.
From the point of view of
discordance, however, it is
possible to see a radical
moment in the defense of
families as rooted partly in
what
is naturally the human
condition.
To state this in the
form of a thesis, our character
as embodied beings

requiring completion (always
imperfect and subjugating)
through the formation of identities,
makes plausible (if
contestable) the defense of the small,
relatively intimate
and stable household as a component
of a social form worth
having, at least under modern
conditions.
I

divide this thesis into two separate
claims.

First,

the institution of family plays a
central role in the
construction of individuals as subjugated
selves.
Second,
we nonetheless ought to affirm, as
deserving of our

allegiance, some limits and norms concerning
the

demarcation of a relatively private realm and
concerning
the upbringing of children. Specifically,
I
argue that

any sort of less normalizing and oppressive order
which we

might be able to achieve will include something which
is
like, but also different than, today's family.
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elaborate on this dual thesis
in the chapters ahead
but I will now briefly
summarize each
I

of its parts.
The
idea is that, on the one
hand, the political role
of the
family, here meaning by
this term an institution
and a set
of ideas current in modern
societies, is largely, although
ambiguously, that of a support
for the forces of
normalization which keep most of
us committed to the ends
around which our institutions
are constructed.
The family
as a principle around which
most people's living

arrangements are organized is a site
for the focus of
never to be realized hopes of
concord and a fertile ground
for the application of a variety
of normalizing
interventions.

And as an ideal the family serves
as a

model of concord which invites either
a depoliticizing
sort of despair and grievance, a sense
of satisfaction
based on the privatization of ends and
the cultivation of
naivete regarding the historical course we
are on, or a

revolutionary commitment to make the larger society
over
into a more "familial" place, or some combination
of all

three.

Regardless of which of these positions people are

drawn to, the notion of family functions to prop up

concordance and so helps to sustain the dangerous growth
of the imperatives of social coordination which are so

conducive to normalization in the first place.

And in the

meantime the interpretation of the nature and importance
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of kin ties through the
lens of an onto logy of
concordance
acts to help sustain the
still near universal
second-class
status of women and women's
activities relative to men
and
men's activities.
On the other hand, it is
also true that the institution
of family, meaning specifically
the common practice
whereby a small and relatively
stable and intimate group
of adults combine residence
with the raising of children,
ought to be defended as a
achievement which, however
precarious and dangerous, is nonetheless
necessary to some
of the ends we rightfully prize.
it is for example
a

locus of much that people experience
as worthwhile or even
deeply satisfying. I maintain, in
other words, that there
is a way to defend the family
from the point of view of
discordance, and I believe that this
defense can provide a
beginning to a counter to the forces of
normalization that
surround us, as well as to the assumptions
of concord and
the institutions of growth that supports
those forces.

The first part of my thesis, that the family
normalizes,
is the subject of the next chapter.

In chapter four

I

discuss the family from the point of view of
discordance,

drawing both genealogical and psychoanalytic perspectives.
In between,

in chapter three,

I

review some of the much

and varied theoretical discourse on the western family, in

order to make the case that concordance is assumed by

wide variety of points of view.

a

CHAPTER

3

THE CONTEMPORARY FAMILY:

OPPRESSION, NORMALIZATION, AND THE
NATURAL

In this chapter

I

am concerned with deconstructing
and

criticizing today's family, rather than
with defending it.
I nonetheless end up doing
some of both, as the power of
the family to do harm stems in part from
the good that it
offers.
This at any rate is the conclusion I reach
after
addressing the following questions. What deleterious
and

unjust features of our society

(I

mean the modern west and

especially the United States) does its institution of
family participate in?

family do?

In other words, what harm does the

Given this harm, what explains the tremendous

appeal and moral force of the image of "the family"?

in

other words, how is the contemporary reality of family
(image and practice) constituted and enforced?

say at the outset that

I

I

should

do not provide here any kind of

adequate description or a documentation either of the harm
done by and through the family or of the technologies of
its enforcement.

Instead

I

offer an account of them which

is consistent with the ontology of discordance.
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This means, of course,
that my critique of the
family
connects to the account of
modernity I give in the

preceding chapter.

am concerned to make
plausible the
idea that there is a link
between our family institution
and today's lack, on the one
hand, of "public" spaces
of
action, accountability, and
the expression of the
different and the unsettled, and,
on the other hand, of
"private" spaces which allow for
unmanaged, incompletely
enunciated, or non-hierachized
differences to exist, on
the other hand, I want to make
this case without denying
that families do to some degree (and
in a changed world
could to a greater degree) operate in
the opposite
I

direction, and help give life and value
to some unrealized
public and private possibilities of our
human existence.

The Contemporary Family

The institution of the private family is a
central
figure in the structuring of modern, western
societies; it
is central both in its capacity as an image
that

circulates and its reality as the typical basis by which

people participate in economic and social life.

1

Ranya

See Michele Barrett and Mary Mcintosh, The Anti-social
Family (New Left Books, 1982), pp. 7-8. Barrett and
Mcintosh consider the family's reality as image to be "the
family as an ideology." To me this wording falsely
implies that such images would necessarily go away in a
society without class oppression.
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Rapp clarifies this dual
aspect of fthe
ho meaning of
"family"
by distinguishing between
families and households.
ldS re the em P^ically
measurable
w??h?n°
?
within people
pool resources and perform units
certain
tasks... They are residential
units withiS wh?^
WhlCh
reS ° UrCeS
^stribu?ed^d

SSSffi.!

-

Family, on the other hand, is as
Rapp points out a
normative model with which people
are recruited into
households.
"The family" refers first to the
"nuclearkin relations which are held up as
the proper model for
the formation of households (mom, dad,
and the kids), and
second to the more extended ties which,
while presumed to
be emotionally significant, people are
permitted to

"activate selectively." 3

This normative model, finally,

includes a particular vision of sexuality and
of gender.
The only sexuality in the normative household
is legally
sanctioned heterosexual ity, and "mom" and "dad," as
the

compatible and jointly required genders of parenthood,
each have their own special characteristics, so clearly

marked by the differences between mother's day and
father's day.
Some aspects of this model of the family are today being

called into question as never before, but the model is

2

•Family and Class in Contemporary America: Notes Toward
an Understanding of Ideology," Rethinking the Family: Some
Feminist Questions Barrie Thome with Marilyn Yalom, Eds.
(New York: Longman, 1982), p. 169-170.
3
See Rapp, "Family and Class," p. 170.
.
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still very much alive and
well.

4

There are now

television situation comedies
which tell the story of an
alternative type of household
there

-

are two "dads," or

maybe a mom and a teenage
helper.

On the one hand the

message is that these families
are okay; there is love,
the children are well cared
for.
On the other hand, the
message is that the characters
did not choose their
different way of life; they are simply
making the best of
a regrettable situation.
Thus the shows seem designed to
reassure us about the resiliency of old
ways despite
social change. 5
The nature of the normative family model,
as well as the
power behind it, is summed up beautifully
in the results
of and the reaction to an attempt by the
Chicago Housing
Authority to remove warring gangs from the 13
story

Rockwell Gardens housing development.

The authorities

began to enforce Federal guidelines that only allow
"families" to lease units.

Specifically, all men living

It has recently been challenged in a revolutionary
decision by the New York State Court of Appeals, to the
effect that, when it comes to rent control laws, any group
characterized by a long-term exclusive commitment and the
pooling of economic resources can legally be considered a
"family." See The New York Times July 7, 1989: Al and
.

B16.

5 Two

such shows are "My Two Dads" and "Charles in Charge."
A notable exception to this trend is "The Tracey Ullman
Show," which has regular skits about a gay couple and
their daughter.
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with a woman in her apartment
without being married to her
stood to be evicted. The
result has been, on the one
hand, control of gangs.
On the other hand, numerous
marriages suddenly took place.
These marriages
are, of

course, coerced.

One man who has hid in the
apartment he
lives in since the day of the
raid said "it's been like
prison." Despite this remark, the
article in The New Yn.v
Times which described these events
is entirely upbeat, and
so is the Housing Authority, which
plans to continue the
program elsewhere.

"It's exciting, isn't it?" a Chicago
Housing
Authority spokeswoman, Katie Kelly, said today.
Quite frankly, we hope the trend continues. "^

Thus while we may have reached the point where
the

gender and marital status of the parents and
caregivers is
a legitimate subject of public debate, an
important degree
of orthodoxy does exist.

According to this orthodoxy,

marriage and family are something to celebrate.

Moreover,

in general "the family" is taken to mean a goods-

consuming, child producing, child rearing, resource
pooling, and property holding household which is based on

nuclear kin ties, is fairly strictly segregated from work
life and education, and is the center of privacy, love,

and stability.

6

In short, the family is marked out as the

The New York Times. October 18, 1988, sec.

I,

p.

18,

col.

.
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only proper place where
children and adults can
live
together, as well as the
most proper place for
strong
affection, intimacy and
personal commitment.
This idea has replaced
an earlier medieval one,
by which
the family referred more
to the importance of
"blood" ties
in locating individuals
and arranging social and
economic
life and less to a "home"
where one could find privacy
and
affection.
Earlier than that, in the
Greece of Plato and
Aristotle, "family" meant the
producing and child-rearing
household; it was articulated
as the realm of necessity,
without the normative status
conferred by the medieval
concern with "honor" or the modern
concern with familial
love.
And, in societies further
removed from us than our
own past, it is misleading to
speak at all of "the

family."

Thus,

in some languages there is no
word for the

unit of parents and children, even
though the speakers are
clearly aware of which children are
biologically related
to which adults, and in other
societies there is no living
space common to the group of parents
and children. 7

This is pointed out by Jane Collier,
Michelle Z.
Rosaldo, and Sylvia Yanagisako, "Is There
a Family?
New
Anthropological Views," Rethinking the Family
Some
Feminist Questions, ed. by Barrie Thome with
Yalom (Longman, 1982), p. 33. Regarding the Marilyn
lack of a
term like our "family" in some languages, they
refer to
G
of Evon Z Vo *t' Zinacantan: A Ma van Community in
H?
S?^,
J
the Highlands of ch 1ap ag (Harvard University Press,
1969)
Regarding the point about a "family space," they
p. 39.
refer to the work of Yolanda and Robert Murphy, Women
of
the Forest (Columbia University Press, 1974)
?

'

'

•

"Family" is, in part, a
contrastive CQncept;
meaning as much by what
it supposedly
-

supposedly is.

s

^

as by

^^
^^

The modern western family
is situated
among, and posited as
a contrast to, the
otherwise
relatives contigent, often
competitive and instrumental,
and usually temporary
relations of modern capitalist
societies.
"The family" is meant to
contrast with the
private world of friendship,
with the semi-public world
of
"private- business and employment,
and with the "publicworld of government, politics,
media, and entertainment.
in contrast with the more
voluntaristic and perhaps
interest-based relationships that
supposedly characterize
these settings, the family refers
to a group of special
persons among whom obtain more
demanding norms of
accountability and responsibility, and
among whom memories
are shared that make the mutual
relations extra ordinarily
valuable and important. Relations in
the family are
supposed to go beyond the instrumental
and the contigent,
as well as beyond the level of sharing
and commitment

considered normal in friendships.
The separation of the family from other
realms of social
life such as work and politics is of course
not just an
idea but also a reality.
The modern family came fully

8

•

Collier, Rosaldo, and Yanagisako, "Is There a Family?"
*'
pp. 33-34.

'
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into its own in the last
century, as a result of the
industrial revolution, and
scholars widely agree on
certain of its features.* It
could not exist in anything
like its present form if there
had been no decline in the
amount of production and education
carried out in the
home. 10 it is, as compared to
the family of feudal times,
more isolated from non-nuclear
kin, servants (if they
exist), and community knowledge
and observation.
it has
changed internally, both with regard
to at least the form
(if not necessarily the import) of
power relations between

U

For the structural-functionalist position,
see Talcott
arsons So cial Structure and
Pgrs^aLifcy
New
York- Free
£ r* s
*> 1970), and Talcott Parsons and Robert F
Bales
l
Family, Socialization and in t eraction Process
(New
YorkFree Press, 1955).
The classic Marxist text is perhaps
Fnednch Engels, The Origin of the Family. Private
Property and the Sta te (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr
&
Company Cooperative, 1902). Two excellent feminist
texts
(which also include good overviews of the family
history
literature) are Louise Tilly and Joan Scott, Women.
Work
and Family (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1978)
and Elizabeth H. Pleck, "Two Worlds in One: Work and
Family," Journal of Social History (December 1976): 17895.
Other important works in the history of the family
are Phillipe Aries, Centuries of Childhood: A Social
History of Family T,i f p (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962)
and Edward Shorter, The Making of the Modern Family (New'
York: Basic Books, 1975).
'

.

.

10 A good
account of this transition in its early stages
can be found in Aries, Centuries of Childhood
.

See John Demos, Past. Present, and Personal: The Family
and the Life C ourse in American History (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), pp. 3-23. Regarding privacy in
New England, see Nancy F. Cott, "Eighteenth-Century Family
and Social Life Revealed in Massachusetts Divorce
Records", In A Heritage of Her Own: Towards a New Social
History of American Women Nancy F. Cott and Elizabeth H.
Pleck, eds. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), p. 113.
,
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-n

and wo.e„, and with
regard to its p hysical
set . up
0n
the one hand one's
gender is no longer iegaliy
and
explicitly determinative
of one's rights and
ohligations
any more than one's
membership in a particular
family any
longer invokes a set of
rules about carriage
and
occupation. On the other
hand, the household
is now
marked by corridors, rooms
with functions, and
furniture
that stays in one place. 12
Along

^^^

^

privacy indicated by these
changes, has come a new
attitude toward children, who
are now thought to be
different than adults, even as
better

than adults, and as

deserving of a great deal of
special attention so that
they develop properly. 13
These truths help to distinguish
the modern family from
its western predecessor, but
they leave many questions
unanswered. 14 what kind of autonomy,
and what new forms
12

Centuries of Ch ildhood
pp 394-403.
i
Ari6S thGSiS in Centuries nf
0n
rTvaov as a modern
D
I
privacy
invention, see Hannah Arendt The
H^an_C^Mitipn (The University of Chicago Press,'
Sf 8
,

.

nhn,^

L

,

,

h
0 lead t0 01l,e Seri ° US
Understandings.
One sLS?d
should ni?
not jump *to *K
the conclusion that history has
G pro
essi ° n fro * ^rge to small, or from
a
familv
material ^ oods to °ne based on sentiment
(I speak
sneak of this more in this next chapter).
Peter
031
iS
irSt idGa a "»Vthf" *nd points to the
w^v
way ^hL
this myth blinds us to contemporary realities
We
lose sight of the important distinction
between the family
the " c °- resid ent domestic group" (household)
anH^fthe
k
f
?f understood
and
family
as a network of kinship.
Just
as we assume that the household was bigger
and more
materialistic in the past, we tend to assume that today
the household and the family have become the
same.
There
-

h^H

^

^^ /
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of social regulation,
come along with the
apparently clear
delation of the family as a
separate space? what
forces, for example,
now Pennine Carriage
choice" and
occupation, and how is the
family complicit with
forces? The modern family
is
as initiated
through voluntary romance
and as separate and
distinct
from the world outside,
and these ideas are a
real feature
of the institution, but
this does not mean that
they are
true.
it remains to be said
how the modern family

^
is

regulated "from the outside."

m

my view the family is in

part a product of social forces
and in that sense hardly
distinct from the "outside."
To ask about social
regulation is to ask about the
ways that rights,
obligations, and social expectations
are established, if
not by the rules and laws of
honor and blood.
I

argue,

following the lead of others, that
they are established
with the help of the notion of
"the
family" as a locus

(and even as an ideal) of happiness.

This occurs not in

spite of but rather because of the
fact that most of us
don't live in "normative families." And,
I also argue,
the fact that this occurs means a good
deal of harm can be

*************
is a "modern family," but within its bounds
there is
considerable variation. Laslett, "Introduction: The
History of the Family," Household and Family in Past Ti^
ed. by Peter Laslett with the assistance of
Richard Wall
(Cambridge at the University Press, 1972)
p. l.

done to people that might
otherwise not be done.
I( like
Rapp, understand the
modern family as complicit
with the
propogation of norms which have
a heavy cost for many.
The Price of the rnn«-» TO Orarv Pa „ ;iy

Because of the role played by
the modern family in the
secondary status of women,
powerful descriptions of these
costs can be found in feminist
scholarship,
fact were
it not for feminism, it is
doubtful that there would be
much at all by way of analysis
and criticism of the modern
family.
Socialist feminists have been
particularly

m

insightful, although (as we shall see)
these insights are
often combined with some problematic
assumptions typical
to socialism.

On the insightful side, Rapp explains
how the family
operates as a norm of loving, worthwhile,
voluntary

relations in the context of a system of
households which
are differentiated by class. The result is
the

perpetuation of a variety of illusions central to
both the
continued acceptance of economies of private
accumulation
and the continuation of the hurt, disappointment,
and

suffering faced so often by people in their pursuit of
worthwhile, voluntary relations.
To achieve a normative family is something many
categories of Americans are prevented from doing
because of the ways that their households plug into
tenuous resource bases. And when normative families

.
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Of particular force is
Rapp's discussion of the
way the
family/household system l inlcs
the pursuit Qf autonomy
love to the reproduction
of dependence and class
and
gender inequality, working
class men and women
typically
look forward to the formation
of their own family
as

somehow liberating

-

"Founding a family is what
people do
for personal gratification,
for love, and for

autonomy.""

What people get instead is
recruited as a member of a
particular gender into a household
situated in a
particular class. They then need to
do their required
part in the family just to keep
it going.

The norm of the family based household
is, in other
words, clung to as the only (and the

approved) locus of

the achievement of satisfying and
meaningful personal
relations. There is enough truth to
this idea to keep it
going, even as it has some terrible
effects. 17 As Rapp
15 "Family

and Class," p. 180.
""Family and Class," p. 173.
17 These
effects are racist and sexist, as well as
classist.
I agree with Michael Harrington
that teenage
pregnancy among the poor (in some places occurring
at
epidemic levels) cannot be entirely explained by
ignorance, lack of access to birth control, or even by
the
refusal of men to use birth control (certainly a factor)
To refuse to countenance the possibility that young
women
sometimes allow themselves to get pregnant to try and
court love and family autonomy is to give them too little
credit.
Poor teenage women are not stupid.
They simply
are in a much worse position than others when to comes to
their chances of getting the romance and independence all
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puts it, ties of family
te oiten,
i are
often »t
at least among the
poor
and the near poor,
poor. nifeii«
lifelines *.».
that simultaneously
hold
together and sustain
individuals. »«

M

,

On the other hand, real
family experiences all
too often
belie the norm of loving,
sharing, and protection,

exploding instead with tension,
rage and violence, while
few families actually
correspond to the norm of
the secure
and harmonious group of
thoughtful yet apolitical
heterosexuals who are concerned
primarily „i th continued
security, self -development and
recreation, this
gap

between norm and reality leads
usually to reflection on
one's own inadequacies rather
than on the inadequacies of
the norm itself and its social
and economic

context."

m

*************
of us are encouraged to pursue.
Teenage pregnancy helos
P
to firm up differences of social
class because it
reinforces stereotypes of the poor,
while often keeoina or
g PSCifiC individuals Poor and dependent?
Moreover
rG ° Ver
s?n^
since it is women who get pregnant,
and because a
disproportionate number of racial minorities
are among the
poor teenage pregnancy has both racist
and sexist
3
111
011
The Ne * American Poverty, p. 196 and
throughiut"

^

'

^ ^

18 J

'

m hrie Spea
P° werful ly of the real importance
nf S!n!! f e !
t0 workln 9 class survival and resistance.
"Thf
I"The Si
Working-Class
Family: A Marxist Perspective » The
Family in Political Thought ed. by Jean Bethke
Elshtlin
Mass
The University of Massachusetts Press,
1982

^

^

,

'

)

*

:

•

19 Even as
of 1978 both parents worked in 50% of the two-

parent families. And one out of six children at that time
lived in a single-parent family. Boston Women's Health
Book Collective, Ourselve s and Our Children: A Book By anri
For Parents
(New York: Random House, 1978), p. 160.
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the (somewhat stilted)
language of Jurgen Habermas,
"familial-vocational privatism"
is an important
cultural
bulwark of late capitalism. 20

Michele Barrett and Mary
Mcintosh, authors of
The_Antiz
social Famil y., discuss these
several points quite
succinctly. They point out
that, when it comes to
the
maintenance of economic exploitation,
families contribute
directly as the basis of inheritance;
they pass on not
only resources, but "advantage
and disadvantage
in the

chances of educational success. "21

The fact that people

live in families also provides
support for the myth that
individualist and market forms of
economic organization
can adequately provide for all.
This lie is sold, say
Barrett and Mcintosh, primarily by
means of the equation
of individualism and familism.
The self-sufficient

"individual" of mainstream economic thought
is, for
example, really a "provider" for a family,
and the talk of
society as composed of such individuals
helps cover up the
fact that many members of society cannot
contribute to

production and the wage system cannot actually meet
the
22
needs of all.

Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973),
The Anti-social Family p. 45.
,

The Ant i-social Family

,

pp. 47-50.

p.

75.
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This elation of
individualism and faBilisB
operates
For example the concept
works hand-in-hand with
the
structure of work
the - fa» ily wage ,„
gender
disparities, and en d er
g
baS e d occup a tion a i
distinctions
to make it likely that
women will be the ones
to give up
work and career and st ay
home to ca re for children 23
Men, on the other hand,
often have little choice
but to
spend little ti»e with
their children. Families
simply
c an not afford to do
it a nother way. 2"

^

-

-

The family is also currently
implicated in the fact that
women are more subject than
men to isolation, risk of
mental illness, mental anguish
and physical abuse.
This
is because the ideal of
family, along with the myriad
of
social expectations, laws,
policies, and economic
realities that support it, places
women and men in
different relations to public and
private life. Barrett
and Mcintosh point out for example
that men, -more fully
located in the public sphere," are
more likely
to be

convicted of a crime, while women,
trapped in solitary and
unrelieved household responsibilities,
are more likely to
be diagnosed as mentally ill. 25

Harrington, The New American Poverty
pp. 196-197.
Ourselves and Our Children pp. 190-191.
,

,

The Anti-socia l Family

,

pp. 58-59.
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The contemporary
family also helps tQ
enfQrce
limitations and impose
expectations with regard
to
people's sexual identity
and activities. This
is
Particularly hard on women,
despite many changes
for the
better in the recent past. 26
The bulk

^

Qf

divided into married couples,
and this gives a
tangible
basis to the pressure the
family ideal exerts on
everyone
to be married. Marriage
of course is typically
an
economic arrangement as well
as a sexual and a
romantic
one, with women being
in a more financially
dependent
situation. 27

what this adds up to is
obstacles to
alternative arrangements of sexual,
intimate, and
financial life, as well as the
reinforcement

of the

pressure on women to be adequate
sexual objects for men. 28
The costs of our family system
are,

of course, also born

by children,

one book reviewer, after
speaking of the

5sy f

2°^

w

sex reform nove» ent "

7a

27 The

Anti-social Family pp. 54-55. Following
Engels
n McIntosh conclu
that
sex-love
must
bT
seofraLd
separated ?
from economic ties and "allowed to
flourish
in
its own right." As I have already
indicated, I?m not sure
"6
e
y " in tS
right " exists
s4e The Ant?sociai
£mnv
7j
°T Friedrich Engels,
X
and
f? mi1 y ,P- 75
qi " of
the l
Family, Pri vate Propprt v and the, Stajbe TheOrigin
Charles H. Kerr & Co., Cooperative,
1902), pp. 91-92.
28 Barrett
and Mcintosh say that sex still takes
primarily .'on men's terms,- and this in indeed place
one way to
put it, although I am uncomfortable with
the way this
reifies ..men" and their "terms" ( The Anti-snn^i
P hras
^
,

^

'

'

>

^^°"

>

(
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widespread sexual abuse
of children, often by
family
members, added that
-Countless children are
beaten,
starved, isolated and
treated abominably by family
members
and caretakers.""
as the hills,

^^^

^

^

^

it was not conceptualized
as a problem (i„

the united states) until
after the "Mary Ellen case"
of
1874.30 since then t
has
iar
issue of individual pathology
and medical deviance.
While
it has, in the words of
Barbara j. Nelson, been
"vigorously portrayed as a
non-controversial issue," thus
turning "policy makers away from
considering the socialstructural and social-psychological
underpinnings of abuse
and neglect," abuse is in fact
"often intimately connected
with poverty, racism, and patriarchy. "31
it is, in other
words, connected to the institution
of family which
.

^

^^ ^ ^

is

itself so wrapped up in problems of
poverty, of race and
of women.

G \*° rer

The New York Times RnoV p^-i^, July 16
Forer reviews America's Courts and Their
Treatment of Sexually Abused c hildren by Billie
Wriqht
Dziech and Charles B. Schudson (Boston: Beacon
Press,
1989 )
loon
1989

p.

'

21.

,

.

30

Barbara J. Nelson, Making an Issue of chil Abuse:
Politic al Agenda Setting for Social Problems (The
University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 5
31see Making an Issue of child Abuse p. 4,
p.
89-90, for each of these respective quotations.
,

3,

and pp.
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Barrett

d MCIntosh sum up
the costs of
in their claim that
it J-s
At
is »*
n +i
"anti-social
tk«
A<iX *
The family, thev
say, "arrogates*
important SQcial
»•

y
^^^^^^
yaiues

^

^

"altruism, feeling
.
commitment,
and in dividual autonomy, -.32

stxne ana distort their

^^^
^^^
^

and loving would be
more widesprea(J if
claim them for its own .„33
It s w th th s
pQint
that Barrett and Mcintosh
are at their weakest
It is certainly true
that the selling of
these important
ideals as -family values „
helps
immune from criticise,
as it adds power to
what Barrett
and Mcintosh call the
widespread "imagery of
idealized
family life... And it is
likewise
.

.

.

^

^^^

provides more than public
relations support for the
family. 34
a<JtuaUy

„

^^

^

^

^

divisions of responsibility
and authority assumed to
be
ideal in the family appear
in the occupational

structure,

in residential and
non-residential institutions, and

33 The

Anti -social Family p. 80.
The Ant i -social Family, p> 2 9.
,

See also p. 42.

»
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elsewhere-

Thus faBily . Uke
arrangemenfcs

business also sunnnrfe
supports *-w
the assumption that
people live in
or should live in,
families
amines,
^
turn many social
institutions are organized
on the

m

,

do get their caring
in faniUes .
conventional family, everything
is,

"pale and unsatisfactory.

on the other h and

36

^

^^ ^ ^ ^

else

the orit ique of today's
family as
••anti-social" misses the mark
on several points;
it
overlooks important aspeots
of our families and
it is
based on a naivete concerning
"the social." Barrett
and
Mcintosh are critical of the
family but, li ke nany of
their opponents who celebrate
the family, they make
(or at
least fail to question) the
problematic assumption of the
reality or possibility of an
authentic self. They
,

participate, in other words, in
a philosophy of
concordance. As a result their
account of the costs of
the family is inadequate and
their recommendations are
problematic.

discuss this at length in the next
chapter.
Consider
for now Barrett and Mcintosh's
call for "increased social
responsibility" in the care of children
and for justice
I

35

The Anti-social Family
36 The
Anti-social Family

,

pp.

,

p.

29-30.
77

(and pp. 76-80).
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based on -genuinely
social control."
These
inese ideas are
not
explained.
The word "social"
appears throughout
their
t-t as a kind of undefended
grant of legitimacy.
They
seem to take for
r granted •>,=,<.
«...
that the proper
commitment for
people to have is to
"
"society
"ety, rat-he,.
rather than more narrowly
to their "own" family,
and the proper locus
of the
formation of such commitment
is a more "social"
world
This leads them to conclude
that the strengthening
of
community requires the
weakening of family ties.
They
put it another way when
they say that we need
.

^

"

"social and

political change so that
...[legitimate] needs and desires
can be met in a more
genuinely social
"38
context.

Specifically, while cutest
increases in social control
are correctly understood as
intervention by unaccountable
and/or pernicious bureaucracies,
Barrett and Mcintosh say
that we must nonetheless "work
towards greater social care
and support for children, and
greater social, rather than
individual, control." 39

Barrett and Mcintosh say little
about what such
collectivism would look like, but we
do know about one
feature
the "total eradication of all
familial ideology
from the media and all public
discourse ..."40

-

We should/

37

The Anti -social Family, p. 53i
38
The Ant i-social Family p. 133
39
The Anti -social Family p. 134
40 The
Anti-social Family p. 8.
r

,

,

77

faniiy ought to be 41

e^lity

—

words - dispense
-

«-*

for women requires

i£

,

ho „ ever
fche

^
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about what
the cause of

,

^

^

ideals o f fa „ ily or
,
as i argue in
,
chapters
that the notion of
family become more
con t estable without
^appearing a itogether ? To my
mind
,

notions of -the family
as
ideology „
itself as "anti-social"
1
cov P r up some
^
cover
.,

ambiguities and P
possibility
siointies.

the

^

^

^

important

a«
An
unqualified endorsement

of "the social" firstn merely replicates
first nf
of aall
the image
of the "family" at the
level of the
me social and
an n so amounts
to an uncritical a ccept
a nce of today's f amily
ideal of

h.nnonious togetherness. 42

Secondly the contemporary

tradition; for then, the birth of
a society If liberated
S the unlinki "g of "truth" fro™
power
it
means the transformation of imposed
beliefs
into
r lng trUth
meanS the lining of a sophisticated
fo™
form of repression,
it means the end of all ideoloov noi
Dust family ideology. And this
liberated society if'
Barrett and MClnt ° sh to be a more
"social"
society?

S^i%S"J

"

^
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«~iy

- »

,act both

- anti .

very basis of our

^
^ ^

^
^

social „ in some

^

-Plicated hoth in the
creation

in
arrogatiQn
caring, sharing and
loving."
we should ask, follotfing
the lead of poucauit;
the commitment to the
soci al be in fact
evidence Qf

^

^

i»age „e turn to, the
condition we imagine,
the thing we
speak of, when we witness
systenatic injustioe?
It is on the basis of
this
that many different
Power relationships, many
different interventions,
are
established. This possibility
appears when the situation
is considered from a
genealogical point of view.
Any such
approach must draw heavily
upon critical views

cedent

of Barrett and Mcintosh

nothing without them

-

—

^^

indeed
mueea it
it would amount
to

but its aim is to recast
their

criticism in the light (or
darkness?) of discordance.
From the point of view of
discordance, an y views of family
which fail to challenge
concordance necessarily miss
something and are part of the
prohlem.
The modern
family

exacts a cost through its
contrihution to normalization,
and it does so precisely hecause
of the way it huttresses
assumptions to the effect that there
is one true or proper
or most free way to live. In the
next chapter I show that
Barrett and Mcintosh share this
problematic assumption

87

with a host of others
S

m
In

the maritime

I turn to a
genealogical account of
the family^ role
in
normalization.
*

Here
°f

,

^

rely especially

a^iiB^flr^Miu^.

as well as on
Foucauit , s

various more limited
remarks on

^ves

us a kind of map of

^

^

connect

^

between
factioity of fa.iUes ana
the variety of forces
that have
shaped that reality,
while Foucault speaks
more to the
question of the kinds of
identities forged by B
eans of
among other things, the
modem family. Taken together
they suggest that the
process of social management
which
involves the family depends
on (even as it helps

to
sustain) a vision of
concordance, both social and
familial, when I look beyond
what Donzelot and Foucault
say to consider what they
imply, x see a theory which
Places the constitution of the
m odern family at the heart
of the transition to modern
forms of self, modern forms
of
power, and modern ideas of
concord.

Donzelot follows many others in
emphasizing the role of
reform-minded "experts" such as doctors,
juvenile courts,

43

19

™?

T

inin

an/gjL

lOkrSuctS?

?.° f J! a nips (New York: Pantheon Books,
The "f*>T of duality: Vo,,,,.
'''

'

'

,
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bureaucrats, counselors,
and psychiatrists
i„ the
Nation of today's easily, which
is conceived
^
»°ving resultant an
uncertain fonn whQse
inteiiigiMi
can oniy come frc
studying the system of
reiations it
maintains with the
sociopolitical level.. -44
The
construction of this
uncertain for, has heen
effected
-inly through the propagation
of new norms of family
life, a process which
he says began with
the work of
Physicians in the last part
of the eighteenth
century
Specifically, Donzelot
documents how the family
in France
changed because of "the
propagation within it of
medical
educative and relational norms
whose over-all aim was to
preserve children fro* the
old custom, "45 custoffls

^

,

^

had come to be seen as
constraints to the proper and
costefficient development of the
population. 4 6

agfi^'o^,^.

W^jE" «1

««nto.h

unity rather than a term 'on
whose real
31 referent
ref IrtT*™***
or meaning
we can aaree » The *nti-social
,
> n fi
g
Fsmllv (New
Book

^

.

.

^

Solrl "? ^^^Tl^L^
1982)

d

It'

1

and CtvUlzaHon: A
Using*

45 Policing,

p.

xx.

46 Pglicing,

p.

13.

4
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^
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Donselot shows that the
customs aimed at
XiKewise the remedies
i»po sed
,

varie<J

fay

^
,

and SQ

well-off the problem was
seen by
influence ana dangerous
practices Qf
which meant physical
danger as well as
"promiscuity „
Among the poor concern
was directed at the
use of wetnurses (and later foundling
hospitals,, the vagabondage
and indigence of those
who did not succeed
in the system
of alliances that was
used to form families,
and the
brothels that were part of
the separation of
sexuality and
family required by this same
system.
Reformers saw these
practices as dangerous and
inefficient, and as breeding
grounds for revolution. Too
many potential contributors

^^

^^
'

to society were lost; too
many troublemakers were
created.
The older regime of family
which was under attack is
called -the system of alliance"
and the "ancien r*n... by
Donzelot.
Eventually superceded by today's
"advanced
liberal family," the system of
alliance had as its point
the determining of those— male
and
would devolve the perpetuation of female— on whom
the
possibility alone for them to marry, patrimony; ?he
the other
remaining in their charge; the
discrimination
between
the legitimate offspring of sexual
unions
and
the
illegitimate offspring.* 7

47

p

•

P2ilcina, p. 24.
228

•

On the "advanced liberal family" see

90

Foucault understands
the late -edieval
™»h<
,
organization of
kin in a similar
fashion; the regime
y une of .in
alliance is » a
system of marriaqe of fi v =4-deVel °P» ent of
kinship
ties of t
t-s,
transmission of names
and possessions. -48
It
as one of its chief
o bj ectives to
reproduce the
interplay of relations
and maintain the
law
that a
gOVerns
" th3t
.49
them
-

.

Ocelot

is guite specific
ahout the problems
that came

to he posed for order
by alliance, and
he descrihes the
failure of attempts to
ameliorate them while
preserving
the old system.

From the standpoint of
the stat-* individuals
were rejected by the Lw
who
nf ln
5 beCame a sou rce
of danger through their
96 and indi ^nce
they were also floss
In thai ,?
'

vla^*™*

:

bundling hospital;

Eg ^ic^o^was

^S^^^S^^r

the

1

-

M
^
? "6

staL were consia'reThomo ogouT^
W S Un e S
t0

"

::men ee re ?a ke n ?o he
7
ruling or of being ruled
?
of alliance was ?Irmula?ed y
bv ^n

L

-

to

can also
and

- ^her^an

ca P able either of
° f the
J*"""
n
f r
raen
s
?o be
( ^or
discussion of the notion of an
"ethical
subiect
» J
n
f
0ral Pallatization of'sex
in^classicafGreecras
e aS an°e
a
th
S
ad e b y and «>'
see
Foucault's The gse n D
Tn
„
V°l-. 2 (Ra ndom House, ills
especial
25-31).
The transforation of Ihe ssvste/o; 2?7" a"d PP
y st em of alliance was
V
prefioured in «-ho
6
ld
* geS
° f a Christian
ethlcl" marital
*

^ecL°

•'

r^-^

?J

^us

L^^?

Sic?

,

"f^f**^

•

?J?

relations

49 The

History of Sexua lity. Vol.

i
,

p

'

.

106

.

"
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—

'-"i"
the interest
the moralization
****** through* 1
d to consolidate
force of the state
the
thronoh
li ?
9
tr
tment of the
inevitable casualties
-?
of
?hi=%
ly re ^ i,» e the
unmarried men and
o women aS
i
and ?h
the abandoned
children. 50

"Estate?

=

The type of families
involved in this attempt
at
compromise were patriarchal
in the strict sense
of the
term
they were small
political organizations
theory by the father
and directly accountable
and linked
to the state. The big
concern of this type of
fa„il y
(certainly of the father,
its public representative,
was
"honor." But these
patriarchal families found
it harder
to contain their members
by ensuring their upkeep,
and
they "abused" the system
in order to reduce their
own
51
costs.

-

m-

The resultant vagabondage
and abandonment came more
and
more to be seen as a
"problem" as the nineteenth
century
wore on, not simply because
there was some misery and
poverty involved, but also
because, first, such misery
played into the hands of the
socialists and neoMalthusians who opposed both the
old order and the

50

.

"Policing, p. 24.
51 For
example, the foundling hospitals
failed as an

"re

SSSSfifi?

^^^SS^TTST^
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reformers bent simply
on updating
v <^ing it,
it and,
an* second,
because
economic change meant
ant thai^.
*
that the ~
productivity
of bodies had
to be maximized.
n a(i the
This finfl
4.v.
Spelled
decl i« and mutation
of
the old system of
alliance.
In Foucault's words
"economic processes and
political structures could
no
longer rel y on it as an
adequate instrument or
sufficient
Donzelot, by the onset
of the twentieth century,
as
reformers successfully
championed, first, a mild
version
of feminism (more or
less co-opted by the
forces of
Philanthropy)
second, compulsory and
,
unified schooling,
as called for by the
logic of the liberal state,
and,
third, a series of remedies
for the old customs. 53
These remedies, like the
prior attempts at compromise,
varied along class lines.
The bourgeois classes were
advised to construct liberal
education around children and

" The

History of s.v^i jtv, vm
n
p- 106"Like Foucault, Donzelot views social
order as »
'
5° r exam P le are understood to exist but
il is not assumed
it
that they are united in interest
or that
their strategies always work.
Similarly while the
is thought of as a "structure,"
inso?ar4s i£ Ices exert
UreS on behavior and limits on the
possible? these
^!^,
pressures
are neither thought of as all in
direction nor assumed to be "contradictions"one consistent
pressing for resolution. For an explanation whicS are
of this idea
see Foucault "Truth and Power," Power/Kn Q w?.°L

\J

'

Lh^

.

Pantheon Books, 1980), pp. 109-133.

^

.

have been inundate* by

classes were

sheeted

,.

medical „

^
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^

to a h ost of new
regulations and
surveillance „n ich aimed
to compel them to
„a*e children
the center of Xife,
to provide the
-supervised freedom"
consistent with the fa.il .
y s function .

^

^^

Donzelot calls the system
of "santast,* „ hich
"corresponds to an accelerated
liberalization of
relations, both within and
outside the family." The
latter process is the
system of "tutelage,.. by
which
families and family members
who are "unsuitable"

for or

resist middle class norms
are "stripped of all
effective
rights and brought into a
relation of dependence vis-a-vi.
welfare and educative agents." 54

Donzelot argues that an important
technique in the
process of contract has been
the use, by medical and
teaching professionals, of women
to disseminate new norms.
A "privileged alliance between
doctor and mother" 55 helped
increase the domestic power of
women vis-a-vis men while
at the same time resulted in
the "domestic

instrumentalization of their persons" and
the destruction
of mid-wives and mid-wivery 5 *
This alliance of women
with philanthropy served, says Donzelot,
as "a point of

54 Policing,

p.

xxi.

55 Policing

r

p.

is.

56 PoUcing

.

See p. 18 and p. xxii for reference to the
respective quotations.

wren's rights novements

Q£ the nineteenth

early twentieth centuries. 57
For the working class
.other, this meant
tutelage; she
was confronted by an
array of programs of
aid and
surveillance, from family
allowances to societies
for the
protection of children. These
programs, says Donselot
were based on an emphasis
on her importance and
a
suspicion about her competence;
they aimed to transform
her into a -state approved
nurse, -58 meaning
their
job was to be vigilant
against the temptations of
the
cabaret and the street. 59 The
bourgeois WOBan> on
other hand, was supposed to
guard against the influence of
domestic servants and participate
as a missionary in the
spread of new norms. «° she was
granted a more
"professional" role, consistent with
her mission within
the family.

^

^

The two tracks of the transformation
of the family have,
says Donzelot, proceeded by means
of forms of power which
are neither strictly public nor private.
They include
both the "soft" inciting interventions
called for by "psy»

57 Policing

,

p.

21.

58 Policing,

pp. 29-31.

59 Policing

p.

45.

p.

46.

60 Policing

,

,

»
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eas Udeas derived

f

^

psyc h o analytic discourse)>
such

as the preferring
of advice>

an<J

^

regulation of welfare
policy and juvenile
and
courts.
Donzelot characterizes
whafc
aeveiopea
a
flexible attitude of
social management,
one guided by

^

"Keynesian" counterparts
in the economic real*
operate
without appearing to violate
the autonomy of the
objects
of intervention." The
modus operand
a
"adjustment," which means
encouragement and creation
as
nuch as prohibition, what
is adjusted are the
norms of
behavior and the cedents
of individuals,
what we have
here, to use Foucault's
phrase, is "bio-power
.

^

^^

^

.

According to Donzelot the key
to this bio-po„er is an
idea made available by
psychoanalysis. While psychiatry,
by classifying children
once and for all as good or
bad/
had affronted the family and
denied
as well the school <1

right to do its own categorizing,
psychoanalysis asks both
the family, the school, and the
juvenile and family courts
to do the "right thing" to
improve the child's
behavior,

appealing to the family's desire for
success and giving
others a "scientific" basis for
interventions. The "psy
idea" which Donzelot says is at work
here holds that
family roles are important norms that
cannot be lived up

Policing, p. xvi.

96

to,

rather than positions
of power and function
Psychoanalysis defends the
importance of the family
but
it justifies always
the discovery that the
family has done
its 3 ob poorly.
This na)ces intervention

^

^

^.^

so they go more smoothly
seem benign; it even
has the
effect of encouraging the
revolt of and the demand
for
adjustments by individual family
me mbers.
Donzelot's
words,

m

The disposition thus produced
with reaard tn fh.
he
family was an admirable one
for
it- made
>l
xt
Possible
to avoid the real danolr.
I
dangers li
of Zu
the family's
autonomy
while f»nfiT^.J?i
.

attaching their dreams and
ambitions to it."
To summarize, according to
Donzelot the advanced liberal
family propogates norms that are
"admirable" from the
point of view of social regulation.
This ±m effected

«

62 Policing,
63

p.

233.

ading °? Donzelot that somehow
h^n^o?
bent
of the use of the word "admirable" misses the ironic
here see Paul
313 ° f thS Social ' M Politick,
?hr~' (Routledge & Kegan Paul),
Three
pp. 67-82.
Hirst reads
Z
approving of "^e modern educative family"
80?
?h
p
he g ° eS ° n to argue that the
^ght of middle
class women 2for equality which was
appropriated
regulate the family should be universalized
so as to reeducate the working classes away from
their materialism
and make possible a non-inflationary
"
Aside from its arrogant imputation and"incomes-policy
then rejection of
working-class materialism," this reading ignores
Donzelot's argument that the "autonomy" of middle
class
families facilitates social regulation. Hirst
also is
rightly accused, by Fran Bennett, Beatrix Campbell
Rosalind Coward, of thoroughly misunderstanding bothand
the
aims and arguments of a good deal of feminism, as
he sees
its proper task as bringing a companionate and
cultured
family to the working class.
"Feminists
Degenerates of
the Social," Politics and Power: Three
pp. 83-92.
Hirst

^
tl^r*
£

nfp^.

(

—

,
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pally through the
offering Qf
assista
and protective
intervention, although
sanctions also
involved.
Don 2el ot points out
that advice is today
an
especially useful for*
of social control
because it is
consistent with the
legitimation needs of the
l iberal
state, which must avoid
bo th socialism and
statism. And
the modern family is
. useful vehicle
it offers a set of
problem which are bound to
be
endlessly recre a ted an d
"solved."

^
_

^^

Normalization ,„ rt tha pam{1y

m

^

m^

While Donzelot never
provides a summary of the
norms
propog a ted through the family,
it is certain
f he
did he would include the
cultivation of an apolitical
Kind
of commitment to "family
values." A more complete
list
would include educational,
relational, hygienic

^

.

and sexual

norms; the prevalent idea
is that behavior should
be
cooperative, obedient, healthy
(not "weird" or "ugly"),
ambitious in an understated way,
expressive and creative
along as an acceptable career
is either enhanced or left

*************
in his "Reply"

^

(pp. 93-95), in turn rightly accuses his
13
attaCking him f ° r thin * s h does not
*
^eir debaL
, example
? bate is a good
of a male socialist and
S!iflniS
alking aSt ° ne an ° ther rather than to
each othe?
n%H meantime, Donzelot is not well
understood'

e

J
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jeopardized. heterosexual
or invisibiy
h6rWiSe

aCC6Pti " g

«

«- «*- that lower class Ufe
tends to produce
"misfits » anrt
i„ accordance
and ln
with the
notion that the
"social welfare
welfare" is
;= an
unambiguously good
t
'

'

Part of what Donzelot
is claiming is
familiar; our
arrangements typically
turn our concern
our etforts and
our blame for problems
towards ourselves and
families,
we are typicaliy
caught up in trying to
shore
up, escape from,
found anew, or get help
for, our
families.
This part of his

-

-

_

^

^

the critigue of Barrett
and Mcintosh, Rapp,
and Habermas
°n the other hand Donzelot
is also pointing out
that a
»°re "public" outloo* c an
be just as .political
as a more
"private" one, if the public
activity and concern
that
comes along with it a ccepts
"social welfare" as an
unproblematic goal. The pursuit
of concordance is

apolitical however it is directed.

This part of his

thesis is not so familiar,
but it is at the heart of
his
idea of how social control
proceeds. The reality which
we
should be questioning is, as
he puts it, "the triumph of
the social."

Donzelot understands the social
as simultaneously an
image and a set of institutions
and qualified personnel
around which and by which people
are normalized.
The

"
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social refers to
social workpro
workers, social
programs and the
idea of social welfare 6 *
tk^re.
T he concept of the
social once
operated, says
DonzelniY uonzelot,
to indicate -the
problem of
Poverty, the problem
of others,- but has
come tQ
general solidarity and
the production of a
lifestyle something with which
all are concerned,
which all should
Bee*.
^d, he claims, the emergence
of the contemporary
liberalized family form is
intelligible Qnly by
problematic the
ne rise nf
of *-k-s«
this new "reality
principle of our
societies. 66
•

_

^

Donzelot, in his cryptic
way, is getting at
the
following idea: in modern
western societies we tend

to

posit the social and the
political as opposites, or
at any
rate as fundamentally
different. The political
is
sometimes seen as an agonistic
realm which stands (either
as a path or an obstacle)
between current reality and
the
possibility of a more truly social
existence. The proper
goal of political activity is,
by this view, to make

Vifi^

S ° Cial isl the set of mea
"s which allow social
tSri

uncertain??*!! ?h

^

P ressu "s and politico-moral

are flexible enough, and internal
srakes SLt are
convincing enough, to avert the
dislocations that
Ce ° f
terests
beliefs wouJS en£S.
PoITc?na
Policing, n
p. xxvi.

^

65 Policing,

p.

xxvii.

66 Policing

p.

xxvi.

r

.
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tself obeolete through
it .
it
to replace relations
o f power ana
difference witn
relations (Marx is
perhaps the mQst
proponents of this view)

^

^

^

„ social „

The most successful
opponent of this position
is the
classic liberalism
championed by among
amona ««,
others, Hobbes and
Locke.
By their view, the
political
itlcai ls
p
is an inherent
*
limit
on the social.
People and groups are
understood by
liberalism to be "social"
(or anti-social, each
in their
own way.
Sociality is, then, for
like-minded people, and
differences between individuals
and groups create the
conflicts of politics.
•

By either of these views
the arena of the social
is
postulated as exterior to politics,it is postulated as
the proper, or empirical,
locus of concordance,
it is

where people get along, or
where they realize their
essence.
Donzelot, on the other hand,
rather than
positing an opposition by nature
between the political and
the social, views the latter as
a construction with
particular political ramifications;
rather than ask how
can we achieve the truly social
life, he wants to know
how, and by virtue of what
discourse, it is that we come

to take for granted the primacy of
the social.

While Donzelot, as a conclusion of his
work, asks this
question only to leave it unanswered, he
does offer some

101

thoughts regarding how

tMs

^^

^
^^

^

^

primacy is connecfced
Practices of social
regulation. His
that the goa i of
social harmony finds
its prinary
expression in the ideal
of the harmonious
middle-class
family; this id eai then
provides the rationale
for
interventions and the
preferring of a d vice that
differ by
class and which denigrate,
depoliticize, and even
disassemble alternative
groups and families.
Psy ideas '
welfare rules, and family
court
lings
virtues of harmony as they
move to enable and
enforce
individual adjustments and
smooth over differences.
The
ideal of the modern family
is thus both dependent
on and
valorized by a depoliticizing
arrangement of

^

interventions.

I„ Donzelot's words, the
family is

inscribed -within a new for.
of sociality, of which
it
appears to be both gueen and
prisoner. "" B y his view,
then, the "advanced liberal
family" is anti-political
precisely because it is anything
but "anti-social."
Clearly then, Donzelot and Barrett
and Mcintosh are at
odds in some respects. The
latter thinkers, like many in
the critical tradition, are
likely to refer to the effects
of the contemporary family as
"oppressive." The concern
is with denial and repression.
Genealogy, on the other
hand, refers to them as "normalizing,"
and the concern is

Policing, p. xxii and p.

7.
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with the production
and privUeging Qf
certain
-in*. By virtue of this
concern>
is
of critical theory
for its tendency
^
particular form of self
or way
life
Thi
a opposition
j of xire.
This
should not, however, be
overdrawn. Critical
and
genealogical thinking can
and should he combined
in the
analysis of the contemporary
family.
T his is because
oppression and normalization
co-exist in modern
societies
Many are kept from, or
denied, what they want
and need
and certain identities
and outlooks are imposed
and
privileged without adequate
justification.

^

^

^

The

contemporary family is implicated
in both these processes.
I turn now to compare
a critical and a
genealogical
explanation of the tremendous
power (popularity,
of the

family idea.

The harm done by today's
family is not,
after all, fully accounted for
unless this power is
explained somehow. On this
question both the critical and
genealogical approach have something
to offer. On the
other hand even together they are
inadequate to the task.
Affirmation is needed as well. This
is because, first,
the contemporary family cannot
be reduced to a mere
guardian of order; it has roots in
aspects of ourselves
that predate the modern era and
which will be presumably
be here long after it is gone.
Second, neither oppression
nor normalization can be explained
without reference to
what besides them the family is.
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The p°v»- a;
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^

°on 2 elot raises the
westion Qf the pQwer Qf
idea when he accuses
psychoanalysis of helping
to "refer"
individual frustration
and "attach- indivi.ual
dreams ana
ambitions to the family.
„ e does not say
about what accounts for
the possibility of this
referral
and this attachment, why
is
fafflUy sQ usefui
_
site for this power? what
is the appeal of the
particular
dreams involved? These
questions point to the self;
they
ask us to consider what
it is about the self
that enables
today's -the family" and
"the social" to be produced.

^

^

^

Foucault provides a genealogical
answer to this question
by speaking of the ways in
which the self is, itself, a
production.
I turn first, however,
to an answer rooted in
the critical tradition.
Barrett and Mcintosh take note
of the lack of an
explanation for the "appeal" of the
family in Donzelot's
work, and they blame this failure
on his method.
The
deconstructive approach can, they say,
only point to the
strategic value or function (for a
set of persons or an
order of relations) of the creation
of
a want,

feeling, or commitment.

need,

By definition, then, Donzelot can

say nothing about what in people's
nature would make them
amenable to be "constructed" this way or
that.
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Barrett and McIntosh
counter
»°dern family (inadequately)

^

^

^

^^

fay

accords with widespread
(but mistaken) beliefs. 68
They
first point out something
I have already
mentioned
that
people sometimes have
rights and obligations
among f a»i ly
-mbers that provide for a
level of economic and
emotional
security not found elsewhere
in our societies.
The family
xs More or less the
only pl ace to turn
inadequately meets these
needs, and at times turns
the
search for security into
isolation, loneliness,
mental
anguish, and physical abuse,
especially for women. Their
second, third and fourth
points are equally valid.

-

^

^^^

Families sometimes provide
a place where people
can more
openly express emotional need,
the family operates to
provide marks of "similarity,
familiarity and belonging,"
and the married couple tvoicaiiv
typically hac
has more resources than a
single parent to financially
provide for children.

^

Barrett and Mcintosh also point
to three beliefs which
support the family and which they
clearly consider flawed
or mistaken (although they don't
provide much by way of
refutation or discussion). First, it
is strongly believed

This is only partly in keeping with
their
commitment to follow »a theory of ideology commendable
that cas?s
S Participants rather than as
P
passive
consumers."
?hf
i\- -social Fami1
The Anti
Y p 2 1.
69 The
Anti-social Family p. 23.
.

f

,
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that children need two
differently sexed ..parents"
(natural or surrogate)
n th
- family
,„., ls
e)
the
seen as naturally
given and as socially
and Morally desirable. -70
Second
the family is typically
seen as rooted in our
deepest
biological urges. And
third, the family is
thougnt tQ fce
a locus for and a
creator of important
"pre-capitalist"
values such as the capacity
to love.

—

.

,

in sum, Barrett and
Mcintosh point out that
the model of
family promoted today is
based on a -id-nineteenth
century
ideal according to which
maternal

tenderness is
complemented by fatherly
independence.
This model is
popular, they say, because
for most people its the
only
aeans available to pursue
some deeply important
goals, in
particular the satisfactory and
fulfilling raising of
children.

suf?ic^nt?'i

and SeCUre

Stable
'

«*

self!

This position is certainly on
the mark with regards to
the way the family is understood
today and what is asked
of it.
By referring to the various
needs monopolized but
inadequately served by the family,
Barrett and Mcintosh do

T he Anti-social family
The Anti -social Family

,

,
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two important things.

alternatives to the

They point to

f anily ,

and they

^^^
^

^

fay

to need, the issue
of the self and its
nature,
its
impossible to explain the
appeal of the family
without
some reference to need.
They have not, however,
p rov ided
either an explanation of
their own or much of a
critique
of Donzelot.
On the latter count,
none of the claims in
their list of reasons for
family appeal contradict

Donzelot's theory,

only the claim that today's
ideal
family form is the most
"plausible- means, in contemporary
conditions, of raising
"self-sufficient" children appears
to be prohibited to Donzelot,
given his commitment
to

avoid attributing properties
to subjects.

Donzelot does

not, however, assert that
subjects have no properties, and
so he would not be contradicting
himself if he believed

that this claim is or might be
the case.
As for Barrett and Mcintosh's
own stab at explanation,
it does not go far enough.
Even if powerful interests are

supported by the acceptance of today's
family ideal (as
they are) this does not by itself
explain this
,

acceptance.

Nor is it enough to show that family
ideals
are widely promoted in our cultural
media; it remains
to

ask why this promotion is possible and
why it is
successful. What, again, is its point of
application?

Their discussion of the need for "belonging"
is fairly

^^^^^
^^^
„^
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vague and mos tly
assertive
the family is .-seen..
as naturally
that it is really only
a more generally
need for
belonging that is
appropriated by the family. 72

would only reluctantly
endorse the family, for
laok o£
alternatives.
Barrett and Mcintosh are
in this case governed,
and
havered, by their undefended
assumption of the benign
and
essential nature of the
social.
People's desire for
belonging is thought to be
both natural and properly
expressed (automatically
flowering?, in
a ..social-

context; the existence of
the family and family
ideology
are then attacked as
"anti-social., because they
maxe the
political implications of this
desire negative.
The needs and satisfactions
to
affection security, intimacy, which we refer parenthood and so on - are not sexual love
artificial
fouri
demonstrat e the need for social
and
hange S ° that such needs and
desires
can
be m»i
?i
met in a more genuinely social
context."

V

This fails to consider what is
implied by Donzelot and
said by Foucault, that the
political power of the family
ideal stems in part from the way
it is used to amplify,
promote, incite, and problematize
the need for belonging.

The Anti-social Family
The Anti -social Family

,

,

pp.

p

.

26-29.
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is not to

it is rather to

evolves the

«*•
shw

paction

* «^^

reality of any such
„

poiicingii

of £amily appeal
,

channeling.

^

^

^ ^^^^
fe

And the dreams and
editions so produced are
in an important way
like the ideal Qf
Barrett and ncintosh
Mcintosh

^„ them
ln
harmony and belonging
are

joined seamlessly to sel
f -expression

autonomy.™

(

sel f -develop»ent and

B y Donzelot's reading,
then, Barrett and

Mcintosh's critique of the
idealized family can act
only
to reinforce that which
gives the ideal its power,
which
is this larger ideal
of freedom.
Barrett and Mcintosh
reject the family for the
sake of the social; Donzelot
tells us that this cannot
work.
This is because
it is

precisely the commitment to
harmony and to the end of
contradiction (the social) that
makes -the family- so
important and so difficult a
reality for us. And the
ideal of the family, in turn,
helps propagate this
commitment. The contemporary
family is complicit with
normalization.
Donzelot, then, is concerned to
deconstruct an ideal of
harmony, rather than to counter
the family ideal with

74

See for example their assert ion of
the need for "greater
social, rather than individual
control" in the care of
children.
The issue of social control through
interventions is dealt with as a mere problem
of the form
these interventions "currently take
The Anti-social
"
,

.

Family

,

p.

134.
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another.

^

„ e does not

COmnitment t0

tMs

,

"exible "psy» techniques

cannot by themselves be
enough to enable norns
to float „
and the "social., to
emerge as the unquestioned
value
around which systems of
power are constructed.
The
subjectification of the self
to modem disciplines
requires a point of
application as well as a
method.
This
point of application is
the human being.
An advocate of genealogy
might we
int e rje ct at this
point: isn't it possible,
and indeed plausible,
that
,.

u

-odern disciplines create a
for* of self „ hich then
serves
as that needy being which
comes to value the social
so
highly? couldn't psy techniques
work in concert with
other mechanisms to create
their own point of application?
Foucault makes this kind of an
argument when he describes
the contemporary family as
based in, and abetting
in,

the

"deployment of sexuality."

Sexuality «nH the Family

drew attention, in the last chapter,
to Foucault's
argument that sexuality is a modern
construct, rather than
an underlying essence or drive.
Consistent with this,
Foucault says that the modern family
is neither the site
I

of a new liberation of sexuality,
nor of a new repression
of the same,
"on the contrary, its role is to anchor

.

"
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sexuality and provide it
with a permanent support "75
is sexuality's
"privileged point of development "76
Originally perilous for
the rule-concerned
system of
alliance, the deployment
of sexuality gradually
transformed it and preserved
it, as the relations
of
alliance become medical
concerns; doctors,

ft

.

educators, and

psychiatrists helped reconcile
"the unfortunate conflicts
between sexuality and alliance. 7 ?
What does this have to with
the power of the family
ideal? By Foucault's reading
it is this transition
which
has provided the basis for
the constitution of the
family
as a site of intense
frustrations,
dreams, and

ambitions. 78

Foucault argues that the family
can be

constructed as it is
importance

—

-

as a place of such great

because of the prior fixing of
the

individual as a site of sexuality.

The family is what it

is because of the concern for
sexuality which it helps to

maintain.

The family is, then, a social
construction that
helps to create its own point of
application. The
sexualized subject is typically heavily
invested in family
ties
both negatively and positively. The
"affective

—
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intensification o£ the
fanUy spaceB is cQnnecte
^
us, to the fact
that tQday , s faniiy
functions
hotbed of constant
sexual incitement.""
The shift toward the
positive production of
sexuality
says Foucault, created
both problems and
possibilities
from the point of view
of order.
The maintenance of
sexual incitement, as
well as the putting
of its results
into use to the ends of
social management, had
to be
reconciled with the threats
it posed to the
system of
alliance, which functions
through the strict control
of
sexual engagements, or
this at least had to
be done if
the two systems were to
be made to function

^
^

-Us

'

'

together.

This is the reason, Foucault
tells us, for the particular
concern of our cultures with
the problem of incest.

M^V??

such°a sSong^nteresf
if more or less by common
^ uxuuxre

fo m<q Jz w
,

/

accordlr

displa * ed
° f inCSSt

^

pernaps this was because it

l^TstuluTalsTrT^l aga^nst^
implications

6
'

**

'

wa«?

»

6
of tnislepfoyment'of sSuallry
which"
P but which a »°"g "s many benefits
had ?h!iV
n g
n9
r orms of al?LnS?^

e

V

'

^«^

<

How does this deployment of
sexuality operate?
form of bio-power, it is (as I
said

As a

in the last chapter)

The History of Sgyi^i jtv. vni
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concerned not so much
with rules as with
knowledge. Four
domains of knowledge
nave, according to
Foucauit, been
strategically central. First
First, there was a
"hysterization
of women's bodies " wr>™<*«/„ i_ ^.
W°»en's bodies were made
into objects
of knowledge; and these
objects were made to
speak.
They
were analyzed as "thoroughly
saturated with sexuality,"
intrinsically pathological,
and responsible for the
"regulated fecundity" of the
social body" and "the
life of
children." Second, there
was a "pedagogization
of
children's sex." children
were seen to be the locus
of a
"precious and perilous ...sexual
potential." Third, there
was a "socialization of
procreative behavior." a concern
with "population" called for
the making of the fertile
couple into an object of
regulation and knowledge. Fourth
(least important according to
Foucauit) was the

"psychiatrization of perverse pleasure."

The "sexual

instinct," in this case as it
operated in adults, was made
the focus of investigation and
correction. 81
am certainly not qualified to
make a final evaluation
of Foucauit 's provocative thesis,
and I am not sure if
anyone is.
It is not easy to know to what
extent the
unities inside ourselves which we seem
to "find" are
actually our own productions or are instead
revealing of
something more "essential." I can, however,
say the
I

The History of Sgv ualitv. Vnl.
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following

First. 1 accept

^

^

actions concerned with
the parents/children
relation and
the husband/wife
relation have played a
big part in giving
the modern family lts
particular
of Donzelot. He and
Foucault agree that this
social
regulation has proceeded
partly by means of the
constitution of domains of
knowledge, as the modern
"sciences" of the self proceed
partly by getting patients
and clients to speak the
"truth- about themselves. 82

^ ^^^^

Second,

think that Foucault and
Donselot are on the
mark in the ways that they
amend (and draw upon) various
feminist and Marxist analyses
of the construction
I

of the

modern family.

They both point out that the
regulatory
actions involved were first
of all not concerned with
maintaining patriarchy so much as
transforming

it for the
sake of better population
management, and second of all
varied considerably by social
class. 83 "There was no

Sf B °

Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own r.„^.
150
ert
r " tn Vnnrn
on
the
"le
of
"
eXDerts and
experts
a nS%r^
elites in the formation of the modern
family.
1
18
cha c teristically, includes the claim
?'
th^tSS
that the construction
of the modern family (like all
1
01
concerned ""h^he maintenance
oPpatriarcnv
P triarc hy (the rule of men over women). Donzelot's
\, l
and
Foucault '. histories suggest a distinction
made
y Jean Elshtain; "male dominance and patriarchy
are not the same thing, though the one
may be a
concomitant of the other." See her discussion
of radical
feminism in Public Ma n. Privat-g Ur,mar,
2 15.

vJr,

™^"

l^
"

-

^^H

L
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^

unitary sexual politics .„ 84

ployed,
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^

^

as a technique of
maximization rather
repression, "by tne
the bourgeoisie
hrm>-„«
with respect to
themselves; Ulce the „
symbolics Qf biooaB Q£
sygten
alliance, the -a„a lytica
of sexuality- -has
to be see „ as
the self-affirmation
of onfi
•

enslavement of another." 85

•

^^

^
^^

Most importantly for
the question at hand,

x

cannot

has today is connected
to a modern sexualization
of the
body.
It seems to me to be
highly plausible that
people
have come to have more
invested in f amily relations

whether this means the
centrality

fa » ily
success „ has fQr
the*, the psychological
devastation of family disaster
the power of the desire
to escape one's family,
or the
power of a desire to found
a family
because they have
come to have a concern in
discovering their own sexual
truth.
The question of one's sexual
truth seems so
..

,

-

important because of the way it
has been bound up with the
question of one's personal truth
of one's identity,
other words, it seems to me
quite possible that more in
our lives turns on our private,
personal family relations

-
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than might otherwise
dQ sQ
we
sq
exploring the Ration
of who and what „ e

u

^

are.

And we are so directed

^

We are pressured>
through ^
variety of mechanisms,
to form a coherent,
unified, and
sensible unity
an identity
gn

-

.

^

^

^

^

Purpose, a sexual preference,
etc.
We moderns are not
only heavily "sexualized,
- but quite self-conscious
and
very homesick. And we are
situated in a „ eb of
interventions and a conplex
of institutions which
a particular set of
familial practices and which
privilege
one particular for. of
"the family- both as an
ideal and
as the most pragmatic way
to survive. We make our
way,
then, as homesick subjects
in a world governed by
tightly
drawn institutional imperatives
of growth.
I„ these
conditions the modern family
normalizes and oppresses, it
is implicated in the same
privatized pursuit of affluence
that makes it such a compelling
(but inadequate)

alternative to the harsh realities
of that pursuit.

Family Appeal: Kin T j es and the Natural
But is this really the whole story?

The tracing out of

the deployment of sexuality does not,
in my view, suffice
to account for the power of the family
idea, any more than
it is enough to point to political
advantage (such as male

advantage) and media
influence

^ires

reference to

JZ2

»*

\

^

eXPlanaU ° n

nature!" (not
<
merely produced)
,
attri
h
attributes of human
beings.
This is
b. =ause, f
ls bei
or one
thing, "productioncan only
ny taKe
take place
oi a , on the
basis of
some raw material
^,
rlal '
Secondly,
ucn "t-=.w
raw _
*' such
material" does
exist.
Humans are natural
beings, and, as
such have
certam features. while
they
.

4.

—

to be) within
particular-

°' P ° SSlb

^
^
^™

m

,

° f SOCial °rt-r.
the range
'
»<* finite.
This idea is

s

=ons lt ent with a
philosophy of discordance,
which, rather
than dispute the
existence of the natural,
only asks us
to first, recognize
that humans are never
simply natural,
and, second, suspend
the idea that the
"naturalness" of
something is automatically
a claim to legitimacy. 86
This last point is
especially important
given the
conservative twist usually
given to the association
of the
family and the natural.
The import of the
natural is in

C

S

re

immuJe°from crItIcL m? our
ITulTll
ref lect on and
Y
complete our own nature fwith?n
tl I
our P a "icular
historical circumstances
gives rfS.

?T*
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fact inherently
k
intestable because,
j contestahiwhile th*

-

»•

« -«

...

*

„.

uu

_

k

application"
n
for the
production of self,
culture and
loentrty, the body
can never be
finally (once and
.
for all) or
objectively explained.
Actual hu
actual
humans bodies
a _„

it^

am

«»*.

Pa^es

then,

is the point of
sayi„ g that .
practice

of the natural,

while the guestion
of human
nature is inherently
contestable, this does
not mean
either that it can be
avoided or
issue is merely relative.
The human conditiQn
with the possibility
of making useful
and important
statements about what
it is that we
as historical
finite beings
recognize as central to
ourselves.
call something natural
is to make the
(contestable, claim
that something of
importance
something good or
necessary
is Bade possible fay
of the bad or the
unnecessary is also made
possible.
It
is to caution us that
something good may be
threatened or
lost if that aspect of
human life is forsaken,
denied,
minimized, or substituted
for.

^^^^^

^

-

-

-

-

^

How, then, is the modern
family form linked to the

natural?

begin with the proposition
that to be human is
to be embodied, finite,
reflective (in various ways and
I

•

- grees)
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dependent for existence
on sone
Qf
ern
soclal relations
and foraed as a
,
seif
participation in some
set of moral
° ra1 rather
than merely
allegiances
'
in puts lt wall
when
,

^

——
'

'

others "in relations
of concrete
particular^
particularity,"
and (2)
bound by "an imperative
„
e„
...to discover, to
understand and
to create meaning.^
To

^^

^

existence discordance
adds a third which
has already been
mentioned.
Humans are not desian^rj
^-^
int ° an V s °c "l
form, and since no
So™ h?*"^*
been Predesigned to
mesh with every drive
and
9 lthln the sel fevery particular form
of comnfi" n " ° f
humans
through social for^suM,^?
[
°
violence to

SEl

S^SS^A*"

TO say that these are
universal characteristics
of the
human condition is of course
to leave pl enty of
roon for
tremendous variety of human
ways of life and worlds
of
waning. It is not however< tQ
leave

,

.^.^

,

When Eli Zaretsky speaks of
the family, he makes an
important distinction along
these lines.
"Ties of

87
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Public Man. Pri^ t e Woman
p 318
Connolly, Politico a nd Amhig nit-y
.

.

p . 13

.

To put it as Martha Nussbaum
concerned with questions of the might, we are natumi»
single good life. The good for good but there is nJ
fragile and dilemma-bound. See,humans is multiple
example
-*<?™pie, ner
her'
commments on Aristotle '<s view *e *>,for c
W ° men
*
Fraaini-v
j^SSj? p. 370
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sexuality, kinship,
and bi -Logical
and psychological
dependence are inevitableself - „
s ^PPorting
nuclear
famil les are not. "90
,
Ties of?
of dependence
are apparently
fiwentiy aB
universal resDon
CO to
6Sponse
universal features
tures of khuman
lif e
Mnra
.
to invariably
use the
the bioiogicai
'
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distinctions regarding
their
Moreover, xi„ distinctions

^

.

— ^ ^- —
^
^
-

'

(MU

typi-.ll, used to posit
specific obUgations
specific shared Tories
and

^

^

experiences.

There are, not surprisingly,
so»e good reasons
for this

Aristotle recognized,
provide a framework for
the
construction or an -ethical-

reality; and, as he
also

knew, this framevorx
is not easily replaced
by some other
human institution, practice,
or experience. This
is
because humans need the
recognition and experience
of
involuntary ties to the past
and the future as a
means to
"ground" (maxe P o S si b i e)
their formation as ethical

selves.

Stanley Hauerwas has put
this in terms of
developing an understanding
about love
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»ave not chosen b
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Noddings understands
this

eve,

of

J-g-j.

^^

„£ ?e

ethical caring o92
wherej
an aspect o f identi
t y rather
the result
Particular concordance
of feelings or
interest.
Li *e
Hauerwas, she thinKs
that this develops
depends on
,.

^

^

reciprocal relations with
specific others. Eth
ical Ufe
^gins, says Noddings, with
-natural caring,- the
acting
on behalf of another
done simply out of
desire
Conversely, -ethical caringis caring motivated
by a
sense of duty, or an
experience of an -I » ust .„
By
Noddings account we come
to experience this -j
•
must"
through the memories we
have of our experiences
of natural
caring and the feelings
that were part of it."
Tnese
»emories for most people stem
from the relationships
to

adults that they had as
children, and Noddings
implies
what Hauerwas says outright:
that the family plays a

mo??

p?"35

Meanin9 ° f thS Fami1 ^" Commonweal

^

J ° Seph L
tls (P^er lang, lis
Ethic of Caring, " p. 339.

H "An
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August,

333^1?

^

epical

le in the fQrging
Qf huaans

beings. 94

^

more cautiously
conclude °
only
niy that
thai- humans
h
must find
themselves cared for
and able to care
in return in some
Xil
rasnion or another,
another- not
necessarily in a "family,*
I

.

in

^

at more length in
the fi nal chapter,
.
Tnis is
in these thin terms
e „ ough of a claim
to help

-n
the

,

powers

use, the

appeal of the family.

ozonation

Humans

_„

explain

o f .-biological" in
£orging links Qf

obligation because it
stands for that which
cannot he
chosen,
to see seething as
intrinsic, rather than
as
chosen (and dispensable,
is to marK it as more
deeply a
part of the self. B
y marKing Kin ties people
bring others
into a relation with
themselves at the level of
identity
and this is part of having
an ident ty
as Hauerwas
the fact of Kin ties
gives us each a story, and
it is by
,

.

f

e
her Point stands re:ard^K- C
rne

SFssySMJ?
elthe^f^

r iCal

^^c^iiroXrr
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el3ti ° nS With
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W^^-SM'SfSl^
H„i

either to form such attachments
or to live anv
life without them.
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inq of ourselves
as a part f a
°
that we
each come to see
ourselves 38
as ,„
,
a " dividual,
historic
>8

TT

•

The modern family
serves a r° le *-u
then in ^e fashioning
of human identity.
To sav
u
thlS how
Y fhi«
ever, is not to
posit
the modern family
form as a universal""iveraai, it is only
to
indicate one if its most i
1Dort
-»nf s
mp ° rtant
°«rces of sustenance.
The modern family has
appeal „ot Qnly
'

'

'

i

^

society disallows or
disables alternatives,
not only
because it allows some
people to compare
themselves

autonomy and responsibility,
and not only because
people
are pressured to concern
themselves with the truth
of
their being, but also
because it speaks to certain
imperatives of human nature
and the human
condition.

contemporary family is

,

The

then, an ambiguous
achievement.

At one level this ambiguitv
yuit ' points
Doint-c to a general
truth.
There is no way of creating
human identity that is
entirely benign. Just as a
sense of identity can give
us
the resources to take a
stand against prevailing ways
or
some of our own commitments,
it also involves the
imposition of uniformity on
ourselves and makes us
=»

Hauerwas, "The Moral Meaning of
the Family," p. 435.

vulnerable to pressures
n re S c„ ror
ofc normalization.
siai
tie, enable and
constrain. Today , s
faal]
fMUy
to delimit and
control
.

—

7

us to find and
make it.

^

*'

not

**
om y

This ambl
»„khe i ps to
explain how it is
that the
th fc
having of children
can be today
y
both a means to tie n»r.,f
m ° re finnly t0
the sta tus mo
and also a representation
of a person,,
*
P ers °nal step
..
beyond its
dictates.
The "natural" anneal
Ppeal of the modern
.
form of
family cuts at least
two ways
it ls
is able to
,
serve both
as a means of
normalization and
nd 33
. «as a
means of empowerment,
sustenance, and resistance.
.

^ty
.

.
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At another level
this ambiguity points
to a specific
criticism and to a
specific political
position.
The
criticism is as follows.
Today , s family ig
bound up with a kind of
enablina that is
enarumg
particularly
*iSahUm
**
P°"tical change, on the one
hand this is simply a
feature of tangible
ties with
others,
to maintain and renew
such ties (for example
by
having children, is to
express a faith in the
future and
therefore to some extent to
the sp^cifis future that
one , s
civilization is pointed towards.
Our family ties

^

^

•

«~ *

therefore put pressure on us
to endorse this future.
This
cannot be the whole story,
however, as tangible ties
with
others are also a precondition
for a politics carried out
by caring selves,
it is possible to be a
self and be

Political, if not
about everyth
family reality is
„
hn
Y 1S h
°»ever,
depolitioizing
because o £ the
specific features
.

'

Weste

*

it repeats an d
reinforces
S

«

"

and «.<
*i. is

Mod ern western
civilian
»
anti- political
(certainiy
'
institutionally bullt
around
amuence. and concordance
=u

*

-ran,
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^
^

^

^
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fami1 The amhiguity here
points tQ a political
fwxAticai position.
The
s, of th e contemporary
'

.

-c
.
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^
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fafflily

normalization an d
oppression

rrr°

n that

-

for
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^

g Uke it if we are
to strive towards
a less normalizing
no™ i
and oppressive
order
ir,
other words, we ar
P
^
are to develop
individual
empowerment, slack in
the order, space
for difference,
and
(a condition of
many other goals) a
oolitic, movement to
political
tame growth imperatives.
•

•

m

,

What should he changed
and what should he
retained*
discuss this further
in the final chapter.

i

To put it in a

what counts as family,
and to make explicit
the amhiguity
of worth
the good and the had
of any organization
of
relations along lines of
kin; we need in other
words, to
politicize the concept of
family.
o„ the other hand we
should recognize the
profound and legitimate
importance
that kin ties have for
people when we consider the
proper

-

-
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•
consider the need
ground and begin
efchical cQmnitment
specific ethers. We
shoul d rlna
,
finallv
Hy, insist
on the
tence of . link at

t

—

^ ^
,
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the considerable
coordination Qf
se lf -ccnscious
participants, between
space for difference
and the preservation
o f so me Kind o£
distincfcion
the public an d the
private.
In the final chapter
t
^borate on and defend this
vision o f a politicized
and
yet continuing
public/private spiit. This
means l wiu
°f
tW °
that child rearing
small households with so
me Kind of private
status is
now, and win continue
to be, desirable.
But what of the other
side of „y thesis? !
also argue
that the very idea of the
value of private households

m

^

^

"

as

families will continue to
be undesirably and
unnecessarily
depoliticizing, normalizing
and oppressing
as long as it
is bound up with the
affirmation of concordance.
Much of

today's critique an d celebr.tion
of f am ily is bounded> and
hampered, by its assumptions
of concord.
I turn next to
this subject.

CHAPTER

4

THEORY OF THE
CONTEMPORARY FAMILY'
ASSUMPTIONS OF CONCORDANCE
AND DISCORDANCE

To summarize my
argument so

^^

^ ^^.^ ^

concordance embedded in
our faniUal
Practice play a role in
the exercise of
power, and
especially in processes
of

^

_

see, to realize an
authentic self i s to
endorse without
a dequate reservations
some mode of imposing
form upon the
body. An d this is
particularly a problem
because our
wcrl d is increasingly
a single or d er
regui ring extensive
social management and
governed by deeding
imperatives
in this situation, the
aggressive guest for legitimacy
all
too easily turns inward;
people tend to define
themselves
so they can see themselves
as free (an d the
or der as

legitimate) within the existing
constraints. The
conventions reguire d for the
or d er to function become
norms, an d room for the
unpredictable, the eccentric,
the
new, the reborn, the
rebellious, or simply the
different
is squeezed away.
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The prevailing
vision of the
tne ffamily
a ™n
invokes just s »„k
iti ° ai
u:u

r
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a

amless han"° ny aB
°<" «"embers, a shared
commitment to the
polite and subdue(j
pursuu
niMie
class success, and
a shared cQncern

^

a

-moment

to,
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re£6r

nuch tout ed
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-one. own,. which means

Fa " ily
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WhiCh 13
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as an a dj ective
to

(Whoxeso^

,
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fanily values/ and
in this
thing that is indicated
is a
.

as in the

^

cogent

to political
action or the exp erience
or expression Qf
This vision of family
is integral to v
ario us techniques
of power at the same
tiae

as it

that power.

u

Qne Qf

^
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As Donzelot points out,
the modern private
family is produced through
the two-tiered techniques
of
tutelage a nd contract, a
result is the attachment
of
dreams and ambitions to
the private family and
the
production of sexualitv so as
a« to
n promote
y
privatized goals,
homesickness, and the pursuit
of concord.
t-

am claiming, then, that
both as idea and practice
the
contemporary family normalizes
through the notions of
I

concordance that it invokes and
enforces.
As a wary reader might point
out, I have not yet done
much to demonstrate the validity
of this thesis.

Perhaps,
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is as natural
as the

valorization of kin
kin, and not even
a sickness
besides
Perhaps it has nothing
to do with
th , the family,"
f
and the
lat!t
latter
is neither an
imposed construct
nor imDl
.
implicated
in
any other kind of
imposition.
Perhaps
wnaps, then,
th
Donzelot's
interpretation takes a
reality that has k
6611 freel
y c hosen
or «fi
reflects the rational
dictates of
states
„f a productive
economy
anH
and misunderstands
it as the result
r of an .1
k
elaborate
and
Multilevel »discipi ining
of selves
Empirical tools of
demonstration

„

.

.

.

,

«.

•
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.

are of

l inited

use
and survey research
might help to
refine or refute specific
claims about what
should count
as ..normal... Th ey
might also warn us of
serious
dissatisfactions brewing
within the populace.
We might
even notice that deviance
persists no matter
Persists
m,*-*
„
how norms are
understood. At best,
empirical work could follow
Donzelot's lead and continue
to trace the differential
methods that the state and
experts use to deal with
families, to encourage and
promote and enforce certain
ideas of families, to get
people to speak of themselves
and their families, etc.
But no such method can
ever tell
us for certain what the
important -facts-- are or
which
interpretation makes the best
sense of them. And when it
comes to the questions of
what about ourselves could
be
otherwise and which actions
should count as chosen instead
here.

Measurers

f s

tiy iBp ° sed
'

;

;
disadvantage.
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7

hniques are cleariy
Y at a

To some extent,
then, this "evidence"
problem
a feature of this
tvn» ,

are int.

,

.

S1,° Ply

<=laims

t

m

the sense thev
" le Y m*w>
maxe of experience
m„
.
F
ceM
Y account
of
family appeal should,
if it 13
i« any
=
good help make
'
**
sense
„
„, (and
,
perhaps give rise to,
experiences of ambiguity
families and the
expectations and
aspirations
famiUeS inV ° 1Ve
Sh ° Uld alS
°
-nse of
the persistence of
the legitimacy enjoyed
b y the order of
modernity.
Concordance promotes the
family and viceversa; and in a
anti-political culture of
concordance it
especially hard call into
guestion that which one's
identity is already
invested in.
<

T

-

*
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-

This argument is,

suspect, likely to make
sense to
(and appeal to) those
who already wonder at
the legitimacy
enjoyed by modern orders,
and who have perhaps
thus far
dealt with this problem by
expressing disappointment
I

in

the working class, crediting
"ideological" machinery as
too powerful, seeing
structural obstacles to change
as
all-encompassing, or placing
their hopes in an impending
immiseration and collapse of
legitimacy.

There is, fortunately, evidence
of a sort which I can
offer to better make the case
that the explanation of

~

—

r

^

iegitimacy

—
r

°

an cont.nue to

;
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ffered here
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ring

can show that
assumptions of concordance
and no
b
into
0;
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te r task, as

i;

z

lzing

nave said that
critical and celebratory
-ews of the family tend
to concur in
assuming or
endorsing concordance,
in tact
fact a great
»~ deal of our
talk
concerning family does
this- xt
it *
Y
thlS
Spends on the notion
that, beneath the
self as heteronomous
social product
there lies some Kind
of authentio or
true self the
realization of which
constitutes freedom.
„h ile
ccncordance is not disproved
by showing that it
is
everywhere (to the contrary,
neither is
fcy
virtue of its being widely
assumed. An d I can
show not
only that concordance
is widely assumed
in the theoretical
discourse on the family,
not only that in this
context
such an assumption can
be seen to overlook or
abet
normalization, but also that
by its lights the
essentiality, the arbitrariness,
and the ambiguity of the
modern family and its effects
are not well accounted
for.
In this chapter I review
a number of perspectives
on the
family in order to make this
case.
x
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The story of concordance
and

eMrgenCe
e

ctive

"

^

^ ~~» Sieging

contempQrary

of the choosing

—a

self
Generaiiy speakin
what is
:
today is the validity
Qf a
choQsing
an active being that
is capable either
of making or
clearly seeing an
underlying harmony in
themselves and the
universe. Compared to
this notion,
the
une iaea
«/
idea of
a f a concord
.uaranteed b y God but always
Qnly
nis reflective hut
finite and mortal
creations, has taken
a back seat.

r
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on the other hand this
same story can also he
said to
begin with the thought of
classical Greece, which
anticipated
and so laid groundwork
for
so much of
this modern understanding.
The debate between Plato
and
Aristotle foreshadowed much
of today's argument.
Plato
attacked the private family
for its promotion of
private
loyalties, divisiveness and
maldevelopment of the self.l
Aristotle praised the private
family as a building block
of virtue in the soul and in
the community.
Plato wanted
the bonds and loyalties of
family to be transferred into
loyalties to the whole community,
and this led him as far

-

-

*See "The Republic," The Great
Dialogues of Plato

byW.H.D. Rouse (The New American

E&fif^'BoSk^iv

2

»« to challenge even
the Greek sexual A
division of labor.
Aristotle
ristotle, conversely,
defended this division
For him,
P. sharing, and ol
P itical
I

^

.
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^
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each of whom has
an in d epen d ent
hase in .
-seho
women slaves i£
pQssibiei
property. 3
,

Plato an d Aristotle
not o„l y mirror
some Qf
disagreements
thev
ney, iiiv
a «
lke
many modern thinker£
^ share
common assumption of
4
concordance.
Elshtain has
h
pointed
out how Plato's
positions on family
reveal his
thoroughgoing
to the virtue o f
an abstract soul
an d the achievement
of an ahistorical
truth. = In the
Pursuit of the virtuous
unity of the whole
society, Plato
«as willing to countenance
the complete coorcUnation
of
social activity, including
a complex system
of social

—

cogent

^"The Republic," Book V
See a i cn c
11
"Philosopher Queens and
0kin
Private
SivS-^i??
Plato
the Family," The Familv i« nl??*"
on Women and
f
Bethke Elshtain^Wefsif^
university of Massachusetts ed b Y ***n
Press,
p. 41.

"

'

«

1982),

ra

B^H!fMaft e L ^. bY

T A
-

-

SinClair

ol^^T^nt^Zrli
5

<

S

f

t a°ctt!y

Public Man. Priv.fo ^mrin,
pp. 20-41.
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unaccountable wise fe
„.
assumed by Piat-n
Plato to u
° f ° ne

Uty"
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be i„ the end the
same as the
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^

entirel y by an
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"

-son
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-ass

or group,

onl y in so fa

th6ir » ale
—.parts, transcend enfcirely
their particular
histories and their
individual
^entities.* on the other
hand, he backs off
his
to egnalit y for
women without a olo
P
gy or regret
when he decides that
it wouldn't go
over in a real state
The best p^ssibl, state
he says
private marriage and famil
y , complete with its
traditional
Greek inequalities.?
In each case
Qf
state, and that of the
best possible state)
Plato assumes
that what the good
requires can onl be good,
y
and so he
does not speak of the
high human cost of his
plans.
This
assumption, of the impossibility
of justice doing harm
or
of good doing bad, is
affirmed throughout Plato's
The
Republic.
'

cogent

^

,

^

6

Public Man. Priv^ a

Wgfflan,

S
Family,'-

22HS?'sS2!i

Women and the

pp.

35-41.

ngUi "' 197 °''
Plat ° on

^erar ° °^kln
(

p.

^

'

l«st°tLTV^r2e £f «ircnos

-

NO/

-„

un just by

impossible." 8

While Aristotle is i-ir^i

PraiSed

f °r h

-

contribution
ideal of political
Political lif.
life, k
his version of
±.w
this ideal suffers
Sane aSS
of concordance
Plat °' hiS
counterpart. Thus
Aristotle is able to
defend the slavery o
£ wonen and
others as (at least in
princip le) . just
foundation
State
B
° th SlaV
cree, sexual division
of
labor nU st. he said,
have a foundation
can in principle be
entirely
iust^ fory Ilust:)
for tn e simple reason
that they are necessary.
» There can be
no
principle to the nere fact
that one should co^and
and
another obey; that is both
necessary and expedient. -9
Just as -it is a function
of nature to provide
food for
whatever is brought to birth,"
so nature must have
provided the different types
of people needed to B a
ke a
just order. 10 Nature has „
its own
q£
sufficiency. h11
to a

„
participatory
.

•

«0"

^

^

^

^-

^
^

^^

^

^.^.^

Jhe
9

Rep ublir, Book

I,

p.
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(Standard Greek

The Politics, Book I, Chapter 5.
1Q The
Politics, Book I, Chapter 11.
1:L
The Politics, Book I, Chapter
9.

^
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While the arguments
of Flato
Plato an
n Aristotle
a
and
mirror in
many ways today's
debai-o k
th ° Se Wh * tta
°
<* and
tho
k
those
who defenri
defend the prrvate
fa-lly and Rouse
tneir
concordance i
„
n some
in
ways very different
" eStern thinking
There is
<?

'

i

7

-

-

appropriately out-of-sight
activities
opposed to that which
is » public „

^

^

(those

"honorable,. and

ffiore

the low

tha „ Berely

are appropriate!,
shared and openly
the -entire community.
Tnus AristQtle

^^
„

^

^

Private househoid, but he
in no wa y endorsed
anything

all the difference
between the classical
assumption of a
harmonious and meaningful
ordering of the universe
and the
modern idea of concord
as the
" e creation
oreation „*
of a meaningful
order b y means of the
activity
c' ot
of human
h„. a » selves.
The rise
of the modern ideal or
f..i,„
of tn
tho
e famil y is connected
to this
modern privileging of the
self
»„h not
„ «.
self.
y
And,
surprisingly we
are typically concerned
not so much with the
ways our
families aid and obstruct
us in the creation of
some
authentic public life (although
this concern is not
absent) as with the balancing
of our desire for family
with our wish to enjoy other
less binding forms of what
is

"

•

thought to be
"private- (personal
need ox public
articulat
xcicuiation)
n

i„<

without

experience. !2

Hegel can serve to
remind us both Qf
^stance from
classical Greece and
of „.
the remaining
relevance of that
and its discourse,
.cording to Hegel,
modern

-e

:'

7

° ne " Sided

b36CtlVe

-

—

-

comply nature

as Plato,
(very CreeK)
understanding of family
and household as .
»eans reflects another
one-sided view."
xcw.
„.
This
Tnis „"objective
freedom," also called
"ethical Lite,
life » is, says
Hegel, the
°

The modern familv i<5 r,^
rse afflbl3ilously
with both privacy and
associated
freedom
T
is used both to
" freed °»" can and
refer to a condition
W ere one ' s fa »ily
life is allowed and
enabled
1 ? a" d also
ability to escape from
to the
one Vfaml?^
3 de » and s. so
"privacy- is used to mean
botn a
rest from the sort of
° f P rotec tion and
relationsth,?
are
su PP°sed to
prevail in the family
and thoL ,
relati
themselves. This muliipn
°ns
c i?v
lng
only the result of the
is
1 thin *. not
fact
S»?
3
at th< "
word "Private" is
relative
r
it attrihnt-f I
hing
de ^ ree °'
closure, autonomy' and/or
?
hidd2!f

^^

^

JL^V*

—

£3?'

cLr-piy

^^T^^^^-^^

Modern
ambiguous, and
life.

mumble
ple

SieSerrr-Hegei's
Origin

of

193-194.

P roblemat ic,
nature
nature°of
of 'an**
any conceivable good

°"
^
^K^/^
^flSS&SL^^
1

see Rud

J-

The

verene (Humanities Press,
1980), pp.

state of affairs
£ fairs that
constitutes our
-ompiete
n

V
ri

x trip that is

p

Each step

»

—

™

situated individuality."

us

^

-

r each this
*

(dialectical,

consciousness and
institutions

"

«-«*.

f the way supp
° sediy
°

the in ter activ e

UltlB3te in

in

>

^

^
^

and collectively

As it ig fQr piatQ

-

what is jU st is assumed
to be possible,
at least in
principle.

Hegel's

m~~ rf

nf th „ Pa „. 1y

The modern underestimation
of the public and the
ethical
is connecte d
says Hegel, to the
enlightenment
un d erst and ing of freedom
as rad i ca i autonomy.
„ e calls
the latter "subjective
f reedom, " meaning
retreat from
commitment in the name of
freedom a nd self-development.
To Hegel the development
of subjective freedom
as an aim
represents an em an cip a tion from
e ar iier mo d es of
,

consciousness, but is itself an
unstable achievement, in
contraction with itself, ultimately
unsatisfying and

,;mlitm
g
t
!° mod «nity, and his attempt to
find" in fi't
rind
h
it the
ingredients
for a life "at home " ssi

r

r
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gating,

and in need q£

objective freedom 15

Active

freedo » is

^

^_J

Q

—
J

of

realization of individuality
based Qn g „ sacrifice „
(transcendence, of
"personality- (the
wiu
as

need,

impulse, and casual
whim"). 16
If this transcendence
o f mere contract
relations is to
taKe place to any
degree in society as
a whole, in

People's everyday
interactions o f need and
interest, and
in the family.

The family< properly

^

^

transcendence, "with the
result that one is in
it not as
an independent person
but as a member.. .17
The family is
thus a real social community;
it is that form of
community
(ethical life, based on
love, based on, in other
words ,
feeling for actual living
individuals" or "mind's feeling
of its own unity." 18

it'recogntzes^hf right"?S. 1 ?

an

-"evement because

sub Ject to find
himself or herself sa??=f?L
her P^ticularity
He credits Christianity
for makin^thf lnto a
Principle
of the western world
""^el's Concept of
Marriage and ramUyf"
p m"**"'
•

t-ress,

1967), Paragraph 37.
See para. 36-38.
Hegel's Philosophy „f p< ht
para. 158
7
<-y

,

£S? SSf ^e^econri^ro fpara?

l ^.

^

'

"f

"
.

139

U,ve when fully
developed
UCh nore than
desirei. «c
*». it is
lprocal recognition.
achieved through
shared activity is
in turn
t
es sential for
,
th»
the develops
of self-consciousness."
F
Freed
reedom requires
self-consciousness
usness, and so
requires the dependence
of
ove
Th i s is not .
contradiotion>
'

,

^

^

won realization of
the telos of the
self (and it is
this sense that it is
"objective") 20
Hegel's vision of ethical
life includes as a
central
exponent not only the
valorization hut also the
regular
transcendence of private
fa»ily
fe, the family exists
only as a .cent in .
larger whole consisting
civil society (the realm
^« economic
roa i ™ of
7
and social relations)
and the stated objective
freedom requires membership
in
families, the leaving of
and break-up of families,
and the
.

U

F.

"Hegelf
T.M. Knoi
304-30*;

?»»• 158 *- See also O.W
»'
g
tr3nS **
(Srsf "* of ^PennsvlCani
enns Y-Lvania
TV
Press, 1948)
dd

ESoffiPfe

'

Zt

^

n

g* 55
21 Heqel's

,^

nde

?

PUtS

-

'

7

echical-love " seeliebert
e
and Familyy"'pp? Io^!o4
situ a ^H

^^

n° tion
V*?}'"
Hegel s Conce Pt
'

'

° f "h°nest,

of Marriage

for Heael "the family is

(University of Massachusetts Press?
5S5)? p.

Philosop h y of R i aht

-

para

.

157
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° Undln9

"

^

*it exists as an
ethxcaz community the
individuai faaiiy
anows
e
b ° UndS
-ual substantive Ufe
in the state, in
learning, and so forth
11
as wel,
well as in
labour and struggle
with the external
world.. .23
Hegel would not be
surprised fcy or
unimportant the misgivings
we have about our
own families
but would criticize
them as often one-sided.
In . fully
realized authentic existence
we would come to
understand
how our misgivings are,
in the overall scheme
of things
unfounded. We would
understand that the ethical
life of
the family is necessary
to, but ultimately
inferior to
that which must be
realized at the level of
the state.
The former is immediate
ethical life, and the
latter is
self-conscious ethical life.

7

^

«

'

^

This position allows Hegel
to achieve insight into
the
ethical importance of the
modern family. «e finds
value
in the way the modern
family, by virtue of its
basis in
the exclusiveness of love,
is based on a turning
inwards.
He points out, following
Aristotle, that -inwardness"
is

^

erson^^
Hegel's

Ph ii OSQp h Y
of children, see para. 177.'
23 Heqel's
Phil osophy of Right

of
y

,

ra

par a. 166.

1

s see

^ ^he

educatlon

'

i
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not necessarily
opposed to -outwardness,

»

^^

need for concrete
and particular relatl
°" S "ith meaningful
others.

W

version o f concordance,
in other words,
does not
equate the good life
with the acnievement
Qf
^
He reminds us of the
importance, especial ly
in large-scaie
social systems where
fairly impersonal
relations
necessarily enter into
cveryaay
evervdav life,
1
f»
of„ some sort of
multiplicity of realms.
„ e understands,

^^

for example, tne

importance of having both
the more intimate and
the less
intimate.
Elshtain's words, »„
we
e are all
;
all impoverished
if all of life falls
under a single set of
.24

m

terms..

Hegel also allows for the
fact that the exclusiveness
of
the modern family has a
problematic side, situated
as it
is in the midst of all
the egoism and struggle
of the
larger realm of civil society,
the family comes to stand
as an ideal, as the locus
of life that makes the
daily
struggle worth it. The problem
is that this ideal can
easily serve to rationalize
and reproduce an unjust order.
Hegel, like Plato, understands
this possibility, and he is
furthermore aware of some of
modernity's particular
propensities to injustice, specifically
the tendency of
civil society (and so market
economies) to develop

Public Man. Privat e Woman

p.

335.

conditions of 9reat
oroat P°verty
and inequality,
of
overproduction and sociai
misery. 25

Hegel holds fast,
however, to the idea
that this order
of property is
redeemable at least in
principle, g i ven
that it is hounded
properly by the family
and the
The key is that the
i f
latter a self-conscious
latter,
ethical realm
which is based on law rafh^y
rather than feeling,
serve to
constitute society as a
whole as an ethical
realm.
Then
the egoism of civil
society is mediated, as
it were, from
two sides.

M
^

"
Kc^iviK^^
"Svlduals
1

6 realization of free
P
P
9
»t 9
g h? ?orm th
the „
basls

antagonisms'berween
of a genuine public
community?"

™

•

Hegel does this not because
of any unwillingness to
be
critical of his own times,
but because of his commitment
to concordance
because, in other words, of
his
commitment to the idea that a
fully redeemable order must
be possible and in the
cards.
Because of this

-

belief, he

25

Hegel's Philosop hy of

Bigkfc,

para. 243-246.

^Landes, Hegel's Conception of the
Family,

p.

131.

Landes, "Hegel's Conception of
a Family," p. 126

.
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does not give enough
credit to many of
"* °r the -.1
"misgivings"
People have about the
modern
•

family.

have in mind two of
the determining
features of that
-titution: it is only
reaped in heterosexual
marriage
and it is based on
the different
Ierent an
n „
,
and
complementary
functions of the father
and the mother
ier
Hea.T
«
Hegel endorsed
these retirements
without gualif ication
saying
is the father who is
to exercise all of
the family right
over its individuals,
just as it is tha
X

*

^^

,

^^^

enters civil society
and represents the
unity of the
family to others. The
mother, on the other
hand, "has her
substantive destiny in the
family.. .28
criticai
Hegel's project that women
remain on the plane of
feeling
and the level of particularity,
as this enables the
family
to provide the essential
counterbalance to the egoism
of
civil society. 29

« ^

^

limited form of bourgeois
subjectivity 30
.

Hegel's position on women, in
other words, is his
attempt to deal with the problem
posed for ethical life by

28

^

Hegel's Philosop hy of ^ght, para.
166.
Hegel's Philosophy of Fig ht, para.
166, 166A, and 175A.
Landes, "Hegel's Conception of the
Family, p. 134.

~
the property
structure of ci„ fl
society.
„
Pi.*
lato. enterta ins
. vision of .
wh
a unity of
part s is achi ; ved
t
thout su
Because
: :;: of this
commitment to concordance,
he, like
Aristotle, postulates
a radical difference
in nature
between men and women.

^

^
—--

7

::r

~

-

—

Women may have happy
ideas tl . t
they cannot attain
to the idea? 'n^ ele 9ance, but
e
between men and women
is li£ I* 3 b difference
and plants. Men
tWeen ani »<als
correspond to ,
?
correspond to plants
because rhe^dev V" 1 * "° men

^
-

This claim is out of
keeping with the rest
of his theory
and undermines his own
argument that the family
is able to
Promote the development
of self-consciousness
and free
subjectivity. The ethical
life of family is
after all
supposed to require a love
founded on reciprocal
recognition.
"The dialectic of love
that Hegel outlines
presupposes a relationship
ci-ween equals
v between
eouai, in
,„ a monogamous
love match. "32 v^tYet u««-i
Hegel is forced, if he
is to postulate
the family as a moralizing
agency and also save
concordance, to announce that
men and women are anything
but equals, thus calling
into question how any
process of
mutual recognition could ever
take place.
,

•

Hegel's Philosonhy „ f D

^ Landes,

^ nt

para 16fiA
"Hegel's Conception of the Family,"
p.
_

i 37

.
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e "d

—

the exclusio
"
activity and achievement.

«

°

agents
even

^

his

om

realm of

He cert^m
certainly anticipated
the

o f those

they rejecte(j

«>e father was . God .
given
the proper „odel for
all forms Qf
-ale superiority and
Bale prerogatiye

^^^^

^
^

-re

^

of

^^

sophisticated evolutionary
grounds.33 Johann ,
Bac hof en, Joh n Mc^nnan,
John Lubbock
Henry
ana Herbert Spencer
were aaong those who
presented the
,

cul n i„ a ti on

^

'

the glorious end-product
of Man's whole
social, sexual, and noral
evolution fro* savagery
to
civilization. 34
.

iSStwSSS^^gSS
Henry Maine.

a

f

* -

lation
s
century by

tnf °T
2uM?„ nineteenth

in

See Elshtain
102-108; Sir Robert Filler
'^rjarch? and
™"*""" ESliAisaJ
S°r!ss, ed. by Peter Laslett T
f
1949) ; and sir Henry^er
* lackw
Maine vinf
the East and We.t

^ZT

ffon^^ ^^ff""" ^
U

'

F e

Anthropo!ogy

«

c^<-7«*-,,

'

1877)

'

»

6uo's CoSc!

v-u.,

P ° Uti °S

"

° f Viot ° ria " Social

ih/u;, Lewis Henry Morqan. Ancient-

and Herbert Spencer, The Princip le

g£
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By co»p arison

the traditional
patriarchal theory of
authority suffered on
many counts, it failed
to
,

bastion of nurturance,
tenderness, and morality
in a world
increasingly dominated b
y predatory capitalist
markets and
large organizations,
it was contrary to
new
anthropological evidence and
contemporary evolutionary
thinking.
Finally, it was under
attack fro* a

ween

rights movement. 35

theories,

To sum up>

powerful

^^

Uke

the wort of Hegel, fit
better with the
features of modernity I spoke
of in the first two

chapters: the new primacy
accorded the self, the decline
of the family as alliance,
and the rise of industrial
capitalism.

*************
Sociology, works (Osnabriick: Otto
Zeller, 1966).
The latter did not so much challenge
the assignment of
women to motherhood as strive to
garner equal Aspect and
U
mot ers to b ^ing women self-rSpect
trough
™nth
!j
motherhood, and
to combine in one world a family
lire
where women could be mothers with a
public life where
women could be citizens. See Linda Gordon,
Nineteenth-Century Feminists Did Not Support »Wny
Birth
Control' and Twentieth-Century Feminists
Do: Feminism
Famil y'" Rethinking Th e FamiTvr
Feminist QuestI"*
ions ed. by Barrie Thorn with Marilyn
Yalom
(Longman, 1982), pp. 40-53, and especially
45-46
pp.
Opponents of this feminism welcomed the new
theories, which seemed to meet the demands ofevolutionary
women "halfway by glorifying motherhood, and the same
time as they
justified kepmg women in the home.

V°S

'

'

F^nf^

^
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Hegel, then, like
these Qther

—

he ldea of marriage

COmPUlS1 °n

^

_

^

participated

^

cQnsent

«- fMlly

as . co

— —

^ "~

°f

Chil

„

ty with

-ese ideas should
not be reduced to
just another means
to maintain
over ween. N or should
tfe overlOQk
idea „ f the self iBplies
. critigue Qf
(and thus o £ the social
construction o f ge n der)
just as
"is ideal of tne family
and the state as
cQnmunity impues
a critigue of modern
capitalist civil society.
The point
is (my argument is,
that Hegel suppressed
these

^^^
^
,

possibilities, and failed to
grant that women cQuid
to "the ideal- and
participate in public life,
because of
his commitment to concord
an ce, an d not simply
because he
wanted women to be at home.
Moreover, all who endorse
concordance, even if they
reject Hegel's particular
version of it, are likewise
going to overlook, endorse,
or
provide the theoretical
preconditions for various forms
of

II

o¥?

ofr^heTs^^

ww

right does not extend to the
subjective realm of
only has sway with regard to
the^conective
propertv on
which the family depends for its
necessary extlrna^
1
existence .Hegel's

pm^^, ^

p^^f™
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^
^

^eals of family that
conpete
assume the reality
Q£ Qr
they, like Hegel

,

^
possibiuty ^

a

abet fQrces Qf
normaiization

^^

oppression.

now turn to some more
contemporary ideas of fa
»i ly
Rather than repeat the
literature summaries of
others i
take a selective approach
and trace the assumptions
of
concordance and the normally
implications of a few
representative or notable
positions^
celeb ratory
ideals of the modern family
compete today for
I

^

predominance: the family of
free choice and the
"traditional" family of
capitalism.
I have chosen the
work of historian Edward
Shorter as an example of the
former.

Shorter argues that the history
of the family shows how
the west has undergone a
transformation from a traditional

shown

^thTce^rat^

of

r^mode^U^ ^

sociologists and psychologists of
various schools
Ver th benefits °f the validity
of the modern
ffmnv
K argUSS that
Ch
these defenses of the family
^££l
£j„
have aided in a gradual process of
the means of production." See his "the socialization of
Haven in ,
^Eld, esp. pp. 22-43. I comment on his view in the
next
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are more highly
valued and protected. 38
H1 account is
Hls
fin
filled Wl th error
and simplicity
p ±1C1T
but- he
h
out
captures
beautifully the
appearance and the allure
Aure of
•*
ot modernity;
mod
he
describes perfectly how
history has to be
b„ seen
order to
„,
14 „
validate
the liberal conception
of the self as an
autonomous chooser,
shorter in fact gives
an organized
and scholarly voice
to what is probably
the most popular
view of todays family
l ife .
As
h&
an wrong. * es Bodern society
praises
-

,

.

^

"

^

_
^

,

^

^

the basis of what
interventions and given what
forms of
surveillance, At „hat cost
to
this privacy, and at what
cost to those who are
not?
Shorter casts the onset of
modernity as a revolution
of
choice, both because
personal choice has become
a major
value and because the
transformation was itself chosen.

^

^^^

38

The Making of th* M^ Qrn Familv
Shorter, the famiiv nf „I 'r^. ^
1

Piatt

The Wish ?«

Sf%

I

'

_
P-

,

18Q

•

According to

? Weinstein and Gerald M.

with H.J. Locke (New York 1953).

Jy
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jor

modern people ,

...

the wish tQ be £ree

the

^

demands for obedience
and cQnforaity
He describes this
triumph of individual

^

cutting of ties With
wit-h
generations.

»

was

km,

^^

community, and past
and future
he says ,

^

,

this change, an d it
is for the sake of
the family as a
domestic unit
»c
as a center of
sentiment
that it was
done,
on the other han d
shorter concludes, the
,
result
has been a victory for
individuals rather than
for
families
First one grQup Qf
fis

—

-

.

^^.^ ^

.

to decide family matters
for themselves on the
basis of
••sentiment- and then a later
group (including people
today) chose to leave
families as often as they
make them.
The modern family is "the
result of replacing property
first with sentiment and then
with sex as the bond between
man and wife." 40

While Shorter understands
important elements of the
transition to modernity
the truisms of family history
-his happy story of the modern family
has been easily
debunked by
many. 41 1T:
it 1s
i* in
in fact k„
j iu«ny.
by no means clear tnat

-

"Shorter, The Making of the MoH.m
Family,
The Mode rn Family

is.

p.

7.

p
Ce iS Weak his reason ing is
sometimes
forced fnd h!^?
claims are not entirely consistent.
*
Jhf
eV16W ° f Richard T. Vann ( Journal of Fami 1 See
H^crn
f
y
History l, no. 1, Autumn, 1976):
106-117, that of
Christopher Lasch, "What the Doctor Ordered,"
New York of
fiSfite, 11 (December, 1975): 53, and that
of'jo an
Icoll
Signs: Journal of Women and Culture
t n Society
no.
2,
3
(Spring, 1977): 693-696.
f

.

te

'

V

.

,

151

_

section

has become popular
only in fflodernity
WOmen
are entirely Det;
1 better
ter D
f, than before,
off
or
community
control over
ver families
„
famili.
has
decreased. "2 And
in it
-tainly wrong to consider
the chan g es that
taken

tw

^

inP° rtant?

**

«

thing it is because
" atJ „
we
e can le
learn
lot about the modern
family b y criticising
them, but it
iB mostly because
his mistaken assertions
are the result
°f his flawed
(concordant) view of
self.
Shorter says that the
traditional world came
apart as a
result of the changes
wrought by early
capitalist which
brought .ore means to
the middle and upper
classes and an
egoism learned in the
Marketplace to the lower
classes 43
The result was a "sexual
revolution" (as indicated
by a
significant increase in the
proportion of childbirths
out
,

™«

both^ess" a^^tiona^e'and^e^s^^t" 6 medieVal west
They su P°^dly
had less sex and aid not
as a ru?f
lue lnfant life
Additionally, he claims th»t if?
5
women before' the
J"
is was he
say S/ a result both of force nl~Zi

^k^HT^
^ghcee"^^^

cSlu^

1

t^they^n^
j^W

Modern

,

4
PP ^4-53
3

-

A^SL^
?
'

^~ntl

"* f ° rCS See »«
on
Ct
4rS?ic": ^2 Z*\l 22*

^^

'

'

on the |ueS?ion of
C0
io
"sent^ntaf, ^and'more
marriage, see pp. 54-78 and 120-167.
43 The
Modern Family, p. 259.
203.

marries

^

152

-

w-lock)

^
^ ^^^^^ ^
^
^

ana a child care

occ urring first among

fche

^ ^
^ ^^

occurring first anong
the bourgeoisie44
classes did not give
fcQ

as the workers
because, says shorter>
sustained t heir loyalty
to the
expressed their ne„l do
y
»i„ant desire

^

^

gratification in their
concern with the welfare
of
children, while in the
lower classes the
"wish to he free"
awakened by capitalism
gave rise in women to
the
expression of their
r aesire
desire for personal
~
independence and
sexual adventure." 45
The scholarship of Joan
w. Scott, Louise
Tilly, and
Miriam Cohen has refuted
Shorter's interpretation
of the
rise in the birthrate for
single women. To start
with,
they have established that
the single women who bore
the
children in question were in
traditional and dependent

r

^

t
1
lower anI workIng classes ln 9 p ti,naCy eXPlOSion "

P

parentrarrsomeno„ morrf

Sabers

^

gt^rrS cla?L?^e vann^ review^.

«>•

n

45 The Mod
ern Family

r

p

.

2 61.

109-

.

positions of employment
and also away
way fro™
from „
home at the
ne
time.
The mothers of ba^ a >-^«,
And servanthood
d!d no?
independent, for autf make w

^L

ften ^ants.
™en °economically

o&Se

* tS"«

comb
economically dependent J ?k se 5vant ^irls
° n the households
they worked. 4 *
in which

Shortens response

employers.

.

M|

is that these
women were being

^^^^^

therefore ,

beCaUSS they had
*»•
wanted to.*" This may
would they want to?

^

must have been because
they

he so, hut the guestion
is: why

According to Scott, Tilly,
and Cohen
Many women were promised
marriage and, for economic
reasons, they needed
marriage.
Far from a rebellion
against the old order, many
liaisons were a desperate
attempt to continue to live
in the traditional

»m

way.

most cases, families
strategically adapted their
established practices to the new
context. --"8

It is true

6S
0t
0lC rSVieW
and als ° ^ise A. Tilly
W
w. scott,
22oft and
»^ Miriam
S°
y Joan
Cohen, "Women's w
t
o^v
r
*.and
European
Fertility Patterns » Journal ~? t
?
f ^"^'""'P ll nary HWnry
VI, 3 (Winter 1976)
447-476.
'

'

\

:

"Shorter, The

Modgi-n Family

,

p 157
Tilly, scott and Cohen, "Women's
Work," D 454
<;«
UiS * *• Til1
"individual
Lives
and
Famil^s.";
Strategies in the French Proletariat,"
Journal
of
ItZitZ History, 4, no. 2
Family
(Summer 19791
137I1S 1
n„Z
k1
a
n
r
worr ent tSe?r mf* Y
The att e»<Pt was to find a new
way to maintain
maintatn the family
f
ties and, of course, survive.
,

^^

^ TT\

.

.

^

-

1^ lu^fST

that old constraints of
family, local church,
and
comity broke down as a result of
population growth and
above all a new mobility,
but women hardly experienced
this as emancipating.
instead more women than ever
"with
inadequate wages and unstable
jobs found themselves
caught
in a cycle of poverty
which increased their
vulnerability.. .49

More men could make a promise
of
marriage with no intention of
keeping it. 50
(For similar
reasons many women, especially
lower-class women,
are

equally vulnerable today

-

the contemporary rise in

unwanted births and abortions is
not the result of a
freely chosen new sexual adventurism!)
It is not at all clear that these
changes led to more
sex.
Jean-Louis Flandrin turns the tables entirely
on

*************
Many daughters did, however, lose touch with
their
families, and this of course must have helped
change some
attitudes as well, in the long run the new
context
spelled the end for the family as a productive
unit
consisting of more than one generation.
49 "Women's
Work," p. 463.
5° Jean-Louis Flandrin agrees, pointing out that,
while
the seventeenth century families of seduced (or raped) in
women could force the seducer to marry the seduced, this
became unenforceable in the eighteenth century, due to the
church's opposition.
"Thus, the rise of illegitimacy in
this age is not in any sense evidence of women's sexual
liberation: on the contrary, it seems to be evidence of
greater difficulty in effecting marriage with the men they
had intercourse with." "Repression and Change in the
Sexual Life of Young People in Medieval and Early Modern
Times," Journal of Family History 2, no. 3 (Fall 1977):
.
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Snorter's argument by
claiming that an
repression of sex helped
cause the rise in births
out of
marriage while leading at
the same time to an
increased
eroticization of life, a threatened
church, says
Flandrin, began to repress
traditional forms of supervised
sex among young people and
this, combined with the
closing
of municipal brothels and
(as discussed

in^x^

above) the

migration of more poor young women
to towns looking for
jobs, led to the increased
births out of marriage. 51
Whether there was more or less sex,
it seems highly
simplistic to understand the changes
that did take place
as "sexual liberation." More
sex is not the

same as more

sexual freedom (as many women
discovered as a result of
their experience in "the sexual
revolution" of the fifties
and sixties) any more than less sex
necessarily means more
repression. As Flandrin suggests and
Foucault argues,

both the denial of sexual urges and
their celebration can
lead to an increase in the self-analysis
of one's desire
and thereby to its transformation and
its intensification.
What we have had, perhaps, is not a sexual
revolution but
a "sexuality" revolution.

There are similar problems with Shorter's
simplistic
claims of an increase in power for women, love
for infants
and children, and privacy for everybody. On
the first

"Repression and Change," p. 207.

point he overlooks two
facts.
While three hundred
years
ago ween were defined
as inferior to men,
they were not
relegated, as they generally
are today, to the nonproductive, relatively less
visible, and socially
isolated
household. 52 on the other
hand, modernity has
burdened
women (and men, anew by
projecting onto them idealized
images that they can not live
up to. The "revolutionpraised by Shorter meant that
women were idealized
as

"submissive, selfless, ceaselessly
effective on behalf of
others," and men were given the
sole responsibility to
ensure the family's economic
success. 53

On the second point (the question
of love for infants
and children)
Shorter first of all depends on
the
,

questionable view that the popularity
of the often deadly
practice of wet-nursing was due to a
lack of interest in

infants, when it was just as much the
result of ignorance
about disease and economic necessity. 5 *
shorter second of
5

Ti
SC tt: and Cohen araue that "women in
these
l
^Z'>
?
[traditional]
families were neither dependent nor
powerless" ("Women's Work," p. 454). For a
converse view
see Mary Beth Norton, "The Evolution of
White Women's
Experience in Early America," in American Historical
Review, LXXXIX (1984): 593-619.
53 See John
Demos, Past. Present, and Ppr^i,
p 12 and
For a longer study on the effects on
pp. 41-67.
the
contemporary family of the imposition of the breadwinner
and homemaker roles see Richard Sennett and Jonathan
Cobb,
The Hidden Injuries of Class (New York: Vintage Books,
r

.

54 For Shorter
's view, see The Making of the Modern Family
For opposing arguments see George D. Sussman,
p. 175.
"The End of the Wet-Nursing Business in France, 1874-1914
Journal of Family History, 2, no. 3 (Fall 1977): 255, and'
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irifes

because -nobody thought
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^

_

of

^

indifference
as we

PhiUipe

^

that every child
contained a man's
personality "55
Centuries o f childhood,
p. 39 .
This
course literally false,
and insulting to women.
„any
People today thin*
(incorrectly, i n raa ny
respeots, that
female children contain
a wsmanis personality,
c
There
was, says Aries, no
concept of child personality
of any
Kind.
People went from being
disposable and vulnerable
infants, to being little
adults 56 Children
aauits.
were depicted
in art as little adults,
they mixed with adults

u

^ ^

in

everyday activities, and
were given adult
responsibilities
very early, childhood, says
Aries, is a modern invention.
Aries throws into question
Shorter's conflation of the
medieval absence of a concern
with childhood with the
period's apparent relative
indifference to infant life.
To Shorter, both were the
result of the same absence of
affect.
But this suggests that a rise
in sentiment led us

*************
Scott, Book Review, p. 695.
55 »uB
56 Centur

ies of childhood

,

p.

38.
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o

concede of

cM^ooa."

see ms Bore likely
that a
r6SUlted fr °" Cha
"- S in

^
_

^

^

would

fae

^

•

cQncern

expectancy and ohanged

^ ^
^^^

attitudes, which in
turn resulte<j fron a
chil dren
The new concern
.

^

overall, but the changes
which led to it were
hardiy
result of a liberation
of affection.

argues, the community
of the system of
lineage had no
interest in eaoh child
as an individual,
only in the

existence of heirs.

This should lead

^

^

^

not only about the
liberation that resulted
fron the
decline of the system of
lineage, but also to
wonder at
what new interests society
had in ma*i m i zing and
managing
the develops of the
individual,
other words, what
was at the stake in the
rise of "childhood?"

m

doc^rine-of j^l^rtalfty-of^veTsoul

^

importance of the child personality ".
43?
In szlTna™
*
this Aries raises questions about
hisown statement
thS " in vit ^iUty» of medieval
?
indifference to
Tn?^"?"?
infant life, especially
since the Church's started to
:Une be£ ° re *** Ch3nge in d
*»°gra P hic
conlitions!

"
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Elites lea the way in
developing a new concern
for
childhood and domesticity,
and they did so
neither as a
simple expression of
preferences newly set free,
nor in
order to provide a
substitute for a sexual
revolution they
thought the middle classes
should resist,
but as a

response to the same changes
in the social and
economic
order that led to the rise
in births out of
wedlock.
Christopher l*sch remarks,
"This withdrawal [from

immunity life]

...

took place not because

^.^

^

became wanner and more
attractive, as shorter
thinks, but
because the outside world came
to be seen as more
forbidding. 58

Lasch emphasizes the role of
elites in this process
the new "privacy" was in
part imposed on people, as
"the
forces of organized virtue, led
by feminists, temperance

-

advocates, educational reformers,
penologists, doctors,
and bureaucrats" went on a
"campaign to establish the
family as the seat of civic virtue". 59
The family was
championed as "a haven in a heartless
world. "60
is
quite clear about the political
implications of this.
In urging a retreat to private
satisfactions, the
nS ,° f d0meSti< Virtue illicitly
acknowledged
T
^n??ft?
.
capitalism's
devastation
of all forms of collective

58 "What

the Doctor Ordered," p. 51.
the Doctor Ordered," p. 51.
60 See Lasch,
Haven in a Heartless World: ThP F ^iiy
x
Besieged p. 6.
59 "What

'

,

9

aitempts^o
P
repair

pri=e that
improvement. 61

IkTS™

they d ^couraged

"

«" the
r St!*?*?""*
Bat «rial and moral

P

Shorter, then, is
misleading on the third
p oint as weU
Modern privacy, for all
of its feal
to people on oertain
conditions, namely that
the right
"healthy" sorts things be
done in private. This
is of
course in keeping with the
work of Foucault and
Donzelot
who argue the rise of
"domesticity., seen by
shorter as a
surge of sentiment was in
fact based in the
imposition of
new disciplines upon the
bourgeoisie by members of
their
own class, similarly, by
their account the "sexual

_

liberation" of the working classes
was purchased only at a
price. New possibilities for
the proletariat have indeed
come to be, but by virtue of
a process linked to the
weakening of the system of alliance.
This has meant a
considerable degree of hardship,
particularly for women
(as we have seen)
There should be no mistake: to
some
degree new chains were put in the
place of the old.
Conflicts were necessary ... in order
for the
t0 be ran ted a body and a sexuality;
?
»™i
economic emergencies had to arise
;
lastly there
e ?tablished a whole technology
of control
whth°
h
which made
it possible to keep that body and
sexuality, finally conceded to them, under
62
surveillance
.

.

.

"What the Doctor Ordered," p. 51.
The History of Sexuality. Vnl
1
p.
.

.

.
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Shorter^

l iberal

assumptions d stort
.

^

interpretation of the
contemporary situation.
„ e for
example endorses a f ace
value reading o f today .
s hedonism
as a logical extension
of the evolution
toward greater and
greater freedom At first
says
free emerges [among men
and women] as romantic
love. "63
It has since supposedly
led to a more directly
instrumental hedonism, where
sex is the major bond
for
couples
..» en
and women come together

^^^^

,

-

^

^

as freight cars do in a
switching yard.. .64

In general

Shorter accepts a consistent
decline in emotional
intensity and community activity
as
natural.

By his

reading, people who are free
choose to cut their ties with
others, as if to stay free.
For shorter the latest in
this line of natural and
unproblematic development is the

understanding of parents as a kind
of friend to their
children, rather than an educator
or representative of the

63 The

Modern Family p. 259. This romantic
love is
understood by Shorter to be egoistic in
nature? as can "*
J° l0" in9 haSty and ""Pi-tic' remarks: be
Love
«£Ttt
at first
first" sight
h
means you are falling in love with
your mother, "The Modern Family,
p. i 56
another person's eyes in the hope that and "You took ?nto
you'll find
yourself. The Modern f a.iiy, p. 259.
64 The Modern
Famjly p 8
,

\

.

,

.

.

"

^
^ ^^
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Uneage. 65

-Kin, the

This

,

^^^

says

pe er g roU p important
once

^

not as a representative
of the demands of the
community
but as a teenage
subculture that -is
independent of adult
values. 66

Shorter endorses the
individuaiist
describes, f irst by reassuring

^^^

instrumental

M-

he

xs not breaking up
because love is still
connected to sex

and people who get
divorced usually turn
around and
remarry, and second by
privileging the "Modern
system of
values" as freely chosen. 67 „
e need
not
,

,

Qf

follow hi* in this celebration,
but unless we challenge
his view of self we can do
little besides follow him
in
the acceptance of the
current situation as inevitable
people are not liKely to give
up their newly found
power
to choose.
At best we could advocate
repressive

-

legislation in order to shore up
"traditional values," and
this is
by his reading of self
i ike i y to be

-

-

ineffective.
in other words, Snorter's
brand of concordance leaves us

with the options of celebration
or despair.

We can

celebrate the modern family as an
expression of free

65 The Mo
dern Family
66 The Mo
dern FaTni1 Y

,

f

p

.

2 76.

p

.

2

76.

6?See The Modern Family, p. 278 and
p. 21, respectively.
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choice, or reluctantly
accept it for the same
reason
Bother way an important
facet of politics is
ruled outthere can be no
collective consideration
of the different
ways "family.. and „
freedom „

^^.^^

^^

constructed.

Politics can only

^

fae

^

struggle or accommodation
between free beings,
and those
not at home with this
had by this reading
best try to find
an "enclave" where they
can be as they l ike or
with wnom
they like. 68
The fact is, however,
that a language of
self-interest
self-development, and
self-expression cannot adequately
characterize the cedents
and practices of most
of us,
even if it is by that language
that we struggle to
articulate a vision of ourselves.
shorter himself is
much more confused about the
issue of agency than his
ringing conclusions about the
victory of free choice
indicate. 70 Modern instrumentalisn
g

«

.

^

68

On the reduction of community
to "lifecst-vi
o enclave"
„
style
in
American culture see Rober
Rn
herf
o 1
t
t
N.
Bellah,
Richard Madsen,
William M.
m Sullivan,
Gill i ?'
,
Ann Swidler, and Steven M Tin?™
TncHvl^H^ and
American Life
Jfe (Harper & Row,
71-75.

V

..

1

1985), pp.

MfrTiL^^
life than they
19sl),

611117 11

r^k^

'

^

° Ut a fuller sens * of purpose
in
can justify in rational terms
...»
Robert
*
HaMtS ° f *** H^rt (Harper i Row?
.

ne * and Shorter speaks of modern
"egoism" as
"l^r-noH ?ln thG marke tplace"
and
as
required
by the larger
?l
rn FamilY P 259)
On^he
othL
hand? ?he
"v rL
1C egoism" taught by the marketplace
is
sook
spoken nf
of as "the sexual and emotional wish
to be free"
dlV Ual S lf fUlfillment "
(P- 259 >< and the end
oftrL
i?
! :
or
traditional
society
is described as a lifting of
'

T

oA?
L ,T
^

^

-

'

'

ana st raightforward
nor as thoroughiy
victoriQus
Shorter Sieves.
Nor does . visio „
Qf
bargaining begin to a&t a f
get at the ways
^
wux
our J-ives
1
liv*^ are w
...
bound up
with power, involved
with confiw
conflict, and fatally
linked to
the unsettled and
the ambiguous.

^
^

t

Some_Critique of tho
Mndern^amii^
in the last chapter
I discussed the
work of Ranya Rapp
and of Michele Barrett
and Mary Mcintosh.
Compared to
Shorter they accord a more
central role in their
explanation to forces of
economic constraint, and
I hope

think that this difference
is important.
On the other
hand I also spoke there of
how Barrett and Mcintosh's
idea
of the family as "anti-social"
is
reductionist, and so

fails to fully explain the
appeal of the family ideal.
i
also said that their understanding
of power as oppression
allows them to be somewhat
naively enamored of "the
social" as the proper realm of
genuine existence. On
these issues the distinction
between their critique and
Shorter 's celebration disappears
somewhat.
For Shorter
the family is disappearing into
the social at this very
moment; for Barrett and Mcintosh
this is instead the hoped

*************
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for result of
political action.
C
nCe iS

—

i„ either casfi

"

^

t hought of
'
prinarily as
oppression, the family
is understood in
Qf
of it, facets, ana
the possibility of a
fuu y liberated
existence is assumed.

^

These assumptions are
not unique to these
particular
theories, bu t are widespread
in i iberal and
radical
thought on the modern
family.
Both tend
.„ Qther
to take see of the worst
from Hegel and leave
out the
best.
Friearich Engels provides
an important example
from
the critical tradition;
while his outdated
speculative
history has been for the most
part rejected, his
reasoning
remains more or less foundational. 7 !

^
^

,

^'^fh

1902).
Eng eis' Sort is based" on
AnclentSociety.
One of the -others" (besides 2: r r»£?
2
d
Mclntosh) who similarly looks
of a genuine social existence forward to X! ! Kis™he earlv El!

SwL

^HT'

that one day, when alientated
labor is abolished the
family and the personal will be
transformed into'
"autonomous life activity," (Harper
&
n
Supposedly the fulfillment of personal
'
needs
wlll^o
longer be restricted to the family
but diffused
"throughout the entire society
and particularly
throughout the world of work"
(p. 141) .
it is worth
2
USe ° f
6 " h Se "uronomous life
activity" is similar to Marx's use of
aSivIt^i.
"species-beino »
1
bei " g " here
th *
human is both
numan
both^ot*?,
°f
totally socialized
and completely
e d
pated
or a critique of this idea as denial
of
h
C P f X hlstorical ly situated, and
language
us?na
«L
S?
i?
using, see Elshtain, Public Man. Private Wnn,^,
.

r™ u

"

^?^';

l^

S

I™

•

•

"

"

^

Sidual

'

!

pp.

£ 89

^
-Coring

^^

to Engels>
the finai

t.r"
"civUization.^
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nain

ne being the

<*

Property destroyed equality
betwee „

^

sej£es

"primitive., economic
equality."

—
^^ ^

^

New SQUroes Qf
came into being (above
all class CQnfliot)(
fche state
became necessary to ma na
ge conflict, since
it was men who
controlled the new private
property (wh y is not all
that
clear,
the state became the
protector of men's
oppression
of women.
Conversely, where there is
no property (in a
future socialise,
the family, says Engels
"free love relations," by
which he seems to mean .
seri a i
monogamy entered into on equal
terms by men

^

,

,

,

^

and women,

with no child-reering or
household work to complicate
matters (these are left to
"social industry",
„ omen , he
goes on, will become full
members of the productive
sphere, and »se x -love» win
blossom (capitalists
supposedly keep the proletarian
family from going further
in this direction than it has
already,. 74
.

This formula has concordance
written all over it.
kind of concordance is evident in
Engels' idea of

oppression (which is taken more or less
directly from

Engels, The Origi n of the Family
p. 90
The Orig in of the Family
p . 91
4
The Origin of th e Fami1y pp. 91-92.
,

3

,

r

.

One
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Marx).

The modern faBily
is

„

he sees

^
.^^ ^ ^

u< sinpiy
Part o, a larger systen
Qf „ separat
capitalist system of
private property .
separations of class, of
individuals ( who are
estranged
fro. one another,,
of public and priyate
based a unequal separation
of gender), and of
state and
society.
Thus the state, private
property, class
struggle, the oppression
of women, and the
instrumental
treatment of humans by other
humans are assumed
,

^

^^

^

to be

neatly linked.

They are all explained by
the same
principle
the imperatives of the
productive system
(largely equated with the
interests of the capitalist
class)
All forms of oppression are,
in other words,
thought to be in concord with
one another."

-

.

75

s~

°"

?S"£SS

«e m£
P

s for

&

lts f noti °ns in the reproduction
Y
of "borrower
an?°f
h
and the
provision of domestic labor (for an
o? ?Z
literature she is referring to, see
Terry
?ee
"Domestic
Labour: An Analysis of Housework
and its Relation ?o t£»
r
n
Review of
8
o (Spring
^pring, 1976)).
fact one cannot explain all
65 f the social world by referring
?he interests
ff^hf
?
1
Hum * hries a
that
to
reduce the
J2 5Unctions in serving economic imperatives
?Li?v
?
is
5o iiYi
re PeCt th P° ssibil ity that the
working
class
?
is noi \>n^
?
ent ^ely Powerless, that features of
the social
inr-?H
world are the result of resistance by them
rather than the
successful exercise of power by capitalists.
Working-Class Family: A Marxist Perspective/' See "The
p. 198-201
For similar criticism see Jane Flax, "The
Family in
Contemporary Feminist Thought: A Critical Review ,"
in The
Family in Political Thnn^f,
pp 236-237, and Eli

f

.

^^s.-

S

m
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^
^^

For Bngels the ov
erthrow of the unifiefl
forces
oppression gives rise
to its

harmonious reality of
liberati<Jn .

-at

18 fundamental tQ
identity

^

By

wm ^

^

^

^

iBpQsed
h
ns
once private property
is abolished; our
determining
conditions „ iU be freely
ch0 se„.
»„ an , s own soc
organisation, hitherto
confronting hi* as a
necessity
-posed by nature and history,
now beco.es the result
of
his own free action."™
it is striking
string khow much this
vision of the future is
like shorter's naive

^

interpretation of the present,

m

both cases a concord is
thought to exist at the level
of the liberated self.
Michael sandel has pointed
out how this notion of
liberation as the end of
determination and necessity
denies to us the very conditions
that would have to
pertain if „ e are even to be
selves that could be in some

*************
rSt

y Ca P ita lis™. The Family * Persona1 t.i f q
nn
pp 93 _
on another important note/many
feminists
have
rightly pointed out that the
insistence of the unity of
e
StS n ° ne st ^9le has assisted
socialists in
?i^i^ -? U t C Ue g
sexual division
of iabor
it ha 3
S alSO hel
H ? ed Permit
P
them
to
take for
granted as natural, the constructs of
"masculinity"
and
^femxnxnxty.^ See Barrett and Mcintosh,
9A
94

'

K

^ ^"iona!

^

The^ntT-^

^

ia
U
an and S c ^ntific,» The Marx-En^
I!ade? second
^nonH Edition, ed. by
Eegder,
Robert C. Tucker (New York
alS ° the similar vlewfof
P 7
Marx Te°cL™T\«
"i
n*
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sense liberated.

Engels , brand Qf

^

separate from, and
incompatible with( what
Sandel
are the "encumbrances.,
or "constitutive
attachments," that
derive their special
force from their
connection to
personal identity and which
*r-o necessary
WniCh are
to character
self-knowledge and friendship
These
cmatr
ta
of familial, ethnic,
economic, national, ana
cultural (in
a word, historical)
7
determination.

^

_

^

''

Sandel's work is,

think, consistent with
a philosophy
of discordance, even if
he does not take such
a position
outr igh t. His criticism
of the liberal idea
of autonomous
choice applies with equal
force to Engels' notion
of
I

liberation.

Neither is possible and
neither is desirable,
for both dispense with the
idea of identity.
By

definition nothing entirely freely
chosen is part of one's
identity.
» Fo r to have character is to
know that I move
in a history I neither summon
nor command ..." 7 8 Multiple
determinations give us each our own
personal history, make
us each unique, and gives rise
to reflective consideration
and conflict concerning shared
meanings.
My final example in this section
is provided by a
classic of early radical feminism:
Shulamith Firestone's

77

Liberalism and the Limits of Justicp (Cambridge
University Press, 1982), pp. 179-183.
78 Sandel,

Liberalism and Th e Limits of Justice

r

p.

179.

-
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le ctin nf
Sex 79
^Se*-

Fxrestone holds, on
the one hand,
that the oppression
of women is historically
universal and
entirely determined due
to the biological
natures of
»»ale- and - reBale ,„ and
on
liberation is the transition
to a world where there
rei gns
an agency entirely free
of social determination
and
oppression.80 History up

^

,

^

^^ ^^

_^ ^

^

determined by the fact of
"sex-class- (said to be
inevitable given the fact of
that women bear children,
in terms of power history
is described as the
ubiquitous
reign of -patriarchy, the
rule of the male class
over the
female,
she believes, however,
that women's liberation
is
possible by virtue of the
technological overcoming of
biological difference (the
replacement of pregnancy with
the cultivation of babies in
the laboratory)
once
political action makes this new
possibility into
.

.

a

reality, we can put an end to
all oppression and
hierarchy, even to the point where
children bargain as
equal partners in households created
by contract. 81
7

r e Pij' leCtiC
° f S "* The C »™ f "" Feminist EgvolutioB
? - Women's
_
=ti2n
(The
Press, 1979)
«° The
Dialectic of Sex pp. 9-12. These ideas
are
10 " 1
emi ism a beit i" different forms,
f
7
See
dlSCUSSlon ?ln Public
Man. Private Wn n
on
,7>A
204-228.
pp.
:

"

i

.

SHi

,

SS&iVSf

M

'

'

h Dialecti of s ex P. 233.
For a discussion of how
;
ll
l language
i
the
of exchange relationships pervades
Firestone's vision of the future, even as she
understands
total freedom" to be identical to "total community,"
see
Elshtain, Public M an. Private Woman
pp. 219-221.
,

,

Firestone,

Uka

Engels

,

^

shorter ,

^
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Mcintosh, uses an
untenable idea of freedc
ireeaom tc
to support the
«
view
-ew r,f
of the faBily
as an oppressiye
necessity which
g or should be, made
obsolete by historical

^

—

,

Progress-

^^

^^

HuBans are

f ro n a

condition where choice
does not operate
at all to
one where it operates
free fro- any kind
of
aeten.ination.S3

^^^^^

^
^
^

^

thin view of the role
of faBily in the
creafcion
and social life, as
if it were an entifely
connected to children and
long-teo, obligation only
by
economic necessity, what
Jean Elshtain
Qf
could as well be said of
the* all, "Nowhere does
one find
a complex, self-reflective
subject in his account
of the
past, his descriptions
of the present, or his
paeans to

^

^

o 2,

*

Christopher Lasch has shown that thi<= h = ~ u
commonplace of liberal academics
as well as ofr^* i
ritlqUe ^aven in a Hearts
World
S
f,f^Z*}
pp
22_43
p ?' 21
Parsons, for examDle ^v<= fK? f
Talcott
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the future,-"

None

^

,

^

permanently in . condition
Qf
as speaking be i ngs
who come

^

to have

Visions only by means
of a language „hioh
also delifflits
and determines. As a
result, none understand
the
importance the idea of family
has today as , locus
where
the aspiration for moral
community is Kept alive,
albeit
in a tentative, vulnerable,
politically disempowering,
exclusive, and so far fairly
ineffective form.

Normalization and thP »T^H

Prior to the last section

I

<t

tona1

F

^ <1y

.

discuss shorter <s somewhat

despairing liberal "celebration"
of the modern family.
It
is important also that I
speak of an alternative sort
of
celebration which is much more overtly
critical and much
less passive with regard to the
current
situation.

This

is the increasingly popular
"conservative" view, according
to which a moral order is possible

providing that we

(among other things) restore the
"traditional" family to
its rightful place of honor and
dominance.
I have chosen

George Gilder and Michael Novak as
representatives of this
view, not because their arguments
are typical but because
they are especially thoroughgoing. By
pushing
the logic

of the conservative position to its
limits, they bring out

Public Man. Priv ate Woman

,

p.

262.

——
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L

worst points

L

truths
t
that have

_

suppress them in their

^

ra(Jical

-

Li * e Hegei

^ ^^^^
^
^

'

^

opening to discordance
and on another level
the
reassertion of concordance.
On the one hand they
Ufe as necessarily inclusive
of injustice,
sacrifice
burden, and pain.
similarly, the Modern

am™

family is

understood not as an
alliance freely entered
into hut as a
system of discipline one
is horn into.
On the other hand
It is equally affiled
that this travail and
discipline
poses no fundamental
ambiguities; it is, or can
be<

instead an opportunity for
moral redemption. The
family
is touted as both the
proper school for moral
development
and the proper locus for
its satisfactory

fruition.
i„
the process Gilder and
Novak assert the naturalness
both
of capitalism and the
particular version of family
dominant in capitalism.
I

begin with Gilder.

He rejects both the idea that

humans are motivated by rational
calculations of selfinterest and the notion that society
is a simple aggregate
of individual desires, demands
and aptitudes. He sees
people instead as ethical beings,
and holds that for any
society to survive it requires in its
participants some
shared faith in the moral goodness
of its own
reality:
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past, present, and
future
e

SStabliShed ln

85

gunh
Such *faith must be

*

<~ -

is based on chance

•
,

wo rl

,

Life

-

say=

marked by ascension

decline, and hedged
in by insecurity.

unroSVraSa^" 6

^ i"
ofT"

3 the

P^eant of

fnvisioned by the
enlightenment ttan a saSa
Ser Wanderin s and
brief bounty, the
9
endlels
God, between alienation
betwee n man and
an!
for the ever-rising
* S we searc "
and recedina
9 romised ^nd, which
we can see most clearly
„hen u £
courage to leave
ourseLes'o^n It

\

dL^

SK^'JE/W

These references to
"man" and "God- indicate
already
that Gilder has some
ideas about how we can
provide a
morally just mode of
balancing security and
risk
inspiring faith, and dealing
with life's ups and'downs.
in fact he is quite
specific
we need both "capitalismfa dynamic process of
"gift-giving" and "creative
destruction" carried out by
"heroic entrepreneurs", and
"the family" (the nuclear
family where the father is
the
sole or primary economic
provider). 87 The combination
Qf

-

5S

" ealt h and Poverty (New
York Ba t
0r g eral
Cnapter
Three "The Returns of
» pp'
2 3 :?
;^H
and
Ch
"The Nature of
weaitn,'.. Hi Hill'.

^

tt
Giv ng
l

.

'

"George Gilder, Wealth and Pm,»w
Yi

pp- 31 4_ 315
a P italis t nature of the
"good society" see
wl,"^"and5 Poverty,
Wealth
pp. 7-8.
Gilder
defines cani^?^™
only as a system where "productive
weaitn is diverse
S Iv
y
an
k6d ln
ca uses" ?We alt h
.

6

S!StV
p
heJlfafTunSersknds

8

T i?^

traditional entrepeneurial ways. See
Chapter Three "The
Returns of Giving," pp. 23-42, and
Chapte?
Five "The
Nature of Wealth," pp. 64-82.
'

—
^
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two oan

,

he says> prQvide

^

—
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piine whereby chance
ana
*
L° t the basis of
moral redemption. „ e
are, in other
words, saved from
discord (and frQB ,
Pontics) by a deep concord
that exists between
the
(opposite but complementary,
natures of men and
women on
the one hand and the
retirements of the production
Qf
wealth on the other.

^^^

To be even more specific,
Gilder tells us that
capitalism (and so morality
itself) requires classes
social stigma for the
poor, and the economic
dependence of
individual women upon
individual men within
family-based
households.
For all of this he ma.es
no apologies and has
no regrets. This is
because he believes that
the
differences of class can
function together
with,

first,

the productive channeling
my of
oi men's
«»v„=i energy
men s sexual
into the
familial role of provider and,
second, the societal
harnessing of women's maternal
instincts so that work is
properly rewarded, solutions
are found to society's
problems, and people's faith in
the order is redeemed. 88

^women, says Gilder, will be most
fulfilled if thev
accept the loss of
*

independence that allows their
°" the or^hana^e "the
weakefsex ^afdT'f-Wl1 defer
gratification and work
nara
^
hard only
onlv if he
h2 is the sole
provider, without sDecial
outside help (welfare) , for a wife
aAd kids
and
Chapter Eleven, -The Coming Welfare B WeaUh
oom'" PP ?
.

£2^,
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(says Gll de r) there
will always be poverty<
group will be "sturwt
stuck 4-k~
there, and both wealth
"ill be moraUy

redeened

_

We are not, Gilder
warns< currently

aiscipunary situation.

^^

^

^

The booming „ elfare
state and
foolish government policy
have interfered
(supposedly,
with the process of
sublimation and creativity,
thus
creating a ^pendent,
fe ar ful, defensive
populace and a
smaller economic pie.
He need to fir™ things
up so as to
enforce the proper norms
of behavior. He
records that
we shore up male-headed
Monogamous marriage through
serious cuts in social
welfare programs and
implement
supply-side style cuts i„
taxes and regulations in
order
to give room for heroic
entrepreneurs. 89

Gilder's wort suffers from
a reliance on bad sociobiology and bad economics.
Regarding biology, numerous
men and women both reject
Gilder's view of their natures
and fail to confer* to his
rele prescriptions and yet

Povert y^

1

^

^^ertv

,

chapter Six, -The Nature of

(Cambridge University Press,
1981), pp. 142-145.

.
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tr'

6 t0 W ° rk hard
'

— —"-t. -

have

When it comes to econo
„ icSi Qniy a
structural factors and
about
.dea that the lack
, f social

^^^

mobmty

reward in our cl ass
system are the fault
simply of
wrongful welfare and
tax policy.
In fact cnanges
encompass the global
econony
rendere(j

^
^^^^

^

-biiity

^

in the U.S. more or
less ohsolete, not
to mention

left the one-breadwinner
family in dire straights. *1
faith" because of a f e
„ policy changes of
Gilder's blandishments.

In

^
^

At another level, Gilder
is probably naive
regard
to the foundations of
"the American dream." Can
the
legitimacy of capitalism be
sustained after it is
acknowledged (as Gilder acknowledges)
that it leads
neither to equality nor security?
Gilder, like other neoconservatives, argues for the
necessity of a restored
faith in the future and a shared
commitment to the whole
without providing much in the way
of reasons why people

V
1 haVe Spent a niMber
°* years
workina
T^-*;
a
9 hfrd°?n
varle
ty
of
"
ways without being
the
2
g
ln y ho sehol <i (although I must
admtt I
V
?
cou?2
could be better at
saving money)
arringt0n 7"e New American Povgrt-y
especially pp.
12f!i 5 o
-

£T?r

'

^^

should have such fa
th and comm tnent 92
one. class position
.

.

_

-re.

-n-

really be

_

as
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a

moraUy justmed?

a h.ghly stratif
ied society like
ours>

the bottom su f£er

,

- no .„

is

^
those

Those who

„ succeedn
their positions with
the help Qf governnent
are at the bottom tend
to either internalize
a judgment
against themselves or
turn to politics an d
demand some
redress.
These demands are then
threats
vision of the morality of
the system, thus setting
in
»otion the imposition of
various disciplines to
enforce
class difference and social
stigma.
The subsidies for the
middle and upper groups go
largely unchallenged

^

^

^

^

or

unnoticed, while even the
crumbs going to the lower
groups
are resented and challenged.
"Assistance" is tailored so
as to tear apart the living
arrangements of the poor and
encourage them in the direction
of relatively selfdestructive means of dealing with
their situation.
"Work
incentives" and the like are
introduced to make welfare
punitive.
Gilder, then, is naive finally
about the political
import of the "anti-family"
provisions of the welfare

system which he seeks to reform.

1

0

-° f
Cu^n^tV ^ *™t 10
^
Books Ig^
'

These provisions promote

f ° r exam P le
Daniel Bell's The
° f SaBifcaUsffl (New York: Basic"
*

the very family values
thfiy
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^^

-position of an utter lack
Qf independence

^

^
^^^
^^^

the

system o f tutelage which,
wnile it
on
rms
in that it does not
utilize all bodies directly
in
employment, nonetheless
succeeds in providing an
a
threatening alternative to
the normalized world
of
contract.
Th e example of the -welfare
family. serves an
essential role in the maintenance
of the norm of
the

middle-class family.

Because Gilder's analysis
considers
the imposition of particular
disciplines of class and
gender on people to be entirely
in accord with nature
and
justice, it provides the
perfect theoretical justification
for the punitive imposition
of these distinctions.
People
may return to "work, family,
and faith," and may thereby
come to see their world as moral,
but only at great cost
to many, including themselves,
and only in the context of
various disciplinary pressures.
The background

requirements of Gilder's program are
marginalization,
mental health treatment, institutionalization
and

incarceration; if it is implemented
successfully this will
mean self-loathing for some and a nervous
kind of selfcongratulation for others.
In sum, the costs and requirements of
maintaining both

adequate levels of production and high levels
of
inequality are either lost on Gilder or thought
to be
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entirely in accord
with nature and morality.
„ e denies
that capital or
industrialism have any
intrinsic
Proofs, instead asserting
that „e need only
the win and
fortitude that b rin gs
"creative- (strictly
traditional
capitalist, solutions.
This is supposedly
possible thanks
to the .oral nature
of chance, fate, and
sexual nature
An assumption of concordance
is, then, a
fundamental prop
of his theory.
Michael Novak's argument is
much more palatable to
liberal, feminist, and radical
ears than Gilder's.
This
is because Novak does
not mix in suppl - side
y
economics or
define "the family" in the
same narrow anti-female
terms.

By his terms many different
household patterns can qualify
as a moral family,
on the other hand, he is
much like
Gilder when it comes to the
one-sidedness (lack of
ambiguity) in his defense of family
and the unqualified
nature of his acceptance of capitalist
order.

Even more so than Gilder, Novak
sees the extra-familial
world of capitalism as discordant,
although the word he
uses is "unjust."
The world around the family is
fundamentally unjust.
The state and its agents, and the
economic system and
its agencies, are never to be fully
trusted." 93

93 Novak,

252,

no.

"The Family Out of Favor," Harper's Mapping
1511 (April 1976), pp. 37-44~7~^

y
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Novak goes on to say
mo re specifically
world, by virtue of
its mobility

Uty

^

its hen
lts
hedonisa, its work
its systems of
transportation, ana its
wealth, is
anti-Wly, and this even
though it depends on
the -hard
work, competition,
sacrifice, saving, and
rational
.

•

'

decision making- nurtured
by the family. 94

Se Wh ° have
most internalized its
nd t^°
these .for «s shear
marriages and families values" and
apart>5

Novak contrasts the
sweetness and light of
the family to
the conflict and pain
of the extra-familial
world.
He
says "What strengthens
the family strengthens
society,"
and -if things go well with
the family, life is
worth
living; when the family
falters, life falls
»™
apart.

Of course there is the
possibility that this is
unfortunate true given capitalist
and/or industrialist
realities. Novak makes some
good points along these
lines.
There is, for example, his
conception
of a

"realist" understanding which
associates liberation -with
the concrete toils of involvement
with family or familial
communities.-" He has a healthy sense
of the

94 "The

Family Out of Favor, p.
95 "The
Family Out of Favor, » p.
96,,
The Family Out of Favor, » p.
97,,
The Family Out of Favor," p.

37 and p.
37.

38.

40.

38.

See also p. 43.
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inevitabiiity in li£e
of dirt( necessity
have this sense is
to have experienced

^

^

"„oral

essential. 98

Saiffi.

0

^^

one 2"S*
spirit that „e long no^
to be of

oodiesV^'

to

«

of the
0

Trl?*
"WS.'i.S'tSf oragVour*

"™an

^

Here Novak echoes
Hauerwas ana Headings in
emphasizing
the lessons learned
through obligation to
and dependence
on specific others to
whom one is tied. 100
context of industrial society,
this has by and large
meant
families.
I am sure that
Novak is on firm empirical
ground when he says that
strong family l ife of some
kind
is fundamental in almost
every instance of "success,"

^ ^^

however defined

-

'

"educational achievement ...the
development of stable and creative
personalities

...intellectual and artistic
aspiration ...,» etc."!
On the other hand, Novak never
criticizes the family on
a single score.
Nowhere, for example, does he
say that
the we should not have to rely
so heavily on families.
Yes,

98

family life is sometimes hard,
painful, and costly.

"The Family Out of Favor." p. 39.
99
"The Family Out of Favor, p. 40.
ioo„ Tne
Family 0ut of Favor „ p< 41i
101 "The
Family Out of Favor," p. 42.
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^™

but this is entirelv
Lirei
the good bv hie ,
y for 4-v
s
stretches credulity
and
i-Portantly, it provides
a
critica,
ntical prop for the
legitimacy of the harsh
extrafamilial world of Mace
class, power, and
labor,
of course,
-va k might simply refrai
„ from criticism
because
d6Slre
emPhaSi
the
in a culture where
the
family is -out or
favor" among the
influential well-off
and intellectual
classes,
x do not, however,
accept this
interpretation.
, say this
because>
family is not "out of
favor
ravor.
m„~> importantly,
More
Novak's
argument depends on the
idea of the family
as
unambiguously a wonderful
and moral institution.
Novak is
not merely saying that
the family ia
seat
Moral reality given the
harshness of capitalism;
he is
saying that capitalism
is a fine thing if
only it is
balanced by the moral wonder
of families.
.

^

"

"

^_

>•

•

^^

SUXM ^

Take,

^

for instance, Novak's
defense of the family for
providing the "economic and
educational disciplinescrucial for the survival of
members of the working class.
What working class people
need to learn, by his account,
is that "they have to be
docile, agreeable, and
efficient. "102 To Novak, this
is just the way of the
world, rather than a feature
of our occupational landscape
that should be changed. His
idea of a what is to be done

"The Family Out of Favor,"
p. 44.
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is si»Ply "a
politics aimed

strengthening faniues

afc

and nothing else. 103

'

To sum up, Novak,
like rii/i„_
Glider, assumes that
a concord
-sts in the universe at a high
enough

^^^

.

the discord that
exists no more than
potential tools for
the learning of moral
lessons, herding
to hcth we can
tap this potential
learn the right lessons
only by
-ans of the disciplines of
fMlly . They each

-

-

^

southing to say ahout
survival

in a privatized and
highly

unegual society, but
ut thev
„
they f»ii
fail to
acknowledge just how sad
this news is. To take
their approach is to
universalize
and thus depoliticize,
present day economic and
familial
reality.

The Family, Ponrordanrp

ancj

NoraaliaatiQn
The several perspectives on
the modern family i haV e
examined are by no means the
same.
The positions of
Engels and of Barrett and
Mcintosh are not cruel in their
immediate implications, as are
the views of Gilder, Novak
and Shorter. Gilder and Novak
do not think of liberation
as autonomy from forces of
social determination, as do
Shorter and Engels. On the other
hand, all these views
have something in common; they
all postulate the
possibility of, the conceivability of,
or the reality of,
,

3

"The Family Out of Favor," p. 44.

a social world

which is not fundamentally

justified constraint

an(J

loss _

^

Thig nakes
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^

Lews

complicit with forces
of normalization.
snorter's way of
contributing to normalization
is the
indirect.
„ e simply takes
fQr

-t

^^^

choice can he freely
exercised in the ahsence
of tangible
cbstacles such as legal
prohibitions, community
tradition
whxch is enforced by
obvious public sanctions,
and direct
-thods of community observation.
Thus he

overlooks, even
denies, the ways choice
is constructed, directed
and
effected by various forms
of assistance and advice,
by
symbols and images of success,
and by the indirect

sanctions of images and
realities of failure, abnormality,
and illness,
addition, his view not only
covers up the
ill effects of the modern
family, but also denies to
people any leverage with which
to criticize these effects,
should they discover them.
After all, how can one
criticize that which is the product
of free agency?
To Engels, free agency is more
of a collective

m

matter,

and is a potential of the future
rather than a reality of
the present. This idea allows
for the acknowledgement of,
and a struggle against, the harm
done by today's family,
so it is in important ways less
cruel than Shorter 's view.
On the other hand, any vision of the
complete absence of
coercion has the potential to cover up the
ways social

f0rmS

"^"^y
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^

fore, a shape upon
people
Snorter's view denies
the possibiUty of
a pQUtics
self, Engels looks
forward to the
disappearance of
Politics altogether.
This first of ali
portends in f or
the status of difference
once victory is declared,
as it
is all too easy to
justify havering people
into shape to
achieve the expected
consensus.
It second of all
.

^

Politicizes people's
psychological state in the
present
and, given the dichotomy
it offers between

ideological and
liberated consciousness,
this easily has the
result of
thematizing "political
correctness." People
targeted for
the correction of their
"false consciousness- have
no
theoretical resource with which
to defend themselves. 104
Gilder and Novak, in contrast
to both Engels and
Shorter, do not include the
achievement of radical free
agency in their vision of the
good life,
instead people
are seen as forming commitments
and making sacrifices

within a determining context of
shared beliefs and
aspirations. This does not, however,
mean a repudiation
of concordance, as the determining
context
of the good

society is idealized by postulating
its harmony with moral
rectitude and enduring human nature.
Nor does it mean
that they fully repudiate the idea
of humans as

Haw* esw °rth's excellent discussion of
the
D»l???n» of »"
politics
"consciousness raising." "Re/Vision: feminist
Feminist
Theory Confronts the Polis,"
pp. 174-176.

%

^
.

indent
of value.

centers of choice and
as
Novak is less expUcit

^
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^

this issue t
o ia.r. but both
assume such independence
in their
«* tody's il ls .
More specifically>
they biane

problem on the attitudes
of the well-off and
the
government p olicies they

^

tQ 105

allows for the possibility
that the attitudes he
depiores
(e.g., hedonism, a
decline of the work ethic,
and an
aversion to commitment,
are linked to the
institutions he
oelebrates (in Gilder's case
large scale markets,
the
private family, and hierarchical
work life)
Of course attitudes are
not entirely determined
and it
is fair to criticize
them, but the focus on
willful
wrongheadedness allows both Gilder
and Novak to pretend
that all can be made well
within the confines of
corporate
oapitalism.106 To then the

^ ^ ^^.^

imposed by the latter are just
the costs of life in
general, and they can be put to
good moral use by
capitalism, the family, and the
morally formed self which
they situate. Thus, while
Gilder and Novak give credit to

ab ° Ut the ""asochistic intellgentsia"
and «ltl
the defecting upper class", the
leading architects of "the war againstlatter being the
wealth."
fae
See
e
»•
Wealth and Pnv.rty p 8 and
*
25
p6
arkS at
e P °^ nt that » ost ^erican monopoly
*
is «i«£ ^°government
°D policy.
Wealth and Pnv» r t v p
286

T"*

.

_

.

^ ^
^^
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people's co»c„ sense
appreciation Qf
fundamental, their analyses
cruelly condemn people
to
forever rely on fanily
to get the „ through
g

_

(especially women,

c«s

at a terrible cost in
isolation

abuse, powerlessness,
and unhappiness.

m

the meantime
Gilder and Novak each
thematize moral fitness,
thus
abetting pressures on people
adjust themselves internally
for the sake of the success
of the order.
We should all,
by Gilder's view, purge
ourselves of hopes for security
and selfish visions of equality.
For the poor and
marginal members of society
this means fending off the
insidious liberal demon which
promises rights and
entitlements.

To sum up, the threat of
normalization stems from a
dream of overcoming ambiguity.
Milas Kundera, speaking of
totalitarianism, has said,

The evil is already present in the
beautiful hell is
C
ai Sd in the dream of Paradise
and if we
2
u °f
de rstand
the essence of hell we must
Ittt
£
561106
° f the paradise from whi <* it
ortginated'lO?

SlM

The paradise we tend to seek is a
concord outside of the
human condition, simone De Beauvoir is
wrong
when, in the

midst of a rather incisive critique of
socialism, she says

107 Milas

Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forg pi-i-inq (New
York: Penguin, 1981)
p. 234.
,
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that socialism at lea**least recognizes that
"we are not an
animal species. "108
_,
n
The point
is rather that
we are an
animal species, and
we should affirm
this and the
ambiguity that it
entails.
.

108

B aU
r
1952?, p l7?

'

The Second

.

York: Bantam Books,

CHAPTER

5

AMBIGUITY AND MULTIPLICITY:
A MINIMALIST DEFENSE OF
FAMILY

don't want to suggest for
a minute that today's
discourse is unified in a
monotonous endorsement of
concordance.
i have already
indicated that different
theories postulate discordance
at different

levels, and,

while concordance always seems
to surface when it comes
to
the important issue of the self,
the differences between
theories are nonetheless important.
Moreover, today's discourse includes
more than one
perspective on the modern family which
rejects the

possibility of a harmonious self,

one of these is of

course the genealogical tradition
represented by Foucault
and Donzelot.
Given the way these thinkers have
indicted
"psy» techniques for their role in
processes of
normalization, it is perhaps suprising that
the

psychoanalytic school of thought also has as its
basis the
idea of the self as a fundamentally discordant
entity.

This tradition take its clue from a great thinker
of
discordance, Sigmund Freud, and like him it has been
very

successful at c ombi „ ing
both critique and
celefaration
its analysis.

^

The differences between
Freud and Foucault are,
along
with the various differences
and oppositions operative
within the psychoanalytic
tradition, important here
for
two reasons.
First they point to the
fact that there is
Plently of room for disagreement
once an approach
,

of

discordance is adopted.

Second, they are of great

relevance when it comes to the
question of what politics
of child-rearing and personal
life flows from the point
of
view of discordance. This question
is the focus in
this

final chapter.

I

argue that an approach to this
question

based on Freud can yield insight
but is rooted in too
fixed a view of the dilemmas of
discordance and is likely
to unduly prioritize the issue of
"personality."

This
leads to a defense of family (and a
critique of family)
which is too centered on domestic dynamics.
The fact of
modern culture's focus on the all-importance
of family is

reinforced rather than called into question,
and the
apparently extra-familial spheres of political

culture,

political history, occupational structure and the
like
tend to be treated as secondary. Moreover, when
the

latter are given their proper due as factors in the

shaping of our dilemmas and the viability of various
changes that might be made, the psychological evidence

appears inconclusive
with
lth r^r-n
regard to the question
of what
is to be done.
<-

As an alternative,

!

offer what

defense of family, where

„

fanlly

,

call ,

,.

..»

inimalist „

^^^

particular form of child
care but instead simply
a
relation of see distance
to the state and to
the public
realm where everything
is equally everyone's
business
The ideal of family, by
this vieWj shoul(J
only to a fairly skeletal
view of what counts as
the
neglect of children and of
what counts as care
necessary
to the development of
humans as ethical selves.

^

^

I should
emphasize that the point here
is not that the defense
of
the family should be
minimalist in its vigor, only
that it
should be so in the vision of
"family, that is

defended.

This means that we should avoid
detailing what constitutes
a family and instead provide
vastly increased across the
board support for all the individuals
who care for and
protect children. People need to
have the power to create
a variety of sorts of family
in accordance with their own
judgments about their personal needs
and their
social

situation.

We need perhaps to be a little less
-pro-

family,-' as this phrase is usually
intended,

and instead

to make our societies more pro-parent,
pro-guardian, prohousehold and pro-children. This has the
promise of

making families less a policed and normalizing
realilty

"

and More of an enabUng

^

^ ^
^

enpowering

^^^

changes at both the ..micro"
level of
together and raise children
and the macro level
of
economic policy and economic
structure.
x conclude this
chapter with a discussion
of these changes and
the role
that the state can (ands
perhaps cannot, play in
bringing
them about.

The Family and the Fnnno mics nf
instinct
Christopher Lasch is one of
today's well known followers
of Freud.
as I have already noted,
1
his critique centers
on the way the modern family
rationalizes that to which it
is a response -"capitalism's
devastation of all forms of
collective life." Lasch is concerned
to support the
reversal of this devastation in
the form of a socialist
polity "in which collective needs
rather than private
profit determine both the form and
content of production,
and according to him the modern family
now helps to

Lasch sees himself as reasserting the more
insights of Freud, a task made necessary by "radical"
the "social
science cant" which he says dominates the
left and right
and which understands humans as "oversocialized"
pure
°f culture and yet as capable, in potential,
of
«2?2J?*5
radical freedom, entirely in control of themselves
and
their destiny. This is, of course, the "cant"
of
concordance, and it is indeed a problem. See Haven
pp.
P *. 8 ?' and p P* 13 2"133.
Lasch's other major works
ii
are The Minimal Self: P sychic Survival in Troubled Tim**
(New York: W.W.Norton, 1984) and The Culture of
Narcissism: Amer ican Life in an Acre of Diminishing
Expectations, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979).
,

defend, of the p rivate
family> ag he argues

^^
^^

democracy depends on the
construction Qf , certain
Principled self which only
it
Unfortunateiy
this wonderful , hesis
Qf ambigu ty s
that lasch, thanks in
part to the version of
Freudian
psychology he endorses and
in part to problem
inherent in
a psychoanalytic
approach, privileges a
particular for™ of
family as the family with
out adequate ju

_
.

.

^

stif ication and so
fails to adequately challenge
today's processes of
normalization.
Lasch ends up advising us
more or less to
simply reverse a supposed
takeover of the family by the
outside forces engendered by
capitalism. To attempt this
is simply to repeat society's
privileging of family and so
to repeat that which rationalizes
the capitalist

institutions Lasch opposes.

Socialization

-

"The only function of the family
that

matters"- means for Lasch the positive
acquisition of
identity. 3

It involves the transformation
of biologically

given sex into socially constructed
gendered subjectivity.
Lasch asserts that this process, if done
at its
best,

creates humans as ethical beings who create
and critique

2

Haven

.

p.

xxi.

Haven p. 130. See Barrett and Mcintosh's discussion
the concept of "socialization/' The Anti-social Famil y of
iiX
pp. 105-110.
,

'

authority according to
principle.

For Lasch, as for
Freud, this a messy and
costly struggle whereby

civilization is imposed on
the multiplicity of the
self
and its infinite and
contradictory erotic and
aggressive
demands.
Life necessarily involves
4
profound loss,
separation, dependence and
guilt.
Children, says Lasch, will
handle their struggle with
these dilemmas for the best
if they grow up in an
"orderly, predictable, loving,"
and emotionally intense
relationship between themselves
and their parents. 5 The
combination of love and authority
in the same powerful,
and attractive, figures allows
the child to achieve
"identification," which means the mastery
of inner rage
and fear of authority. 6 such
identification is said by
Lasch to be necessary if children
are to develop past
shame (the fear of ridicule) to guilt
(the fear of

parental disapproval and self-disapproval)

.

Although he

does not put it this way, Lasch's idea
of successful

socialization involves a kind of acceptance of
discordance.

"Mature freedom," he says, involves a

In Freuds's words, "there are difficulties
attaching to
the nature of civilization which will not yeild
to any
attempt at reform." Civilization and Tts Discontents
trans, by James Strachey (W. W. Norton, 1961),
p. 70.
See
also pp. 51-60 on the necessity of instinctual
renunciation.
,

5 Haven,
6

p.

164.

Haven, p.

123.

.

recognition of

W

s

contradictory place in the
natural

order of things." 7

Inch's concern

is that socialization
of this sort is

today being undefined
and displaced by another
sort one
that supports the powers
that be by making
principled
opposition rare. The
problem he sayS/ g
typical personality being
created: people have weak
egos
are opposed to authority
are afraid Qf being
to live up to any
expectations, and are dominated
,

.

^^^

^

p^,,

by a

concern with the present and
with mere survival. 8
People
are dominated, in other
words, by society's standard
of
the "realistic." Put in
terms of psychological
development, Lasch's thesis is
that children fail to
overcome an original dependence
on the mother, and this

derails the identification process
needed to properly
create the superego. The children
of our "shame culture"
are deeply dependent, resentful,
and resigned
in a

-

word,

"Narcissistic." 9

7

The Mini mal Se1f p.
8see The Minimal Self

2

r

57.

especially pp. 60-99.
The home, says Lasch, has, like the rest
of society, has
been reduced "to a state of warfare" (or
rather a
precarious truce), because ~he father is afraid of
"the
dangers of close personal intercourse .., rationalizing
passivity in the form of an ideology of non-binding
commitments." The then dominant mother imposes "her
madness on everybody else" ( Haven p. 157)
r

9

,

H
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This N a r cis sistic
(or Minimalist") self
is, says Lasch
preoccupied with personality
and its harmony. Th
is
concern "originates in
the ego's need to assert
itself
•••in order to counter
the forces that seem
bent on its
annihilation. "10
other way Qne might
course, is that the modern
self is overly bent on
the
pursuit of concord. And
indeed Lasch considers
the

^^^

^

transformation and distortion
of Freud's ideas, so as
"to
redefine psychoanalysis as a
theory of behavior," to be
a
result of this concern with
harmony.

The theory of interpersonal
the premise that personality relations bases itself on
constitutes not a
battleground (Freud's more accurate
erce P tlQ n) but
perceo?ion\
P
an integrated, harmonious
whole.

w

"

The "forces" that, according to
Lasch, make the self
feel deeply threatened seem to
be a combination of events
and interventions. The events he
speaks of are

totalitarianism, nuclear weapons and death
camps; these
have he says promoted despair about
the meaning of
individual political action and commitment.

Thanks mainly

to Donzelot, we already know something
about the

interventions he is concerned with,

in Lasch 's language,

managerial and professional classes have "invaded"
the

10 Haven
1:L

.

p.

66.

Haven, p. 65.
12 Haven,
p. 66.

"
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family in suport of the
interests of capitalism,
a ki nd
of dual movement by
specialists ("doctors,
psychiatrists
child guidance experts,
officers of juvenile courts")
and
by social science
(anthropology, sociology and
psychology)
has simultaneously upheld
the importance of the
family and
attacked it for its incompetence,
destroying the

confidence of parents and
facilitating the takeover of
family functions by the school,
the peer group and these
same professionals.
while the family is purported
to be
different from the outside world
of instrumental
interaction, it is not, says Lasch,
thus setting up a
cycle of personal failures, outside
advice and
intervention, and continued acquiescence
to the
desirability or inevitability of those
larger structures.
The contemporary family fails to
uphold "values" or work
on "principles opposed to the ones
that prevail

elsewhere. 13

Ultimately, however, Lasch attributes the
modern pursuit
of harmony to capitalism's imposition
of a particular

version of the public/private split,

a

version which is

based on the separation of home from work and
of work from
leisure.
The rise of mechanized and market-structured
modes of work has, of course, been an integral
element in
the history of this separation, and Lasch (following

Marx)

Haven

,

p. 143
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believes that these forms
of work life lead to
people's
feelings of powerlessness
and internal division. 14
sch
moreover considers the
removal of work f rom the
home to he
a psychological
calamity in

^

itself.

™^
^T^ ?^^^?"
a^^

Child no lo ™rer
identifies with his Lr^-«
1
nte
thei?
authority in thV
°Li
lndeed he
internalizes their authority
at

the^L^^?

'

This calamity is according
to Lasch manifested in
the
trend toward the transitory
coupling of adults and the

standoffishness of youth.

Lasch believes that these

developments, far from signifying
freedom (Shorter's
view), indicate a failure
of today's family, along
with
other social institutions, to
enable people to come to
terms with separation and dependence.
This is said by
Lasch to spell a greater conformity,
a more fragile sense
of self, and more total control
by the state.
It should be clear by now that
Lasch 's critique of

contemporary perspectives on family is
in many ways in
keeping with what I have said thus far;
indeed I commend
him for emphasizing the inevitability
of discord and
imposition.

His approach to the whole issue, especially

his thoughts about what is needed, are,
however, flawed in

14 Haven

.

pp.

15 Haven

.

p.

7-8
130.
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important respects.

so ne of these problem
ste» fro„ the
particular approach to
psychology that he adopts,
an d see
are .ore deeply rooted
in the psychoanalytic
stance to the
question of discord. To
put this another way,
there are
flaws in Inch's approach
to questions of personality,
and
there are problem inherent
to any theory that focuses
on
personality.

Concordance as Narcissi g ™

Lasch's concern with personality
is plain to see.
Whereas I have concerned myself
with locating what I see
as the problematic assumptions
of concord implicit
in

various views, Lasch is concerned
with the way some of
these same views are expressive of
different malformed
personality types. There is first of
all "the party of
the superego" (neo-conservatives such
as Gilder)
who are
criticized for falsely understanding freedom
as the
destructive and exciting unleashing of raw
impulse.
They
are said to seek an escape from the dangers
of freedom
through the punitive imposition of a moral law. 16
There
is next "the party of the rational ego"
(liberals such as
,

Shorter) and "the party of Narcissus" (psychoanalytic

feminists, pacifists, environmentalists, and democratic

It hankers for the restoration of punitive sanctions
against disobedience, above all for the restoration of
fear" ( The Minimal Self pp. 258-259).
r

socialists

-

„

.....

adyocates of a cuifcurai
revoiutionn)
whom r.sch critici 2 es
for rejectlng dependence
the true "definition
of selfhood as tension,
division
co„fli ot ,.17 These
groups

^

^

Misunderstand freedom as the
end of a guilty
conscience
Serais in asserting the ability
of the self to bring
the
social under its control,
and radicals in denying
the
boundaries between self and
world.
in contrast to these
-pathological- points of view,
Lasch defends the Aristotelian
conception of practice as

"Purposeful activity" because
it understands that
humans
are both connected to and
apart from nature." Lasch
first distinguishes this
notion from the -instrumentalist,"
of liberals, which he points
out forgets that we are
natural beings.

Instrumentalism regards the relation
of ends and
means as purely external, whereas
the older
tradition, now almost forgotten,
choice of the means appropriate' holds that the
to a given end has to
17 The
18

Min imal Se1f

r

p

.

2 58

eXam
Lasch s critique of the modern
?n^^-10 2<°?5^lnstrume
ntal reason (The Minimi
'

va

self ?
5J
p
The Minimal Self, p. 2 55.
La sch in some ways
her Cri i ies of modernity based on
the classical
tradition
q
^ f
tradition.
See
Wilson
Carey McWilliams, "On Equality as
1 F Undation for Community,"
The Moral ^nnff*?^
?
ITtT/t
of
the American
Republic Second Edition, Robert H.
Horwitz, ed. (Charlottesville: University
Press of
Alasdair Maclntyre, After yj^tue: *
d
ln Mora Theory (University of Notre Dame
Press,
^
fco
T
0
1984).
See
also the discussion of the decline of the
concept of a "calling" in Bellah, et. al., Habits of
the
Heart pp. 65-71.
247)

*

,

llu^^'J^V^^
,

—
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be^ons^dered as it contributes
to internal goods
as
On the other hand
Lasch says that this
"older traditionis also superior to
the prevailing Narcissism
of the
radical left, which overly
eguates humans and nature
contrast the internal
goods which Aristotle
speaks of are
said by L*sch to be best
conceived of, not as the
realization of a true essence
(as in fact Aristotle
thought) or as the achievement
of a communion with
nature
(as the radical left
supposedly thinks) but as a

m

,

technique of social construction,
as the development of
proper forms of "compensatory
gratification. "20
inpasse ° f narcissism is the
Creadon
°S ° £ , the
creation of cultural
objects, "transitional obiects "
Slm " ltane °usly restore a
with mothers and with mother sense of connection
nature and assert our
S
r
n
thOUt ** n * ln
on m:t nerror natur4.?i
°

™

What Lasch is doing here is restating
Aristotle in terms
of Freudian psychology. Thus,
while Lasch says that the
creation of transitional objects requires
the

rescusitation of work and politics as realms
of the
development of excellence, he doesn't speak
very much
about his vision of work and politics.
Instead he spends

19 The Minimal
Self, pp. 254-255.
20 The Minimal Self
p. 246.
,

The Minimal Self, p. 246. On the human relationship
to
nature, see also The Minimal Self p. 256.
,

his time discussing its
puported psychological
precondition: the coming to
terms with the ambiguous
human
relation to mothers and
"mother nature."

suppose that Lasch considers
"mother" and "mother
nature" to be universal
categories that apply with equal
force to the existential
psychological situation of both
men and women. What he asserts,
however, is that a being
called "man" must simultaneously
master "mother" nature
and acknowledge his dependence
on both "her" and actual
mothers if "he" is to achieve
mature freedom. This seems
to me to amount to the claim,
however obliquely made, that
a mature freedom depends on
the maintenance of the
I

categories of man as culture and as
human being and woman
as nature and as both more and less
than human.
If women
are so identified, is not the call
to assert mastery over
nature also a call for men to assert
mastery over women,
who represent mothers and nature? in fact
the association
of women with nature constitutes a central
prop by which
women have, in modern times at least, been
excluded from

public life and been forced to speak or establish
some
kind of identity for themselves largely within
terms made
by men. 22
See Sherry B. Ortner, "Is Female to Male as Nature is to
Culture?," Women, Culture an d Societ y, pp. 67-87. Ortn«r
makes the case that the distinction of male/culture versus
female/nature has served cross-culturally and universally
to ground the oppression of women.
This may be the case,
but, given the difficulty of what constitutes oppression'
in different cultures, and given the unique content

.
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Perhaps a distinction
between women and men along
the
lines of nature and
culture could, within a
different
system of power, operate
in a new way, with
different
effects less prejudicial to
women, or perhaps it could
be
overcome
left behind
as changes in attitudes
to
nature mesh with changes in
conceptions of selves and
gender.
Lasch, however, does not make
the case for the
former or the latter. Nor does
he acknowledge that the
distinction is linked in any way
to the problems faced by
women

-

-

In fact Lasch shows a
considerable lack of sensitivity

to gender issues.

This is indicated by the way he
speaks
simply of socialization when he
is in fact referring to
the boy's internalization of the
father's authority. He
seems to see the problem of mature
freedom in terms of the
problems male children face in dealing
with dependence on
mothers, just as he in effect identifies
the supposed
decline of the right kind of socialization
with the

decline of the father's, rather than the
parent's,
authority. 23

Additionally, Lasch spends little time

*************

imputed by the enlightenment to "nature," to
"
and to the distinction between them, I limit "culture
myself here
to the claim that the assimilation of "women"
to nature
has come to be more prejudicial to women as the
enlightenment idea of humans as subjects who center the
world and administer nature has become dominant.
23 Hayen,
While Lasch says "The justice of women's
p. 162.
demand for equality remains too obvious to ignore" Haven
he follows Freud in talking mostly about the
p. xvi)
psychic battles of little boys, rather than little girls,
and he argues that the psychic development girls must go
(

,

,
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considering the

^.ti™,

of „ hat else families
could be
besides patriarchal or
invaded, and this despite
the

considerable literature on
the subject generated by
an
alternative Freudian school
of thought psychoanalytic
24
feminism.
He fQr example say£
aimost
abQut
school's central proposition,
which is the idea that the
near-universal reliance on women
for child care reproduces
what La.ch would call
instruct alist raen and Narcissistic
women.
One might especially expect
him to deal directly
with Nancy Chodorow's argument,
as she connects more egual
child-rearing arrangements with
the achievement
:

^

of the

very goal endorsed by Lasch
y W5CR

i-h-,+- v^-t-w
tnat
both men and women

strike a balance between, and
comes to terms with,

*************
Unt6r th6ir b ° dies
necessarily makes them more passive thanand become women
men Haven

SceslLnv^Lf^

(

,

pp.

^important examples of this literature include
Nancv
Chodorow "Family Structure and Feminine
Personal i?^'
p«fn^£ulture__aj^
Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and
L P ere edS
stan *>«^ California: Stanford
Univ^«
5
PreSS 19?4); Nanc y Chodorow, The Reproduction
?
nJ
Z
f
k
otherj
Ln
QQl
q: Psy choanalysis and th
.gonijT^Tr^-nrlcr

r

*

'
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'

ft

(University of California Press, 1978); Dorothy
Dmnerstein, The Mermai d and the M jnotaur: Sgxu
aJ
qe nt a] d -^ m-an Malajse (New York: Harper
and Row,
?
o! r
19,6); Stephanie
Engel, "Femininity as Tragedy," Socialis t
0, 53
198 °* PP 77 " 10 4; and Jessica Benj^mTn^
SFJS*'-?
Authority and the Family Revisited: Or, A World Without
rS
Egg-GgEmap Critique, no. 13 (Autumn, 1978), pp.

^c?

'

iRl!j?

'

*

,
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dependence and separation. 25

^

lMOhf however(

and proceeds to accuse her
of rejecting rationality and
selfhood altogether. 26

Lasch's insensitivity on this score
is in a way
suprising, given that, like Freud,
he rejects the idea
that nurturance and purposive
rationality are respectively
"male- and "female" characteristics.
instead he considers
these options to be equally open to
men and women, even as
he believes that both sexes are also
equally given
to the

errors of pursuing either self-sufficiency
or mutuality
and relatedness, in responses to life's
dilemmas. 27 But

Lasch's failure to consider alternative
gender

arrangements makes more sense if we take his
remarks on
"mother" and "mother nature" to mean that he
favors

female-centered child-rearing arrangements as necessary
to
achieve proper socialization (selfhood).

This

interpretation is reinforced by Lasch's persistent use of

"Family Structure and Feminine Personality," Women
Culture, and Society, ed. by Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo
and Louise Lamphere (Stanford University Press, 1974).
Lasch criticizes the entire "party of Narcissus" for
rejecting purposeful activity entirely, along with its
instrumental version. The Minimal Self p. 244, p. 247,
and p. 253.
For a sympathetic reading of Lasch on this
point, see Kent M. Brudney, "Christopher Lasch and the
Withering of the American Adam," Political Theo ry, 15, 1
,

(February, 1987), p. 134.
2; The Minimal Self
p. 245.
,

.
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the word .Recline..
„ he „ speaking of
famUy 28
ot this he has been
accused of supporting
"patriarchy
Whether this is fair or
not depends on what
one means by
the term.
is not opposed (at
least explicitly, to
economic equality for
ween. He instead opposes
the
equalisation of child care
-under existing economic
conditions" because, by
his reasoning, it would
only
result in a more politically
vulnerable personality and
worse care for the young. 30
He sees
_

^

^ch

^

^^

defense of "patriarchy., but
merely as the concern that
the authority of the
mother will follow the example
of the
authority of the father and
gradually disappear, leaving
a

coniiX;/^

2

?;

-T

here is a c °ntradiction here,
as Lasch

?==*«^rats-ur^
as ErLJ=
rLr-^ ™*
*? C

declined

the n00! as the latter

very well, so it is not clear how
it could have declinpJ
It is of course not contradictory
to endorse In "idea?" nf
socialization and then argue that we
approximate it less
n
bUt th faCtS do not ^ar Sis
thesif
ou? It
i to merit
t lilt**
eas , ot enough
Lasch 's privileqinq of
?
.J'
the family, which he says has been
"invaded!" This
fa
geStS that the
y
v^uSarv m:re auto " om us vis-a-vis power oirelations more
and
the otdll'
?
truly
riv
*te
See
P
Barrett
and
MrTnfn h mu
Mcintosh,
The_Anti-social Family, p.
and p. 115.
e
iPle Barrett and Mcintosh, The An ti-socia!
Family f°p.

\

'

30 Haven

r

p.

1
^

xvi

/^

.

m

208

nothing between the individual
and the impersonal
interests of society. 31
On the other hand, Lasch's
model of successful
socialization commits him to a
defense of a breadwinner
and homemaker/nurturer division
of family responsibility.
He and psychoanalytic feminists
agree that these
arrangements tend to create strong
ego-boundaries and a
weak sense of sexual identification
in men, but he
strongly suggests a connection
between these personality
characteristics and the creation of
humans capable of
principled resistance to authority,
while they criticize
them instead as both rendering men
"psychologically

defensive and insecure," and guaranteeing
male
"sociocultural superiority "32 Lasch's
argument can,
then, be said to be "patriarchal"
in a certain
.

sense, in

that he seems to assume a connection
between the

achievement of mature freedom and the establishment
of
"traditional" (modern) "male" and "female"
personalities. 33
Hay_en, pp. 115-116.
To Lasch those who attack
now largely egalitarian) family as authoritarian the (by
or
patriarchal miss the point and contribute to a process
of
crisis and decay by undermining the credibility of
the
"parent's" authority. The point they supposedly miss
is
the problem of the passive and unprincipled personality.
32 Chodorow,
"Family Structure and Feminine Personality "
11

p.

33

66.

Lasch's critique of Narcissism can, in other words, be
looked at as a critique of a "feminization" of
personality.
It is because of this that Stephanie Engel
and Barrett and Mcintosh say that Lasch arrives "at a

«

209

Is the recovery of
paternal authority necessary
if we

are to achieve a recognition
of discord?

Were Hegel and

Aristotle right about the need
for a strict division of
roles, even if the cost is
much higher than either of
the,
thought? I suppose that this
is possible, but the price
to be paid is very high,
especially for
women, and

m

not at all convinced.

I

am

fact, Chodorwow's proposition,

that the homemaker/breadwinner
division in modern
conditions perpetuates a disempowering
pursuit of condord,
seems much more plausible to me.
It is hard to squarely confront
Lasch on this issue

because his only overt claim regarding
gender equality is
that a tradeoff between equality
for women and mature
freedom exists now, "under current
economic
conditions.

Even on this count, however, Lasch is
unconvincing.

if

families are anywhere near as invaded by
outside forces
and principles as he says they are, it
is hard to see how
there is much to lose from women joining
the work force
(as they already have)

with Suzanne

H.

.

In fact I am inclined to agree

Woolsey and Mary Howell that children with

two parent-caretakers are benefited if both of
those

*************
stance that systematically devalues women's experience
as
well as feelings of attachment, mutuality, identification
and relatedness." See Barrett and Mcintosh, The Anti^Q^al_J^mily, p. 124, and see Stephanie Engel,
"Femininity as Tragedy," p. 88.

.
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caretakers work (at job
s that provide
satisfaction and
self-esteem) 34

Suoh good jobs are of
course a rarity, and the
compatibility of »odern
occupational structures and
the
creation of "empowered"
or "mature" personalities
is very
much open to question.
This is however no reason
to
bemoan the -.decline" of the
family or the entry of
women
into the work force. On
the other hand it is also
not
enough (although still
important) to call for more
equalized child care, if industrial
society means that
bad, neglectful, or
politically stifling forms of

upbringing will prev ail regardless
of how equally their
burdens and joys are shared.
These considerations should
lead us also to ask questions of,
for example, political
economy, and in general ask after
the implications
of

modernity for children.

This is where some of the limits

inherent to a psychoanalytic approach
become apparent.

Problems with the Psy choanalytic Aoprn^
p

Neither Freud nor his followers engage in
enough
criticism of the enlightenment understanding

of nature as

fundamentally other to the subject.

Rather they repeat

See Woolsey, "Pied-Piper Politics and the Child-Care
Debate," Daedalus 106, no. 2 (Spring, 1977):
pp. 141-142and Howell, "Employed Mothers and Their Families,"
Pediatrics 52, no. 2 and no. 3 (August and September,
1973).
See also Ourselves and Our Children p. 195.
,

r

its terms by thinking
of nature as both the
U»it and
means to the satisfaction
of individual instincts.
Thus
we are told that there
is a single and permanent
dilemma
built into the human
condition. The guestion
becomes one
cf how to create the
-personality- that win best
mediate
between the never directly
seen -instincts- and the
culture and -sociabilitythat are valued only for
the

instinctual satisfaction which
we could not have without
them.
The search for the social
(in L*sch's terms, the
ideal of Narcissus) is turned
into a universal and
inevitable psychological feature
it is said to be Eros
itself.

-

in Lasch's case the effect of
this is to undermine his
own emphasis on the importance of
political action as a
means to reorganize the world of work.
First, his stress
on the central importance of the
"right" family life acts
to reinforce both the depoliticizing
idea that a good

family life is everything and the
disempowering sense
people have that they don't measure up. This
could pave
the way for the increased "management" of
families.
Second, Lasch questions the assumption of the
benign

character of the social by ruling out entirely the
idea
that social and political life are somehow natural
to
humans.

He reduces ideals to "substitute gratifications."

Given this approach, he cannot translate his concern that

^

we become beings with
principles into . statenent
of
these principles should
be.
virtue is seen as an
adaption, not as intrinsic
excellence. Another way
of
putting this is that
Aristotle does not translate
well
into the language of
an economics of instinct,
a more
promising approach from the
point of view of enabling
Political action would be to
argue that social and
political life are of intrinsic
worth but at
a cost.

i„

other words, Aristotle should
instead be rewritten from
a
point of view of discordance.
As

have already said, Lasch's
focus on the category of
"personality" as a means of responding
to a relatively
fixed human condition also leads
him to unnecessarily
pessimistic conclusions about the
compatibility between
equality for women and men and the
worthwhile
I

transformation of the realms of politics
and work.
This
makes his work vulnerable to
appropriation by various
conservative political forces which he
opposes.

On this

score psychoanalytic feminism presents
an preferable
alternative, as it points out that an increase
in the
father's authority is not a prerequisite
to the

development of politically empowered personalities.

On

the other hand, by virtue of its similar
reliance on

instinctual theory, psychoanalytic feminism tends
to

follow Lasch in reifying the dream of a home as a
feature

°f every human, not
an assumption that can
be more or less
problematized within different
sets of social and
discursive practices. The
focus is thus still on
the
proper resolution of
conflicts within the self,
instead of
°n, say, the way
-homesickness" is nourished
and the
resolution of conflicts is
emphasized (by, among other
things, psychoanalysis). 35

One way to get at the
problems with a psychoanalytic
perspective is to compare it
to a genealogical one.
Both
Donzelot and Lasch find a
positive connection between
the
weakening of family ties and
new forms of social
management, but Donzelot 's
approach points not toward
"personality" but toward structures,
structures which
converge to locate people in
private struggles managed by
an assortment of interventions
at various levels.
Donzelot calls on us to challenge
disciplinary practices
based on ideas of family, not to
restore (or for that
matter abolish) the idea of family. 36
3

Psychoanalytic feminism has made for some
powerful
accounts and critique) of the creation
of gendered
subjectivity. See for example Carol Gilligan?
in a
Different Voice: Psychological Th eory anci Wnn,on~
Development (Harvard University Press,
1982).
fhave
0
rath
than P s y cho ^alytic feminism in my
critique for reasons of space and because
his views are
r
1 6
Zt is the refore more important to me
*
5o
I? ?
to distinguish
between his perspective and my own. For a
good general discussion of psychoanalytic
feminism see
Elsntam, Public M an. Private Woman pp. 285-97.
36
Barrett and Mcintosh criticize Donzelot and Lasch
alike
for basing their criticism of the contemporary
family on
an idealization of an "invaded" patriarchal family.
While Donzelot would do better if did not so blithely

rkil

^-

^

^

'

,

A genealogical perspective
does not preclude one
from
following Usch in his
claim that humans will
always be
tempted by some sort of
ideal of complete harmony,
and
Donzelot and l^sch clearly
agree that the current
fact of
this temptation is put to
controlling political use,
but
this is not to say that the
situation is fixed, either
in
terms of the harmony sought
or the dangers involved.
The

contemporary situation is the
result of the combined
effect of many "discursive
practices;"
it results,

in

other words, from the circulation
and the absence of many
ideals, the fact of many
practices, and the reality of
many constraints and liberties.
The fact that Lasch follows
psychoanalysis in seeing
power as a negative law-like force
over against desire
means that he cannot countenance the
possibility that we
live within a situation (a series of
discursive practices)
that give the dilemma-bound nature of
human existence a

particular shape. 37

Perhaps, for example,
*************

11

it is only by

refer to the family of the "acien reaimp"
as if it was not
construction, it is a mistake to equate him with
Lasch on this score.
Donzelot 's critique of
times can, because of his concern to reveal contemporary
the family as
a construction, be seen to refer as an
alternative not so
much to the patriarchal family of old as to a
possible
future in which "family," as a concept that
organizes
nouseholds, is more contested and more varied in its
formulations than today.
37
Foucault points out that psychoanalysis follows the
psychiatry that preceded it and Western political thought
in general in that it understands power in a "juridicodiscursive" way, as that which says "no." Psychoanalysis,
says Foucault, only changed the repressive hypothesis by
putting forward a new understanding of desire, as that

virtue of a particular way
of thinking and speaking
that
it appears as if the
acceptance of freedom and the
losses
it entails depends on the
fixing of -woman" as the mother
whom -man- must both master
and depend on. And perhaps
this way of thinking and speaking
is already receding
behind us.
In fact there are many plausible
notions of "maturity"

and "mature freedom," none of which
is uncontestably
superior or politically neutral. For
this reason it is
wise to proceed with caution when
counseling reform in
accordance with any detailed model of the
"best"

socialization.

Instead reforms should be based on rather

minimal ideas about what constitutes good
upbringing and
neglect, and should aim for the most part
simply to create
space for people to have more say in their
domestic

arrangements than they do now.

The Import of Alt ernative Modes of Childrearing
What, then, are the "minimal" ideas about good

upbringing which
directly,

I

I

endorse?

Before answering this

want to further make the case that the theory

*************
which is only by virtue of, rather than despite, the
negative work of power. See The History of Sexuality
81-91 and pp. 100-101.

,

pp.

and evidence as to what
constitutes g ood upbringing
points
in certain directions
but is nonetheless
inconclusive and
ambiguous on several counts.
Rather than survey the vast
and varied an literature
that pertains to this
subject, i
limit myself to a review
of some of the various
and
opposing arguments about more
and less "collective"
modes
of child rearing and
their effects on personality.

should first say a few words
about the terms I use in
this chapter, as there are of
course a host of possible
living and child rearing
arrangements.
Following the
aUth ° rS ° f Ourselves and our
Chilean I use "cooperative
family living" to refer to a group
of families who agree
to share some acitivities and
some living space but retain
their separate identities. 3 8 There
is also "communal
I

,

family living" where a group of families
and individuals
choose to tie themselves more closely
to each other by

sharing a house or perhaps a piece of land.
the continuum is "communal society."

Here

At the end of
I

have in mind

practices that make the community and its
representatives
stand in the relationship of the protector and
caretaker
for the children.

In the Kibbutzim of Isreal and the

early Oneida community of New York state this is

accomplished first by having children live in a children's
house of some sort and visit (perhaps everyday) with their

38

pp.

179-185
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biological parents, and
second by organizing the
daily
life of adults such that
biological or familial
connections with others are
not all that relevant.
This
means some kind of relatively
communal form of
householding, where work, play
and the two together take
Place within the public space
of the whole group.
Since the issue at hand is
the effects of child rearing
on personality, I focus here
on the question of the
differences between communal society
and the private
nuclear family (partly because
these two forms have been
the object of a great deal of
study)
La Sch of course
.

is

part of this debate, as his critique
of the "decline of
parental authority" commits him to an
opposition to
collective child rearing, which he says
is already with us
to a degree.
His psychological theory is,
however, like

many others in that it fails to settle
the issue, and in
the meantime poses some threats of its own.
begin with the argument of Barrett and
Mcintosh who,
in opposition to Lasch, call for "increased
social
I

responsibility" in the raising of children.

Given that

they speak favorably of the kibbutzim and the Oneida
community, and since they argue that these communitities

teach us that "the strengthening of community requires the

weakening of family ties,"

I

assume that they consider

communal society to be the ideal form of such social

218

responsibility. 39

They stop short>

Qf

explicitly for industrialized
countries to adopt such
arrangements. This is perhaps
done so as to avoid the
difficult question of whether
or not the lessons
apparently taught by some small
and self-selected
argricultural communities need
to be reconsidered in the
light of very different
conditions,
it also might be
because their critique of the
contemporary family does not
(despite their claims) add up
to an argument against
the

private family per se.
For example, one of the points
they (Barrett and
Mcintosh) make is that child-rearing
in the family tends
to produce "a highly individualistic
personality
structure. "40 The details of their
argument, however,
only make the claim that such a
personality is the typical
product of "an enclosed family, with one
parent
[the

mother] mainly responsible for the children." 41

after they go on to describe this personality

—

Then,

one

marked by "a lack of concern for group support
and
approval or group interests"

—

they compare it not to the

typical personality of children raised in other sorts
of
families but instead to that of the typical collectively

The Ant i-social Family
The Ant i-social Family

,

p.

53.

,

p.

51.

The Anti-social Family

,

p.

51.

,
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reared child, »ho
who is «ih
said <-„
to v
have a greater dependence
on
the peer group and more
security of self. 42 This
important questions
unanswered, and it makes
it all the
easier for them to jump
to their conclusion
that the
family is "anti-social.,
and should be transcended.
Barrett and Mcintosh in
other words fail to make
a
thorough or convincing case
that we ought to move to
more
collective forms of child
care.
This does not, of course
»ean that we ought not to do
so, and Barrett and
Mcintosh
are on firmer ground when
they argue that the typical
collectively reared child is
different, rather than
inadequate, as compared to the
typical family raised
child.
This, at any rate, is a
reasonable conclusion to
draw from Bruno Bettelheim's
assessment of child-rearing
on the kibbutz, using Erik
Erikson's model of psychic
development, Bettelheim says that
that growing up on the
kibbutz creates an easing of feelings
of shame and doubt,
as well as an absence of adolescent
crisis. 43 He also
says that on the other hand the
kibbutz personality has a
tendency to be -flat," to lack imagination. "4
It does not

^

-

42

Chodorow makes a similar move when she compares
collective child-rearing to exclusive mothering,
but she
more sensibly limits her to the claim that
"exclusive
single parenting is bad for mother and child
alike." The
Reproduc tion of Mothering p. 217.
43
children of tn * r>rpam (Toronto, Ontario: Macmillan,
,

icJj??
"
1969),
pp. 313-317.
4
The Children of the Dream p. 172. See also Elshtain's
^
discussion of Bettelheim's work, Public Man. Private
Woman pp. 294-296.
,

.

"
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"deepen" as a result
of having resolved crises
successfully.45 His
evaluation
ter»s of EriKson's
model , despa r is avQided
some
to personal identity,
e.otional intimacy, and
individual
achievement. 46

^

.

^

^

^

Such a "cost" is, of course,
no small matter, as
Bettelheim knows. But on
the other hand one cannot
conclude from his study that
kibbutz-raised children are
not in some ways ethical,
caring selves. The evidence
does nothing to impune Hauerwas'
and Noddings' claim that
ethical development depends on
experiences of caring that
children (and adults) have within
ongoing and reciprocal
relations with specific others,
but it suggests thac these
others do not have to be parents
or a single set of adult
guardians. According to Bettelheim,
"the kibbutz example

suggests that the infant can achieve
basic trust even if
there is much less sameness and
continuity of the outside
provider than we assume is needed, so long
as continuous
providing is guaranteed. "47 of course it
is one thing to
establish "basic trust" and another to establish
"a

reciprocal relationship of caring," but in the
kibbutz it

5

The Chil dren of the Dream
6
The Children of the Dream
7
The Chi ldren of the Dream

p.

315.

,

p.

318.

,

p.

66.

,

seems that the latter
is established between
the child on
the one hand and the
Kibbutz, as mediated
through peers
caretakers, and parents,
on the other. 48

Adults can of course be
uncaring, and communal
or
cooperative arrangements
stand the risk of encouraging
neglect or at least making
it more convenient.
The fact
that there are plenty of
"parents" available could
mean
that people only parent
when they feel like it,

and there

may be times when nobody
feels like it.
This is more than
an abstract concern, as
many actual communes have
been
based on a philosophy which
sees children as more or
less
equal to adults (able to choose
parents) and which
understands liberation as more or
less the absence of
obligation. 49 There is no shortage
of psychological
evidence when it comes to showing
that children are
confused and often disturbed as a
result of being "freed"
from the certainty of reliance on
and obligation to

specific others. 50

48 The

Children o f the Dream pp 70-71.
See Alice S. Rossi's critique of communal
child-rearing,
A Biosocial Perspective on Parenting, Daedalus
106, no. 2
(Spring, 1977), pp. 13-I6.
See also R. Thamm, Bevond
Marriage and the Nuclear Family (S an Francisco,
1975), p.
124; R.M. Kanter, D. Jaffe, and D.K. Weisberg,
"Couplinq,
Parenting, and the Presence of Others: Intimate
Relationships in Communal Households," The Family
Coordinator 24, no. 4 (1975): 433-52; and Firestone The
Dialect ic of Sex p. 233.
r

.

*9

r

50 Rossi,

"A Biosocial Perspective on Parenting," p. 15.

.

This just goes to show how
often people's attempts to
live in a radically
different way end up replicating
much
of the society they are
explicitly rejecting. People who
seek to "turn parenthood on
and off and exchange children
as well as sexual partners"
are at one level rejecting

the

norms of "the family," but at
another level they are
embracing the liberal vision of
the family as a voluntary
grouping of like-minded people who
get together for mutual
satisfaction. 51 Alice S. Rossi in fact
argues that
the

"sexual script" and the "parenting
script" of many
communes is also found in the new family
sociology; both,
she says, seem "to be modeled on
what has been a male
pattern of relating to children, in which
men turn their
fathering on and off to suit themselves..." 52

Modes of SMldJSearlag and Social Conformity
I

conclude from this that we do not need to promote

models of healthy psychological development so
much as

The kibbutz philosophy is quite unlike this in that it
entails the acceptance of strong obligations to the group
and a disapproval of extramarital sex The Childre n of
fche
Dream, p. 51)
Kibbutzniks are ready and willing to make
great sacrifices for the children (p. 131). Bettelheim
observes, however, that the radical child-rearing
arrangements of the kibbutz were an "afterthought." He
surmises that "a society that had no interest in children"
had to adjust to the fact of their existance in a way that
allowed the adults to continue with the intense collective
existence that was so important to them (pp. 17-18)
"A Biosocial Perspective on Parenting," p. 16.
(

.

critique bogus philosophies
of liberation which make
obligations to children optional,
and tear down, weaken,
or reform the societal
structures that reflect and
enforce
these philosophies (such as
the occupational and housing
systems)
One might counter perhaps
that this cannot
.

be

done without transforming
childcare so as to effect
personality for the better. This
brings back the question
raised by Lasch: is there a relationship
between modes of
childrearing and the development of
an ability either to
acknowledge discord or engage in
resistance to the demands
of one's community? 53
In fact it is (fortunately) no easy
thing to manufacture
conformism, as the relationship of child-rearing
practices
to the development of a political culture
is quite

complex.

53

•

On the other hand, the manufacture of

This issue is complicated by the fact that social
discipline, while always impositional to some degree,
is
necessary part of human life. People should be capable a
of
resisting demands made by their community, but which ones?
What is conformism to some are the minimal requirements
of
social order or morality to others. For my part, I don't
want children growing up to take high levels of inequality
for granted as the only "realistic" way to organize
society, and I am upset that so many people insist that
all pain is justified, that we live in an entirely moral
universe, and that things can be made so right some day
that we won't need to put up with politics any more. On a
more affirmative note I want to people to be taught trust,
kindnes, cooperation and social responsibility. Of course
not everyone will agree with my idea of what discplines of
the self are acceptable or worthwhile, nor can I
demonstrate in some final way that I am right; thus I must
live with the fact that even the goals I cherish the most
are contestable.

nonconform

and political

task,

^

^^

^^^^

consider again the case
of the kibbutzim.
Bettelheim says that kibbut2

space to carry "on an
internal, private monologue
(or
dialogue," with themselves,
and this he says cosines
with
the lack of deep-seated
differences among kibbutz
members
to produce an inability
to conceive of themselves
as

different than thev
ey are

'

Thio
Thls

m

turn means a lack of
*.

political imagination.
[There is] less doubt about
the validii-v
„u
Y
6
says.
Hence the greater inne si
o"ut
also™
later on, the only limited
ability to aceot^ni'
lnt
lid bUt 0ne ' s -n wh?ch
I!mI?L
PaClty t0 deal With hypothetical n
Sections
JSi ™
ithat
out
in question one's own values
or way^of
*.

"^

-

From the point of view of discordance,
this is a very
serious criticism of the kibbutz way
of life, but it is
not clear either that familial
child-rearing does not
carry similar risks in some contexts
or that the results
observed by Bettelheim flow from collective
child-rearing
per se. 55 On the first score, the contemporary
U.S., with

54 The Chi
ldren of the Dream
55 From a

,

p.

173.

psychoanalytic feminist point of view, the
kibbutz offers an experiment of very limited utility
in
assessing alternatives. The "meteplot" (those who oversee
the care of the children in the children's houses) are
all
women.
Rossi points out that "men are rarely involved in
the care of the very young," in communes that prescribe
the equal sharing of child care.
"A Biosocial Perspective
on Parenting," p. 25.
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its private households,
is certainly no bastion
of nonconform (even if the hero who bucks
the crowd while
affirming good old American
values is a staple of
popular
culture).
This is, as we have
discussed, partly because
of the effects of the
family and its location in
a class
society.
The family is heavily
valorized as the locus
both of harmony and fulfillment
and of autonomy and
personal effectiveness, but
life is organized such that
the family (l ike the rest of
society) fails for the most
part to provide these things.
People often feel isolated
and ineffectual, and these are
not the conditions that

breed principled political opposition
or a repudiation of
prevalent social norms.

A good deal has been said to this
effect in the
psychological literature. Many investigators

for example

agree with Urie Bronfenbrenner that "a
warm, constricting
mother-child relationship maximizes dependency
and

produces a child who is readily socialized to
adult
standards." 56

Jerome Kagan has spoken of the

disempowering effects of class differences as mediated
through the family.

He says that the situation of the

lower-class child is akin to that of the later-born child,
just as the middle-class child shares features with the

Bronfenbrenner, with the assistance of John C. Condry,
Jr w Two Worl ds of Childhood: U.S. and U.s.s.R (New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), p. 70.

*»t

born.

The children of the
former

reauze

they have little of
what the culture and/or
their family
values, and then try to
hide the resulting
perceived
inadequacy.
Kagan says that in the
lower-class child thi s
leads to "a readiness to
take risks, an easier
dispositi on
for aggression, and a
tendency to assign responsibility
for failure to external
events. "57 The middle-class
and
the first born child, on
the other hand, "is pushed
to
differentiate himself from the
lower-class youngster
once

he recognizes his presence,
probably durng the early
school years. "58 The resul

^

^

^

^

less feeling of inadequacy
but a more cautious and
conformist outlook.

On the second score (the relationship
of collective
rearing and conformism) certain
features of kibbutz
,

upbringing help to develop self-confidence,
and so point
in the direction not of conformism
but rather
its

opposite.

For example, according to Bettelheim
children

who feel no good compared to their
parents (typical of
western middle-class families) experience
more shame and
internalize rules more throughly than the
children of the
kibbutz, who want only to measure up to their
much closer

hi

1977V p

in
50

^

Family/

"

Daedalus

58 "The Child
in the Family," p.

53.

-

106,

no.

2

(Spring,

1

Peers.

*

The result

,

ne sayS/

^

less

^

Kibbutzniks than among
typical westerners. This
may lead
to an ability to resist
which is not immediately
evident
as those who do not
like it on the kibbutz can
leave and'
often do (this in itself
is an act of courage and
criticism which requires
political imagination).^ This
also makes it unclear how
best to interpret the tremendous
unanimity on the kibbutz. Were
the kibbutzim to

constitute a whole society that
somehow had to either
accomodate, normalize and/or repress
all its members,

there might be a good deal more
difference present. The
kibbutz under those conditions might
of course also fail,
or fail to be in any fundamental
sense true to the
original kibbutz mission.
it may be, then, that (as
Bettelheim suggests) the lessson the kibbutz
teaches is
the desirability of multiple child rearing
arrangements in
any single society.
"it is a fine system for some and not
for others." 6
In conclusion, while Lasch is on to something
when he

claims that collective child-rearing is already
with us to
a degree and has serious malignant conformist
effects,

the

key issue is one of concordance and normalization, not
of

The Children of the Dream
The Children of the Dream
The Children of the Dream

p.

311.

,

p.

295.

,

p.

299.

,
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socialization and personality

.

«

All sorts of

"personality types," including
the guilt-based "ethicalindividual which Lasch defends,
can potentially be put to
service toward the ends of
order. 63 Nor is Lasch very
helpful when he posits parental
authority as the only
alternative to "the socialization
of reproduction." There
are in fact a host of possible
forms of upbringing which
are consistent with the formation
of an ethical self and
are uncertain or at least mixed
in their political

implications. 64

The most important question we
need to

9 these llnes Lasch's thesis could be construed
not
as the k
bemoaning of the ascendency of the
"feminine*"
personally but simply as the claim that
a new anS long
overdue valorization of experiences and
personality
traits
long thought of as "female" does somehow,
in today's
context, play into the hands of, or provide
a foundation
tor, a new authoritarianism.
Given the entirety of
Lasch ;s work, I think this is a bit generous,
but it
certainly is an idea to be found in his work.
See Kent M
Brudney, "Christopher Lasch and the Witherinq
of the
.

American Adam."
63 The
current order was, for example, created by people
with the typical "male" and "female" personalities
engendered by the socialization process which Lasch
compares favorably to that of today. At one level, it is
important to accuse Lasch of sexism because he fails to
ask by what system of the construction of gender we will
produce the kind of individuals who will engage in the
principled resistance he says that we need. At another
level the important question is instead how to structure
orders so that they have room for resistance.
64 Kagan
goes so far as to say "...it may be impossible to
state the principles underlying functional relations
between specific parental practices and particular
behavior in the child, except, perhaps, in the extreme,
where consistently harsh physical abuse creates serious
phsyical distress" ("The Child in the Family," p. 39).

ask about our rearing
of children is not what
personality
we create but in what
manner, and toward what
ends, both
adults and children are
subjected to disciplines
and
assimilated to norms.

The difference between
these alternatives is
perhaps
subtle, but nonetheless
important. Normalization
does of
course involve the structuring
of self, and so the
making
of "personality," but the
point is to set one's sights
at
taming forces of normalization,
not simply at redirecting
socialization. We can perhaps go
so far as to imagine an
order with reduced requirements
regarding personality, or
for that matter one where
personal style is less
valorized.

We ought not limit ourselves to
a comparison
of selves, as if we could pick
the best one.

From a point of view concerned with
concordance and
normalization, the private family gets
a mixed

assessment.

It provides many with much that is
worthwhile and not

easily replaced, but at a significant cost

-

some costs

being born by all and some especially born
by women, by
marginal economic groups, and by the institutionalized.
My overall conclusion is that we should, while
working

within the framework of private households, aim to
create
space (provide support) for more people to have more
say

in the particulars of their domestic arrangements
than

they do now.
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JUalm

Accost of tuo

nrnaLauaUtap

For all my criticism
cf psychological
approaches to the
Politics o f the fanily
, do endorse
,
as s
saidj
"mxnimal" ideas about what
constitutes "good" upbringing
and these are not without
their political implications,
t
begin with the words of
Jean Elshtain which 1
cited in
chapter two, that people are
(1, in need of Uving anong
others -in relations of
concrete particularity,"

^

_

and

(2)

bound by "an imperative
...to discover, to understand
and
to create meaning. "65
, regd here
come to be (and continue to
live) in a process of
identity
formation (and reformation and
adjustment)
This involves
the creation of meaning and
requires the presence

^

^

^

.

of

specific others.

Whatever the culture, children have

crises, experience stress, and
have to cope with anxiety.
Their questions are "who am l?,» »„
ha t am I?,» "what is
the world?," and, very early on,
"what good am I?

Distinctions of self and other, good and
bad, desirable
and undesirable, and alike and different,
come very
naturally and are reflectively applied by
the child both
to her or himself and to others. 66
Children compare

themselves to others, make attachments to
significant

"Public Man.
66 Kagan,

Pri vate Woman

,

p.

318.

"The Child in the Family," pp. 34-35.

others, perceive that
certain attributes are
desirable
ludge themselves according
to whether or not they
have
these attributes, and
ma*e an effort to fashion
themselves
so as to achieve a
modicum of self-certainty
and selfvalue. An essential part
of this process of becoming
a
self is the development
of a narrative about
oneself; this
story becomes partly
constitutive of the self; «i»
exist;
for example, partly by
virtue Qf

^

which tells me who »I- am.
meaningful and the symbolic,

^

^.^

^

^

'

This story is filled with the
it involves judgments, and

not just accounts; it is a
memory of feelings as well as
events.

Even according to this minimal
psychology normalization
is unavoidably a part of life;
for to form a narrativebased vision of oneself is to some
degree to impose a form
on the self (or, one might better say,
on the body) which
accords somehow with particular visions
of what a human
should be. This inevitability of normalization
is,

put in

these terms, nothing more than the inherent
ambiguity of
morality and the necessarily moral nature of human
identity.

The only options we have (if we even have

them), concern how tightly drawn our identities
are, how

fully responsible we are to a model of a coherent self,

how much slack is permitted by the larger order when it
comes to identity formation and transformation, and, of

.

course, the contents
of the moral judgments
we
internalize.
It follows from
this that children at
a minimum need a
certain level of
predictability and sense in
the world

inner and outer

-

-

which they experience,

one cannot come
to be as a self in a
particular world if what
one does
seems arbitrary in
relation to what else
happens.
Perhaps
-ore importantly, children
need the means to develop
and
sustain some good judgments
about themselves. This
might
mean roles to emulate,
valued activity to perform,
or the
apparently non-contigent and
deep-seated approval
of

significant others to merit.

Modern society has made for

an emphasis on the latter,
as identification with
roles is
seen to unduly constrict autonomy,
and as children, and
young adults, have been deprived
of participation in

clearly productive or valued activity. 67
Even this minimal psychology
suggests that the modern
desire for autonomy has been partially
self-defeating
(perhaps I should say it has been
-taken advantage of),
as the focus on love intensifies
the private family space,
makes caretakers vulnerable to normalizing
advice and
assistance, and in general helps to point
people towards
harmony and away from politics and conflict
(see my
arguments in chapter two)

67 Kagan,

"The Child in the Family," pp. 40-43.

233

Adults also need roles to
emulate, valued activity to
perform, and ways to come
to good judgments about
themselves.
general, psychological science,
while not
determinative, gives support
to those who claim that
"one
isolated parent at home with
a child or children may
not
be the best way to structure
child raising for the parent
or for the child. "68 i
nstead tne evidence suggests that
community forms of sharing child
care, widespread until
the modern idealization of the
isolated home and the
introduction of divisive systems of

m

social mobility, are

good for children and adults.

m

such settings parents

can get relief from the enormous
responsibility of solo
child care, and both parents and
children can benefit from
a diversity of role models,
peers, and friends. 69 Rossi,
in this context,

refers favorably both to "growth centers"

and to "multi-family households."

Both could be aided by

government and mostly privately controlled.
In the modern circumstance, growth
centers in
young children spend part of each day may help which
to
teach humility to the oldest child and self-conf
ience
to the youngest
Multi-family households, in which
the sexual and parenting lines of the nuclear
familv
remain intact but which include overlapping and
shared living space, would similarly provide children
with access to peers and parents with built-in
support systems for alternating child care, coping
more easily with family emergencies, and easing the

Ourselves and Our Ch ildren p. 205.
Ourselve s and Our Children, pp. 179-185.
r

both male and female
household members.

The idea of development

'0

have merely sketched here
also
allows for a fairly
definitive formulation
concerning what
should count as abuse
and neglect.
These ideas are, i
think, not very controversial,
at least among those
Adults
that live with and care
for children, and by the
standards
they provide the modern
private family is deserving
both
cf serious criticism and
considerable acclaim." on the
cne hand many, many families
(of nil sorts) help to
provide many, many children
with significant
I

others,

predictability, and the chance to
engage ln soae £ort of
valued activity. The intense
love that often comes with
the intimacy of the private
family helps people to forge
commitments, to make sacrifices for
each other, in short,
to care for each other. On
the other hand, our private
families often mean isolation for
their members from any
sort of supportive community.
Our families and households
are situated in a highly stratified
class society, which
makes for all sorts of pressures,
insecurities,
and

feelings of powerlessness and inadequacy. 72
70

often these

"A Bio-social Perspective on Parenting,"
p. 23.
7
M S abUSers ° f childre " believe, at some
level, that
K ? they
what
are doing is wrong. Many ask for help in
variety of direct and indirect ways. See Ourselves a
and
Our Children, p. 224, and pp. 257-258.
72
On the effects of class on children, see Kagan,
"The
Child in the Family," pp. 47-50.

L
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factors help lead people
„ho were
mistreated
ChUdr"n t0
Pare " ts '
• their children in turn
There are, as Bettelheim
sa ys n0 re than once,
no neglected
or beaten children
on the kibbuts, as
compared
two m il lion cases
each year in the United
'

—

"

^

^^

^

States."

&- "Minimalist-- catenas
at Eaaily

This sober note .akes
an appropriate starting
point for
»y "minimalist" defense of family,
as
,

far

froffl

that the modern family
has no drawbacks, I only
argue that
we (of western modernity,
need seething like it
if we are
to strive to„ a rds a less
normalizing and oppressive
order.
I went however to
make clear that -minimalistdoes not
mean tentative and uncertain.
I refer instead to
the fact
that I am purposely broad
and lacking in detail in my
specification of what counts as a
family and rather narrow
in what it is about this
wide range of families which
I am
defending.
I am not for example
arguing that
-the family-

makes the best selves or is
necessarily the appropriate
locus of community. And I do not
have a problem (per se)
with either the -decline of parental
authority- or the
proliferation of alternative householding
arrangements.

the * ib* utz see The Children of the nr»,
p 297
I!°!^
Or^Abuse in th U.S., see Ourselves and our chnA.L
p
'

,

.

.

.
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On the other hand

am not tentative in my
opposition to
large-scale state or comity
run child care. On a
more
affirmative note,
j am arguing that we
should aggressively
move to support people
in their attempts to
live in a
multiplicity of types of
household. This means, as
I said
at the outset of the
chapter, that we should
fight for
social and economic change
and public policy which
makes
our societies more
pro-parent, pro-gaurdian,
pro-household
and pro-child.
I promise to give
some examples of what
such change and such policy
might be, but first some
defense of these various
propositions.
I

Adrienne Rich, like Barrett and
Mcintosh, is very
critical of the modern family and
the institution of
"motherhood" that goes along with
it.
Unlike them,
however, she is careful to
distinguish this oppressive
family
the "patriarchal family"

-

-

from the family per

se.

This is in part because of her
concern with the
implications of collective child-care.

This book is not an attack on the family
or on
mothering, except as defined and restricted nnH.,
patriarchy
Nor is it a call for a mass system of
state-controlled child-care. Mass child-care in
patriarchy has had but two purposes: to introduce
large numbers of women into the labor force
...and to
indoctrinate future citizens. 74
.

Of Woman Born: Motherhoo d as Experience and Institution
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1976)
p. 14.
,

in fact there is
good reason to be
suspicious of
collective child care
under any conceivable

Modern
conditions, not only
under "patriarchal- ones."
Kor the
sake of the unregulated
diversity essential to
politics
for the sake of
protection fro* normalizing
or repressive
observations and interventions,
and I think for the
sake
of a richer, more
multi-textured and multilply
satisfying
life, we need to draw
lines of some kind between
the
public and the private.
This means for one thing
that we
should avoid state directed
child care as much as
possible
(while at the same time
using the state as a vehicle
to
support people in the caring
of children)
First I will
speak of modern conditions
and their relevance. Second
I
will discuss the need for
a category of, and
institutional
supports for, the -private."
And third, I will connect
this to the guestion of
child-rearing and private
households.
.

To speak of the relevance of
modernity
return to the arguments
the following.

I

I

need only

made in chapter one.

Consider

First, the modern ideas of legitimacy,

freedom, and authority place high
demands on the self.

Modern order, and modern governments,
demand more than

75

And on the other hand, should people create
for
themselves a society which is not systematically
unfair to
women, it will probably nonetheless be
deserving of some
attack.
I discuss the issue of patriarchy
shortly.
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obedience and .ore than
ritualized endorsement; they
demand reflective endorsement
and they retire from
people
behaviour that reflects
endorsement.
Modern selves are indeed
reflective, and this means
not
only that they are capable
of a variety of modes
of
thought and action, but also
that they are structured
on
the basis of a good deal
of self-discipline, and
quite
able to impose still more.
We (modern people)

are
thematizers, aggressively defining
reality and seeking the
self-conscious mastery of it. We
therefore readily
construct catergories of normality
and deviance, putting
pressure on ourselves and others
to fit into the former.
Modern orders, like modern selves,
are highly
structured; they are governed by
demanding imperatives and
require considerable levels of
self-conscious

administering.

it is true that we ought to move
to lessen

the imperatives that so constrict our
decisions,

collective and otherwise, but it seems
inconceivable that
we can in the foreseeable future either
do without
wide

scale (not merely local) "social policies"
of some kind,
or make and implement such policy without
imposing
on

people in a variety of ways. As

I

said in chapter one,

normalization is not only made necessary by our complex
interdependence, it is also provided with a perfect
pretext.

^
^
^

And, of course, we
of modernity are
what
always have been: we
are

Philosophies of concord.

These faots „ f

^

^

^
^

not go away, ana so
it is important
we
distinctions between various
arenas of activity and
experience. More exactly,
we need to continue
to
recognize some areas of
life as "private-, relative
to
others. „ e ought to do
this on the one hand
for the sake
of democracy and
politics, and on the other
hand for the
sake of the preserving
the possibility of the
experiences
particular (in modernity) to
more -private" arenas.
Democracy under conditions
of a high degree of selfconsciousness requires (consists
of, at least two things.
It requires first the
reality of a space where anyone
can
speak and speak more or less
to everyone. Talking counts
as "speaking" in this case
only if it is of relevance to
possible collective action. This
means there must be
structural room for different courses
of action and a
cultural ethic in support not only
of free speech but of
the importance of listening to
what other people have to
say.

This can be called the realm of "the
public/' although,
as Jean Elshtain has pointed out, it
is important that we
conceive of this space, not as a pristine arena
that
floats above everyday concerns but as the very
realm where

we contest the

^

of what

^ ^
^^
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important to idealize
politics in the sense that
„e
therefore believe that
(in Connolly's words,
it can be
"the „ediu m through
which essential exiguities
can be
expressed and given so»e
redress," but we should
not
idealize politics as a
real™ of aisty ideals.
This will
only lead some into
public life for the wrong
reasons
lead others to scorn
politics as for the light-headed,
and
create pessismism when
people discover just how down
and
dirty politics really is. 76
The second "thing" required
by modern democracy are
Places where people can speak
and not be entirely "in
public." This is important
because the force of the
public world (with all its imposing
definitions of
reality) can only be held
accountable and possibly
transformed given the possibility of
silence, of

concealment, and of the alteration of
public discourse in
more private speaking. Moreover
what is at issue here is

more than "room," or physical space
free from
surveillance.

Democracy and slack require multiple ways

of speaking, and this in turn requires
a pluralism of

loyalties and dependencies.

This means more than one mode

of existence; it means opportunities to
play different

characters and to assume different stances, without
an

76 Public Man.
Pri vate Woman

,

pp.

346-349.

unchecked insistence
on a complete absence
of
contradiction, x cannot
resist the obvious
metaphor
"Checks and balancesat the governmental

XeveX do notnin,
to controx the power
of normalization (and
i„ the U.S. at
this tiae they do little
more than abet private
power,.
For this checks must
ust exist
exist- at the level
t
of the social
construction of the self.

want to stress that this
idea of democracy includes
-re than this call for multiple
I

institutions, loyalties,

and realms of experience.

it is also the insistence
that

any way of demarcating and
constituting realms of society
is problematic, even
hurtful, although at the
same
necessary and inevitable. The
fact of social forms hurts
us not simply, or primarily,
at the level of a compromise
and sacrifice of individual
interests, but at the

level of

a compromise and sacrifice
of possible ways of being,

m

modern societies, or at Xeast in
modern Xiberai capitaiist
societies, a good deal of such injury
is disguised by
means of the public/private distinction.
It does not
necessarily follow, however, that we
should address the
injury by stripping away the status
of private
from all

arenas.

Instead we need structural slack, multiple
ways
of speaking, and politics both at the
level of the public
and the private.

am not, then, by any means denying the cogency
of the
recent politicizing of the distinction between the
public
I

na the private as
carried out by feninisn
n pointing out
that „ the personai
is poUticai

^

eW and

^

Problemati zation o f
"
»the
family," and this
book ig therefore
footsteps. The personal

^.^^ ^

is in(Jeed

poUticai)

xs a contestable
social construction
that has

effects.

^

^^

positional

This is not> by my
reading;
argument
the private, hut a way
to tear down the
immunity from
critique claimed under
liberalism for all that is
currently deemed private.

^

in fact,

in my view the cause
of gender justice is
best
served hy the effort to
preserve and expand the
realms of

concrete human relations,
and alternative spaces
for
speaking and experience,
without imposing on women a
construction of themselves as if
they lived for mother's
day each year. Along these
lines, a good deal of

feminist

criticism rightly insists on the
independent value and
validity both of the experiences
women have in so far as
they are women, and of the
experiences and relations
anyone can have in those realms,
such as the
household,

which are still socially marked as
uniquely the province
77
of women.
Householding and the practices and
experiences that go with it have their own
value; they are

f
exam le .Gilligan's In a Different- v„i^
11***
and
°T -An P
Noddings'
Ethic of Caring" provide examples of Sis
kind of feminist criticism.
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not simply a neans
tQ

^

^^
^^
^

externai
v
that so many p e0 le
find . great deal Qf
p
experiences of "family- ..
even in
normalized families
is a point in favor
of that
institution. „or should
we forget that we. as
highly
structured, reflective,
modem selves, are capable of
diverse loyalties, conflicting
identifications, and
multiple modes of expression
and action. The
continuation
of a public/private
distinction, enforced by the
construal
of some claims to a "right
to privacy" as legitimate,
is
essential if we are to preserve,
and to make, room for
such richness and diversity.
SOffie

-

This defense of privacy is
reinforced by the fact that
much of what we value most in
the realms we deem private
cannot be replicated in more
public contexts. This is
perhaps partly due to what Elshtain
states as a general
human truth
"particular experiences and spheres of
social relations exude their own
values and purposes, and
have ends not attainable by, or within,
other spheres."™

-

It is also partly due to the current,
and likely

continued, nature of modern communities;
they are large in
scale, complex in their requirements,
and encompass a good
deal of diversity.
In this context any attempt to rely on

public settings to provide humans with intimacy
and

Elshtain, Public M an. Private Woman

,

p.

334-335.

spontaneity is likely
to lead
ChariCatUr6d f0r
»'

^

^

^

t° suit public
iffiperatives

tttoaae^jMacracv.

Pri „^-

1Iril|

^

.

^

LhL Lu
of democracy and
multiplicity, then, we
need a public/private
distinction. This means,
as x have
already just suggested,
that „e need to continue
to
organize daily
fe by „ea„s of small,

Tor the

sa)ce

U

relatively intimafce
and stable households
in which children are
raised and
which have some claim to
shelter from the inquisitive
eyes
of society. This is
because privacy and democracy
require, at least in modern
conditions, a multiplicity
of
institutional spaces, none of
which are entirely
answerable to the others. The
private household can be,
and to some degree is, such
a space, even if it is
now
largely colonized by imperatives
of order.

When

I

say "household" here

I

also mean "family," a

Place where people live together,
sharing time and space,
exchanging unpaid services, committed
to staying together
over time, and participating in
rituals or traditions that
somehow mark the fact that one aspect
of their identity is
as members of that group.
when I say that we should

"

v ° deflned ln Ourselves a nd Our chilH^n p
, f
Authors
of that text in turn cite Mary Howell,
Helping Ourselves (Boston: Beacon Press,
1975), Chapters

ir/
154.

y
™
The

,

.

1

organize daily life by
meang Qf
children should in
general
ra

^

z
.

se(j

^

^^

meubers

households,

^

we have seen that the
abolition of the
private family is compatible
with the the minimal
grounding of identity,
b,t the family/society
distinction
helps give many a personal
story that is distinct
from
even though bound up with,
society's story. The
private
status of households is
thus important because it
helps
prevent the identity of the
individual from becoming too
thoroughly bound up with the
social order as a whole,
an age where legitimacy
itself depends on the internal
mental state of society's
participants, this distance is
valuable.
It helps to put people in
a position where
reflection can allow for the critique
of established
understandings, despite the pressures
on them to put their
internal musings to work to bring
themselves in line. The

m

particular (and intense) experiences of
family can provide
a ground for resistance to the
order or
to some of the

order's particular norms and imperatives.
To put this another way, a public/private
split can make
it easier to acknowledge the ambiguity
of the worth of

each realm, and therefore of social forms
in general.
In
an age where power operates partially by
catering to the

human penchant to be at home, the private family can
be
(in certain conditions) a bulwark against the temptation

to treat society
as a home, jus t as
the fact that there
is

seen as less than a
home.
one possible response
to my argument here
is that I too
readily assume that
collective household,
arrangements
are necessarily invasive
and authoritarian. Things
may he
that way now, someone
might say, but it could
be
different. Barrett and
Mcintosh for example acknowledge
that "increases in social
control" over child-rearing
"currently take" the form of
"interventions into private
life," and parents, who
"bear most of the work and
costs
of bringing up children"
are not unjustified in their
resistance to these interventions. 80
They suggest,
however, in keeping with their
assumptions of concordance,
that increases in social control
need not take a
pernicious, interventionist form.
After all
C
slices departments of local authorities
1*1 K°
^i visitors,
the
health
the school welfare officers are
scarcely the agencies that socialists
have in mind
1 "*
SOCial responsibility for

chUdren?"

'"'^

What then do they have in mind?

No direct answer is

given, but their conclusion seems clear
to me; they think
that one day there will be less of a private
realm into

The Ant i-social Family
The Ant i-social Family

,

p.

134.

,

p.

134.
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which there could
be interventions by
Qutside agencies '
Affairs that use to
he consider "
private „
-eaxs, cleaning and
housekeeping, and the
work Qf caring
for people"
will be nanaged
„
so "social controlwiU he achieved without the
cists it
has now.

-

^ ^^.^

My response to this
is two-fold
two told,

on *-v,
the one hand, the

ideal of people managing
their own lives together
cooperatively, is bo th
beautiful and i mp ortant.
P eople s
lives are in fact Managed"
in many ways right
now, only
the appearance of "privacy"
disguises this and prevents
it
from being a political
issue.
Moreover, many of the tasks
Barrett and Mcintosh refer
to can and ought to be
more
cooperative affairs.
indeed, the historically
recent
demise (but not death) of
various more cooperative forms
of living (everything from
mass transportation to the
sharing of child care in urban
neighborhoods) has meant
higher costs, more inequality,
and more isolation,
,

especially for women.
On the other hand, it is very
important, especially
given modern conditions that we
either cannot or should
not dispense with, not to speak as
if we can render our
social world and our processes for dealing
with collective
issues entirely benign in their import.
We cannot. We
cannot do so because to deal with collective
issues is to
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take part in a
particular way of life
and so in a
Particular, naroly be
ni gn way of producing
identities and systems
of value.
"Intervention" is in a
-nse a part of the human
condition; it need not
come fro*
the "outside" to
exist.

^

,

in fact the assumption
of concordance involved
in the
vision of entirely
non-coercive "social control"
is likely
in practice to serve
as a tool of a kind of
coercion.
Harmony is the expected
outcome, once the community
is

deciding things "for
ror itself.
itself
y

»

»„j ....
And
the participants of

that community are then
expected to "voluntarily"
reach
the expected consensus.
They are not only supposed
to go
along with the result; they
are expected to endorse it
as
well. This is especially
likely to result in a squelching
of spontaneity and difference
for two reasons.
First,
in

modernity persons are subjects who
seek to see themselves
as having freely endorsed the
conditions of their
existence and who can police
themselves for inconsistency
very thoroughly. Second, the
collective
issues that have

to be dealt with can all to easily
be construed as
rational or scientific questions with
only a few logical
outcomes.
In these conditions, the establishment
of
communal society promises to enhance forces
of

normalization and oppression.

Practical ftBBiisafciana

^

This may see. to leave
us in a difficult spot
an, as we have already
seen, our families
currently aid
and abet in the same
forces of oppression and
normalization which would
probably be enhanced in a
modern
communal society. To
summarize, the problem stems
on the
one hand from the alluring
but in many ways disempowerin
g
nature of the promise of
harmony offered by "the
family,"
and on the other hand from
the many-sided enforcement
.

of

the norm of the privatized,
successful, "middle-class"
family.
A central part of this
enforcement is what
Donzelot calls the systems of
tutelage and contract, and,
as the effects of class
position on children suggest,
these systems are able to normalize
partly by virtue of
the operation of the disparity
between them. The world of
liberalized relations and middle class
values has its
other (real and imagined) in the
world of the dependent
the former way of life is offered
as superior to the
latter, as indeed it is, thanks especially
to the stigma
and the deprivations this polarity creates;
the person who
accepts the proffered norms can see themselves
as "free"
and "responsible," relative to those who are
"no good." 82

-

82 Donzelot

speaks of an "effective dynamic" between
working class pole and the bourgeois pole." Policing"the
p
xxi.
On the nature and political significance of
citizen/other distinctions see William E. Connolly,
Appearance and Reality in Pointing (Cambridge University
Press, 1981), pp. 157-172, and Richard Sennett and
Jonathan Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of m agg (Vintage

Sidelines and some specific
possibilities which are
Keeping with the position

in

have taken regarding the
a^iguity of the modern family.83
There
issues from which to
draw examples
we need to change
Public policies that deal
with families, we need to
change
schools, and we need to
change the economic context
I

m^

-

in

which families make their
way.

i

speak selectively,

beginning with possible changes
at the level of families.
We need to distinguish
carefully between cooperative
arrangements, communal arrangements
and collective
arrangements. The latter will
too thoroughly dissolve
distinctions between the public and
private.
Cooperative
and communal ways of living and
raising
children, on the

other hand, are typical alternatives
modes of private
householding, and what we need is a
proliferation, or at
least a legitimation, of alternatives,
what we need, in
general, is to reduce normalizing
pressures as far as

possible by supporting people better in
their own efforts
to live in a multitude of ways. At
this time many

*************
Books, 1973), pp. 135-141.

^Interestingly enough, the changes I recommend at the
level of families are a lot like the recommendations
of
Barrett and Mcintosh. Their specific ideas about what
to
do in the present are excellent; it is their long-term
vision and its assumptions of concordance that I question.
See The Ant i-social Family pp. 131-159.
r

government laws and
employer policies ass.e that
people
live families with one
primary wage earner, with
another
Parent available for full
time day care.
Policy should
neither assume that this
is the case nor try to
make it
so.
one thing that governments
can do is to provide
substantial "child allowancesparents or tax rebates
to households for each
child that is raised there.

-

(Many

governments provide these in
some form already, but they
are not available in the
Unites States. 84 There they

might fare well politically if
they were conceptualized as
social insurance for children. 85
mat ig criticially
important is that they be provided
as a universal

benefit,
not as part of a means tested
welfare program, and that
"household" be defined very broadly.

We also need government subsidies
which make a wide
range of day care programs available
and affordable. One
of the important principles here
(and in general) is that

parental (or guardian) control should be
maximized.
Efforts to help children and their caretakers
should as
far as possible not replicate the bureaucratic,
standardized, professionalized school system.

(We should

On child allowances in Europe, see Harrell R. Rodgers,
The Cost of Huma n Neglect: America's Welfare Failure
(M.E. Sharpe, 1982), p. 106.
85
See Mary Jo Bane, Here To Stav: American Families in the
Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 129.

Jr

•

'

^

also try to reform
the schools tQ
and no„- prof e ssional
and parental
o insteaa
should be directed to
help non . institutional
foras Qf
sharing of care proli
ferate .86 WoQlsey
persuasively that parents
prefer such forms of help,
Tnis
is better for parents
(they prefer it, and it
is, as I
have already said,
certainly fine for children."
People who are poor have
for years used networks
of
caring such as multi-family
households to help share the
meager resources in the
community and to help parents
work.
highly unequal societies,
however, personal
solutions to public problems
tend to perpetuate the
problems, and the networks of
sharing can stand in the way
of the available upward mobility,
even as they remain
essential for maintaining day-to-day
living.
Ranya Rapp
calls this effect "leveling."

^

^

^

m

No one gets ahead because
individual upward mobilitv
can be bought only at the price of
very people who have contributed to cutting off the
one ^survival
Upward mobility becomes a terribly
scarring
experience under these circumstances. 88

86

See the excellent discussion of what is needed
in
Ourselves and Our Children pp. 204-208.
W 1Sey haS shown that P are"ts prefer forms of
day care
f°,
!u
that
keep the responsibility with relatives, friends, or
in the home.
"Pied-Piper Politics," p. 132.
,

88

"Family and Class in Contemporary America,"

p.

179.

^

Matters are often
made worse by
welfare
nr.
y weifa
re programs,
which
act to veaKen or
dissolve these
he y fail to provide
their recipients
to success and make
the* especially vulnerable
to
surveillance and other
actions in violation

^^

of rights

normally enjoyed by
others.89 In general „
elfare heips
set up the poor as
an example for others;
it helps people
marginally (and importantly
1) , but it helps also
to
maintain the systen of
ineguality in which so»e
people are
poor.

This brings us to the
issue of the social and
economic
context in which families
operate.
Much can be done to
improve the welfare system
it could be less
stigmatizing, invasive, and
destructive of actual families
but it will continue to have
serious negative effects
as long as there is a high
degree of structured inequality
and a high cost of living (as
exist for example in the
United States)
Just to give one reason why this
is the
case, in the United States
there are so many people who
are poor, near poor, or seriously
struggling to make ends
meet that any welfare system which
provides adequate

-

-

.

^Colin

C. Blaydon and Carol B. Stack
show
programs fail to take the actual structure how welfare
of poor
nd hous nolds in to account (perhaps in
order to
f
fn?n^!%H
enforce the normal route of upward mobility)
"The
emphasis is on legal relationships, not living
arrangements." See "Income Support Policies
and the
Family," Daedalus 106, no. 2 (Spring
1977), p. 149.
.

payments and does not
seriously deter work would
be
prohibitively expensive."
si-ilarly. day care programs
by themselves can only
have quite lifted results."
To state my po sition
in the fona Qf a generai
we must make what counts
for success in society
compatible
with a variety of householding
arrangements. This means
changes are needed both in
the way work life is structured
and in the way goods are
consumed,
it means, more than
anything else, less inequality,
it means, at a minimum,

full employment.

By "full employment"

I

mean a state of affairs where

there are enough good jobs for
everyone,

what a "good

job" must provide depends on what
social benefits

government provides; the important thing
is that one way
or another people are liberated
from struggling against
each other to avoid or escape all that
now goes with
membership of the lower rungs of society.
Full employment
would increase the tax rolls, save the
goverment money in
benefits that go to the unemployed, increase
the

On the degree of inequality and the cost of living
in
the U.S., see Michael H. Best and William E. Connolly,
The
Politicized Economy, Second Edition (D.C. Heath, 1982),
pp. 49-59, and Harrington, The New American Poverty p!
On the exorbitant cost of any goverment provision* of
88.
adequate income within the confines of the curent system
of inequality, see Harrington's discussion of Nixon's
Family Assistance Plan, The New American Poverty pp. 32r

,

33

•

91 See Woolsey,

"Pied-Piper Politics," p. 143.

bargaining power of all
workers, g ive p eople more
breathing room to he
political or different,
work wonders
in reducing disparities
in income that fall
along racial
and se.ua! lines, and
remove what is probably
the number
one source of stress
for people in families.
employment, especially if
combined with reduced
inequalities at the workplace
and in wealth

mi

and income,

could also lead to new
political coalitions between
the
middle and lower strata of
society
(now closer,

,

and so

considerably alter the balance
of power in the direction
of these groups.
There are a number of reforms
in the workplace that fall
short of full employment but
would still help people in
families.
These include improved parental
leave and sick
pay policies, an atmosphere where
parents could bring

their children to work, and shorter
work days and work
weeks.
Changes in these areas are badly
needed.

But any

such reforms will fail to reach many
unless there are
changes in "the structure of consumption"
and the system
of occupational incentives which are
such a central part
of contemporary western systems of
inequality.

This means on the one hand moving away from
a heavy

reliance on "external" and "individual" incentives
such as
the promise of promotion, the fear of getting fired,
and

the hope of becoming rich.

We need rather to emphasize

internal and shared
incentives, suc h as
fumuing „ ork
and social relationships
and the chance to
contribute »to
so»e collectivity „
ith which one identif ies 92
on the other hand
expanding society's provision
of
"inclusive goods" whioh
are for colleotive
Such goods
mass transit, preventive
health care
are
generally m ore cost-efficient
and are clearly more
egalitarian. 93

^

^

,.

.

-

-

A Note cm Patriarchy

One important objection
that might be made to my
whole
argument is that it fails to
adequately confront the issue
of patriarchy and its links
to the family.
i want

therefore to say a few words about
what

I

see as the

implications of my argument on this
question.
I should say first that
I don't use the word
"patriarchy" myself for several reasons.
For one thing it
refers to a specific idea of political
authority and

legitimacy

-

the rule of fathers

-

which has been put

more or less to rest in the victory of
liberalism over
patriarchal ism. More importantly for me it

implies a very

total claim

—

that human life is uniformly marked by the

rule of men over women.

92 Best

I

think this gives too little

and Connolly, The Politicized Economy

93 Best and
Connolly, The Politicized Economy

r

,

p

.

p.

6 4.
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M

credit to „o,„en and
is not the case.
perhaps most
importantly, ..patriarchy"
to dm i»pl ie s that
the
subjection of wo»en is
due to the rule by
and ascendency
of m en.
Thi s ! thin k
insufficiently aCnowiea.es
the wa y
"the social construction
of gender- creates
"Men- as well
as "ween,.- Thus
whUe
benefit
of wo»en (although
it is also to their
disadvantage in
ways,
and at ti.es »en should
be held accountable
for the subjection of
women, they do not exactly
,

,

,

^^

_

,

"perpetrate" it.

must however say secondly
that, while words are
important, we should not
allow a word quibble to make
us
lose sight of the point.
The modern institution of
family
is indeed centrally
implicated in the process of
normalizing its participants into
a set of gender
categories which disadvantages
and disempowers women
relative to men.
modernity some very old categories
and practices continue still to
be of great harm and
disadvantage to women. And, while some
have faded in
power or been repudiated, there are
new ones,
I

m

m

particular the idealization of "home" in
the mid-

s ° cial COnStrUCtion of g^der,"
see Gayle Rubin,
"Tho
The Traffic in tj
Women: Notes on the ^Political Economy' of
~ e ?'
Toward an Anthropo logy of Wompn e d. by Ranys
r
Reiter (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1975), pp. 157210.
Rubin argues that biological sex is constructed
socially in the form of gender.

;^.

f
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nineteenth century not only
rationalized new forms of
production and consumption,
but also perpretrated new
forms of isolation and
exclusion on
women.

^

This should not lead us
to hastily conclude that
the
subjection of women is
inherently tied to distinctions
such as those between family,
society, and government.
it
stems rather first from the
way those realms are accorded
value and constructed as most
fully the province of one
particular gender (women) and
second in the way that
gender is constructed so as to
make society's valuations
and assignments seem rational,
legitimate and even
desirable. Hegel is not wrong when
he asserts that the
private household can be a locus of
ethical life, but he
is wrong when he claims that this
private version of
community is distinctly secondary to the
mediated ethical
life of state, and he is also wrong
when he argues that
women partake more directly of nature than
men and so are
,

fit more fully for the home.

The first of these two claims is reversed to some
degree
by the philosophy of liberalism, which understands
the

essence of ethical life to be a private matter.

The

second claim, that women are closer to nature, is still
alive and kicking, although under pressure.

Men and women

alike tend to accept the idea that typically male

See Rich, Of Woman Born

,

pp.

46-49.

.
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activities are more r*ni
t-u*. 9 i
cultural,
more world-making and
more
distinct from
om tho<5«a
«^
those of other species
than the typical
activities of women. It
is in keeping with this
that both
family and women are
thought of as closer to
nature, more
immediate, and perhaps even
less uniquely human than
men
and the extra familial
realms of life.
it seems then that
the secondary status of
women has one of its key
props
intact as long as the "natural"
is taken to mean women
more than men and the family
more than society.
The abolition of family is

,

however, not the answer

here.

Instead we need to challenge what
from my
perspective is Hegel's most important
mistaken claim
that a moral concord exists in the
cosmos.
Hegel assumes
that nature provides that which
is needed for ethical
life, and he holds out as a model
for a good society one
free of mere necessity, dirt,
inacessibility of reality to
reason, and ambiguity.
The philosophy of discordance

-

challenges this hope as misguided, and demands
that we
radically problematize nature on the one hand
and reason
on the other.
Should such a problematization take hold in
society, then the assertion that women and family
are

"closer to nature" than men will,

I

think, become less

meaningful and less subjugating to women (whether or not
it disappears altogether)
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The reading of modernity
provided by the philosQphy
Qf
discordance locates the
impetus of tyrannies
Qf
normalization in the
Operatives of growth and heavy
requirements of coordination
of modern institutions
in
the weakening of people's
allegiance to these institutions
and the future they
promise, and in the
philosophies of
concordance which have been
the historical partners
of
modern institutions. Prom
the point of view of
discordance, the modern western
family is an agent of
normalization and a promoter of
concordance, but it is not
exhausted by that description.
If we are to give more
life to, or even merely sustain,
the modern emphasis on
rule by the consent of the
governed, and if we are to
avoid making a mockery of the
modern commitment to the
equal worth of persons, then we
must acknowledge that we
can never universalize the
affluence or achieve the moral
rectitude (and superiority) our order
is now geared
to

pursue,

we need to change our institutions
so that the
future they are building is more worthy
of our allegiance,
and at the same time acknowledge that
no set of social
forms is ever going to fully worthy of
human allegiance.
This historical possibility can only come to
be given

transformations in many of our highly interdependent
institutions and ideas, including those of family.

Struggles at many levels
change, but this does

wUl

^

be

^^^

^

^

^

of modern traditions
is called ror
for- instead
„ we
should hope
to witness a kind of
wholesale
8ale Milt,
shif* a rearrangement
of
elements to accommodate
the loosening of growth
imperatives and the cultural
acknowledgment of the
inevitability of arbitrariness
and justice in any
social
form.
The most complete change
might not be noticed

M

'

as
such: this would be a
transformed understanding of
politics. The operative
ideals of family, discourse
of
the family, f ily poliov>
and actual

„

households

^

some extent displace or
disable the policing of families.
Such policing would, without
thereby coming to an end, be

referred to by some metaphor
which expressed its
impositional and political character,
it would be
contested.

Speaking more broadly, family ideas
and practice would
come to be in and help sustain a
world governed by what
Connolly calls the "institutionalization
of ambiguity."
This means that both discourse and
the day
to day

institutional practice with which it is
bound up would act
to allow, and even enforce, the
acknowledgement of a dark
underside of all our achievements, in such
a world we

would all be regularly reminded of the fact
that neither
the most enlightened application of reason, nor
its most

^^^
^

care f ul attunement
to . larger
can render even our
h i ghest achievements
un ambiguously
legitimate. That at
any

^

,

ontology of discordance.

^

^

^

^

'

^
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